Abstract
The article is based on Professor Lieven's recent book, Pakistan: a hard case. He starts by contrasting British and American attitudes, emphasising that Pakistan is far more important to Britain than Afghanistan as a result of the sheer size of the diaspora. And British officials and soldiers spent decades dealing with the North-West Frontier. They would not have been surprised by the shifting loyalties of the tribes, which are simply a fact of life. But the basic point of the book is to explain how the Pakistani system works. Pakistan is a troubled, but not a failing state. It is tougher than we think. But the very reasons for its toughness inhibit change. The military are over-powerful and the tax system is grossly inadequate. Cooperation over the terrorist threat to the West is good, but Afghanistan is another story. Pakistan is making its calculation on the basis of a western withdrawal, which would be welcomed by the average Pakistani. At some point the West will need to cut a deal with the Taliban and only Pakistan can get them to the table.