THE BRI IN MALAYSIA’S PORT SECTOR: DRIVERS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE

Abstract

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been characterised as a large-scale initiative to boost the movement of goods and services, capital, and people from China to Southeast Asia and beyond. Transport and logistics are a key aspect of this enterprise, with many projects focussing on railways, road networks, and ports receiving priority attention. However, BRI-related initiatives are often cast in unitary terms, with agency and autonomy almost uniquely ascribed to China-based firms and funders, and very little attributed to host country agents or their interests. Since 2013, Malaysia has received substantial inflows of BRI-related funds for infrastructure, particularly railways and ports. The Kuantan Port Expansion on Peninsular Malaysia's East Coast and the Melaka Gateway on its West Coast are two port-centred development projects associated with the BRI. Begun at the same time, these initiatives are similarly structured, as joint ventures linking large China-based state-owned enterprises with local players. Despite their similarities, these two projects have followed vastly different trajectories. While the Kuantan Port Expansion is proceeding according to schedule, the Melaka Gateway lies mired in delays and controversy. Through comparing and contrasting these two projects, this article will explore how – despite China's financial and political influence – host country actors can and do oppose, subvert, and even veto infrastructure initiatives perceived as inimical to their interests.

Keywords:

• Malaysia
• Belt and Road Initiative
• China
• Infrastructure
• Political Economy
• BRI

Notes

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50 Similarly, a disputed wall surrounding Alliance Steel was lowered while the company’s contribution to the Malaysian economy, in terms of employment was highlighted. Ong Han Sean, ‘Alliance Steel agrees to lower height of the great wall’. The Star, September 5, 2018, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2018/09/05/alliance-steel-agrees-to-lower-height-of-the-great-wall (accessed 14 July 2021).

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78 According to Camba’s classification, government-linked corporations should be classified as part of the national political elite. We make a distinction between wholly government-owned corporations such as Khazanah Nasional which we classify as part of the political elite, and publicly-listed corporations that are majority government-owned, which we classify as part of the national economic elite.

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80 World Bank, Crafting Malaysia’s National Port Strategy, p. 63.

81 One of KAJD’s shareholders, Dato’ Sri Yahya bin Hamid, is a member of Malaysia’s largest political party, United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), and was a local assemblyman in the state of Penang in the 1990s. However, he has never held an apex position in the party’s hierarchy, nor has he held national-level office. Consequently, he is not classified as a member of the national political elite.

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83 Beyond Tanjung Bruas and Melaka Gateway, there is an additional port operating on the border of Melaka and Negri Sembilan. Kuala Linggi is a proposed RM 12.5 billion expansion of the existing port into Kuala Linggi International Port which will offer services such as storage, repair, and refuelling to very large tankers. The project has ostensible support from Chinese players and the current port operator. ‘With RM 12.5b port, Malacca eyes slice of shipping giant Singapore’s pie’. Business Times, November 23, 2016, https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/with-rm125b-port-malacca-eyes-slice-of-shipping-giant-singapores-pie (accessed 14 July 2021).

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93 Suhli Azman, ‘Melaka Gateway remains on track’.

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98 RSN Murali, ‘Melaka Takes over Zoo and Birdpark’. The Star, October 2, 2018, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2018/10/02/melaka-takes-over-zoo-and-aviary-park (accessed 14 July 2021).

99 Companies Commission of Malaysia, ‘Company Charges: KAJ Development Sdn Bhd’. August 13, 2020, https://www.ssm.com.my/Pages/Buy_Corporate_Information/e-Info.aspx (accessed 14 July 2021).

100 See for example, Port Klang’s expansion plans and the planned expansion of Penang Port. Zunaira Saieed, ‘Westports Expected to Spend RM10bil on expansion’. The Star, February 8, 2020, https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2020/02/08/westports-expected-to-spend-rm10bil-on-expansion (accessed 14 July 2021); Audrey Dermawan, ‘Big Plans ahead for Penang Port’. New Straits Times, January 12, 2020, https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2020/01/555922/big-plans-ahead-penang-port (accessed 14 July 2021).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Francis E. Hutchinson

Francis E. Hutchinson is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Malaysia Studies Programme at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore. He is Managing Editor of The Journal of Southeast Asian Economies and has published on decentralization, federalism, and sub-national economic development in Malaysia, Indonesia, and India. Email: [email protected]

Tham Siew Yean

Professor Tham Siew Yean is a Visiting Senior Fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore. She has served as a consultant to national and international agencies, including the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank Institute.