Abstract
Questions of who was allocated land under Zimbabwe's Fast Track land reform programme and how productive the beneficiaries have been are highly controversial. This article presents detailed empirical data on beneficiaries who were small and medium-sized commercial farms (the A2 model) in Goromonzi district, land allocation processes, and land use. Goromonzi District is one of the four districts that share a boundary with Harare, the capital city of Zimbabwe. A questionnaire survey targeting 65 A2 beneficiaries was implemented in 2003, while key informant interviews were done in 2006. Drawing on both primary and official data, the article shows that official criteria for selecting beneficiaries for A2 farms that emphasized the potential to use the land productively were ignored in practice. The institutions responsible for land allocation were captured by members of the ruling party and by representatives of the state security apparatus, and most beneficiaries were drawn from the governing or the local elite. Many lacked sufficient capital to invest meaningfully in commercial agriculture, did not have relevant farming experience, and were unable to put the bulk of their land into production for several years. As a result, in Goromonzi District the impact of Fast Track land reform on commercial agriculture has been negative.
Notes
1Under the Fast Track programme land was redistributed in terms of two main planning models: the A1 model involved small plots for household-based production, and the beneficiaries were to be the generality of the ‘landless’ population of Zimbabwe, while the A2 model involved the sub-division of large scale commercial farms into medium-sized farms, and was intended for would-be black or ‘indigenous’ commercial farmers.
2Used interchangeably with national elites, the term governing elites refers to those who are based either at the national or provincial levels. They are fully employed, occupying top positions in government or within ZANU PF as the then ruling party. In this category are cabinet ministers, former ministers, provincial governors and top officers in the military.
3This study is a PhD thesis undertaken at the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS), School of Government, University of the Western Cape.
4By 2010 around An estimated 16 386 A2 farms were in place by 2009. A2 farms were in existence.
5Department of Agricultural Research and Extension.
6Pseudonyms are used.
7Refer to : 24 percent comprises 18 percent from the Zimbabwe National Army and 6 percent from the Zimbabwe Republic Police and the President's Office
8Refer to : 8.5 percent comprises 3.3 percent from the Zimbabwe Republic Police, 1 percent from the Air Force of Zimbabwe and 4.2 percent from the Zimbabwe National Army.
9Pseudonyms are used here.
10See footnote 7.
11More recent data on land utilization is not readily available.
12 http://allafrica.com/stories/201108151221.html; downloaded 25 August 2011.