The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan and the Shaping of National Identities in the Second World War

Abstract

This article explores the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP), the RAF's major scheme for training airmen during the Second World War. Through this training programme, the dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand provided an indispensable contribution to the generation of British air power, a necessary condition for eventual victory. The article first considers the precise ways in which the BCATP extended British air strength, through an analysis of the output of graduates in the UK and the dominions. This is followed by an examination of how the governments of Australia and Canada attempted to ensure the continued national identification of their personnel once these airmen were serving within the RAF, reflecting the increasing political independent-mindedness of the dominions. Although Canada pursued a bolder and more successful policy of ‘Canadianization’, the mixed reception that this initiative received from airmen demonstrated the fact that the importance of national identification to Canadian airmen in Europe varied widely depending on individual experiences; indeed, national political currents were moving ahead of any broad consensus among servicemen.

Acknowledgements

This article is based on two conference papers presented at the Centre for the Study of Modern Conflict, University of Edinburgh, June 2012, and at Aarhus University, Denmark, November 2012. I would like to thank Professor Ashley Jackson and Steve Marti for their comments on this article. I am particularly grateful to Professor David Reynolds for his patient and insightful advice on earlier drafts.

Notes

[1] For just a few examples of the debate over the bombing offensive, see Cox, ‘Setting the Historical Agenda’, 161–69; Edgerton, Britain's War Machine, 283–87; O'Brien, ‘East vs. West’, 89–113; Overy, Air War, 117–23; Peden, Arms, Economics, 169–74; Tooze, Wages of Destruction, 648–50, 671; Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive, 10, 288; and Weinberg, World at Arms, 151, 418–20.

[2] Recent examples tackling this omission in the historiography include Jackson, The British Empire; and Stewart, A Very British Experience.

[3] For example, the BCATP is literally only a footnote in Hastings, Bomber Command, 142; it features once in Overy, Air War, 143, within a single paragraph on British air training; in Connelly, Reaching for the Stars, 11, 65, the scheme warrants just three sentences; and it receives less than two pages of coverage out of almost 700 in Terraine's comprehensive tome, The Right of the Line, 257–58. In the latter book the massive numerical importance of imperial aircrews is acknowledged, but in several histories men from the dominions are referenced almost entirely in the context of unruliness and ill-discipline. Connelly, Reaching for the Stars, 110; Hastings, Bomber Command, 295; and Murray, War in the Air, 24.

[4] Although this article is limited to assessing initiatives from dominion governments to promote national identity and how these were received by airmen, particularly in Canada, further discussion of ‘Britishness' and its importance to the UK and the men in imperial armed forces can be found in Rose, Which People's War?; and Webster, Englishness and Empire.

[5] For instance, Hatch praises the Mackenzie King government's handling of the BCATP identity negotiations, whereas Dunmore and Carter considered Canadian success to be more tempered. Hatch, Aerodrome of Democracy, 24–26; Dunmore and Carter, Reap the Whirlwind, 38. Criticism of Australian wartime governments is much fiercer, with McCarthy entitling his study of the BCATP A Last Call of Empire and Stephens asserting that young Australians were supplied to the RAF as little more than ‘cannon-fodder’. Stephens, Royal Australian Air Force, 60.

[6] Golley, Aircrew Unlimited; Hatch, Aerodrome of Democracy; and Marshall, ‘British Commonwealth Air Training Plan’.

[7] See, for instance, Conrad, Training for Victory; Evans, ‘Empire Air Training Scheme’.

[8] Fedorowich, “‘Caught in the Crossfire’”; Stewart, ‘“Empire Air Training Scheme” Negotiations'.

[9] At the conclusion of hostilities the RAF had 200 squadrons and over 20,000 machines, not to mention a large training establishment. Air Ministry, RAF Flying Training, Air Ministry papers, AIR 10/551, 2, The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA).

[10] Peden, ‘Burden of Imperial Defence’; The Air Ministry unsurprisingly suggests that the RAF was performing a much wider set of roles in this period, but still places imperial policing as the primary one. Air Ministry, RAF Flying Training, AIR 10/551, 7, TNA.

[11] Some Dominion men were already serving directly under the RAF including over 500 New Zealanders and almost 450 Canadians. Hatch, Aerodrome of Democracy, 5; and McIntyre, New Zealand Prepares for War, 245–46.

[12] Prime Minister to Dominions, 26 Sept. 1939, Cabinet papers, CAB 21/499, TNA.

[13] Memorandum—‘Re: Establishment by the British Government of training school of airmen on Canadian territory’, 11 Sept. 1936, MG 26 J4, Mackenzie King papers, vol. 151 file 1274, microfilm, C109410, Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC); ‘The Imperial-Flying-School-In-Canada Idea’, L.C. Christie, 19 June 1938, Office of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs papers, vol. 755 file 243, LAC.

[14] The USA trained 16,050 men, Southern Rhodesia 10,107 and South Africa 26,107. Statistics from Air Ministry, RAF Flying Training, Appendix No.3, Analysis, by Air Forces, of the Total Output of Qualified Aircrew, AIR 10/551, 279–80, TNA.

[15] Dunmore, Wings for Victory, 35; and Stewart, ‘“Empire Air Training Scheme” Negotiations'. The RAAF narration of the scheme points specifically to the role of Stanley Bruce, see Empire Air Training Scheme, Historical Review, Department of Air, AWM138, 1, 2, Australian War Memorial (hereafter AWM); for Massey's role, see Hillmer, ‘Vincent Massey’.

[16] Report of Lord Riverdale's Mission to Canada, AIR 20/340, TNA.

[17] Canberra's direct pleas to Ottawa over the distribution of Canada's billion dollar gift and for a morale-boosting ground contingent as Japan advanced south in 1942 were both deflected by referring the Australian government to London. King made repeated reference in his diary to fighting alongside the UK rather than for the empire, on one occasion explicitly stating that the logical position for Canada was ‘at the side of Britain, and not to begin to play the role of those who want Empire war’. King diary, 4 Dec. 1940, MG26 J13 series, Mackenzie King papers, LAC.

[18] For more on the diplomatic relationship, see Baxter and Stewart, Diplomats at War; Stewart, Empire Lost. See also the special issue on dominion high commissioners in London during the Second World War, edited by Fedorowich, in The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 40, no. 1 (2012).

[19] Stewart, ‘“Empire Air Training Scheme” Negotiations'.

[20] Report of Lord Riverdale's Mission to Canada, AIR 20/340, TNA.

[21] British high commissioner to Canada, Sir Gerald Campbell, reported home scathingly on the Canadian attitude after negotiations were concluded, describing King as ‘the narrowest of narrow Canadian nationalists’. Eden deemed the report to be ‘sharp, even bitter in tone’, probably due to Campbell and King's personal encounters, but still true to the difficulties in Anglo-Canadian relations under the King government. Chamberlain concluded it likely that the report, ‘sharp though it is … does not exaggerate’. Prime Minister's Office papers, PREM 1/397, TNA.

[22] Campbell to Eden, 19 Dec. 1939, Prime Minister's Office papers, PREM 1/397, TNA.

[23] On 28 September King wrote that he had ‘seen nothing which appealed more generally to the Cabinet as a whole in any proposal that has been made’, adding that he personally found that ‘the more I think of the British proposal … the better I think it is'. King diary, 28 Sept. 1939, MG26 J13 series, Mackenzie King papers, LAC.

[24] Memorandum re interview between British Air Mission and Committee of Cabinet in Prime Minister's Office, 31 Oct. 1939, MG 27, III B 20, C.D. Howe papers, vol. 52, LAC; King diary, 31 Oct. 1939, MG26 J13 series, Mackenzie King papers, LAC.

[25] Campbell to Eden, 1 Nov. 1939, DO 35/1071/2, TNA.

[26] King first recorded the ‘railroading taken for granted style which Riverdale adopted’, in what basically amounted to a British ‘recruiting scheme from the Dominions'; on 31 October he said after hearing the fuller proposals that it ‘was a sort of taken-for-granted attitude that it was our duty and obligation, and that the part of the mission was only to tell what we would be expected to do’. King diary, 17, 31 Oct. 1939, MG26 J13 series, Mackenzie King papers, LAC.

[27] The Australian negotiating team did indicate in one memorandum that Australia would be happy to attempt all of its training domestically—effectively a threat to withdraw from negotiations—if certain conditions were not satisfied. Despite complete withdrawal from talks being considered in Canberra, however, the importance of imperial unity and a lack of domestic equipment precluded this from being a serious option. Fairbairn to UK, New Zealand and Canada delegations, 22 Nov. 1940, AA1966/5, 326, National Archives of Australia (hereafter NAA).

[28] Both signed a separate agreement with the UK before departing. Campbell to Whiskard, 17 Dec. 1939, AA1966/5, 326, NAA.

[29] King approached Tweedsmuir to ‘have a word’ with Campbell after the high commissioner had upset him, and later to speak to another member of the British negotiating team, Great War veteran Air Marshal Brooke-Popham. King had taken an immediate dislike to Brooke-Popham and the latter further angered the Canadian premier by disagreeing with some of his proposals. King happily reported following Tweedsmuir's requested intervention that Brooke-Popham ‘looked indeed as if he had been spanked. His face was very red and his manner very crushed.’ King, 1 Nov., 16 Dec. 1939, MG26 J13 series, Mackenzie King papers, LAC.

[30] Surprisingly no official name was discussed or settled upon during the plan's negotiations, leaving it to be given various titles in different countries—for instance the Joint Air Training Plan (JATP) and the Empire Air Training Scheme (EATS)—not to mention being referred to by many different names in official documents. This unfortunate situation was partially resolved when the scheme was renegotiated and extended in 1942, with the name British Commonwealth Air Training Plan being agreed upon for the dominion elements and Combined Training Organisation (CTO) as an all-inclusive term (including RAF schools in Canada outside the BCATP). The final resolution on the BCATP name came in February 1943, when it was decided that CTO was an unimaginative acronym, too easily confused with the chief treasury officer, and thus all training in these three dominions subsequently fell under the name BCATP. For problems with the lack of an official title and the various forms used by the dominions see Dominions Office papers, DO 35/1081/1, TNA; Organization & Establishment—Designations and Abbreviations CTO, JATP, BCATP & CTE, RCAF papers, vol. 3214, LAC.

[31] The proportion of dominion men to Britons was even more impressive, since men from many nationalities flew for and fell under the ‘RAF’ classification. This included almost 9,000 flyers from the following occupied European countries alone, namely Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Greece, Poland and Yugoslavia. Further RAF manpower came from Allies (such as the USA), other occupied countries (like Norway) and the empire (for instance, from India and the West Indies).

[32] This statement was part of a message sent via the American delegation to the 1942 Allied Air Training Conference held in Ottawa. It was well received in Canada by the government and press alike, going on to inspire the title of one study of the BCATP. Hatch, Aerodrome of Democracy; excerpt from the Citizen, 19 May 1942, Air Training Conference, May 1942—Press Clippings, RCAF papers, vol. 3528, LAC.

[33] Another was the exchange of ideas as four air forces worked closely to coordinate intense training in widely varied conditions. For Commonwealth air forces adopting a New Zealand education initiative, see AIR 18/15/29, Archives New Zealand (hereafter ANZ).

[34] In addition 50,000 acres of land were turfed or grassed. Construction contracts peaked in 1942, with the Canadian government having signed more than 1,000 such agreements worth over $80 m. Mechanical strength also grew immensely. In September 1939 the RCAF possessed 191 airframes and 267 engines, whereas by 1944 this was 11,000 airframes and 24,700 engines. Final Report of the Chief of the Air Staff to the Members of the Supervisory Board, Military, 1939–48, MG 27 III B II, J. L. Ralston papers, vol. 39, LAC.

[35] Cost in Canadian dollars. Hayter, ‘History of the Creation of the BCATP’.

[36] Report of Lord Riverdale's Mission to Canada, AIR 20/340, TNA.

[37] Air Ministry, RAF Flying Training, AIR 10/551, 79, TNA.

[38] In January 1943 a table was produced by the Air Ministry based on rates of effort and wastage in Bomber Command. The heavy bomber figures, for a single operational tour, were: killed or missing, 54 per cent; prisoner of war, 25 per cent; wounded 5 per cent; free and uninjured 16 per cent. Air Ministry, RAF Flying Training, AIR 10/551, 230, TNA. At the end of the war 120,000 men had served with Bomber Command, of whom 55,573 died, 9,838 were shot down and captured alive, with a further 8,403 wounded. Burleigh, Moral Combat, 482; Webster and Frankland provide casualty statistics by commonwealth nationality in Strategic Air Offensive, 286.

[39] The RFC was the British Army's air section until it merged with the Royal Naval Air Service to form the independent RAF on 1 April 1918, following General Smuts' committee's report on air power.

[40] This was despite 21,000 Canadians alone serving with the British air services in the war of 1914–18. Douglas, Official History, 193.

[41] Power to King, 23 June 1941, BCATP (General File) Part 2, Department of External Affairs papers, vol. 6287 file part [1.2], LAC.

[42] That the names involved were a Canadian (Ralston) and a Briton (Sinclair) is indicative of the stronger Canadian push over the recognition of dominion identity in the scheme. For the terms of the agreement, see Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, appendix ‘I’, 562–63.

[43] The proportions agreed were 25 RCAF; 18 RAAF; six RNZAF. In fact, 17 RAAF squadrons and seven RNZAF squadrons were produced. Further problems arose over who was to pay for these new squadrons, but they were more easily resolved. DO 35/1084/1, TNA.

[44] Stephens, Going Solo, 4.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Clark, ‘The Empire Air Training Scheme’. New Zealand had a similar experience— by 1 July 1944 80 per cent of its trained aircrew were serving with the RAF in all theatres of war, Mitchell, New Zealanders, 9.

[47] Text of Mackenzie King's address, Campbell to Air Ministry, 3 June 1942, AIR 2/8181, TNA.

[48] Canada also pushed for a Group of fighter squadrons, but the need for fighter flexibility—to operate from multiple bases—precluded this. Instead the RAF committed itself to manning three bases with Canadian ground and administrative personnel, letting Canadian fighter squadrons operate from them whenever possible. Draft Parliamentary Statement, 4 June 1942, J. C. Ilsley's departmental papers, vol. 2724, LAC; ‘Appendix G’ of Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Chairmen's Committee, 26 Aug. 1942, Air Training Conference 1942—Conference Diary Minutes, RCAF papers, vol. 5389, LAC.

[49] Bruce urged his government to give air personnel to the UK only ‘on condition of retaining identity as Royal Australian Air Force’ before the BCATP was conceived. Bruce to Menzies, 15 Sept. 1939, A5954, 582/9, NAA.

[50] During negotiations Menzies told Fairbairn that preserving Australian identity was ‘of first rate importance … we know that you will continue to press this matter’. Menzies to Fairbairn, 22 Nov. 1939, AA1966/5, 326, NAA; See also ‘Retention of Australian Identity of Members of the RAAF under the Empire Air Scheme References' for a list of Cabinet statements, Nov.–Dec. 1939, on the central importance to Canberra of RAAF squadrons manned by Australians retaining national identity. A5954, 236/5, NAA.

[51] In an Australian narrative on RAF and RAAF air training, Australians going to the RAF in the interwar period were said to have ‘lost their Australian identity on arrival’ in the UK. Air Training Narrative Report, A1966/5, NAA. Australian identity and the RAF were apparently incompatible because, in Australia, it was held that the ‘RAF means the air force of the Mother Country’. Horner, High Command, 44–45.

[52] As in the infiltration of existing RAF units with sufficient numbers of Australians to become RAAF designated squadrons. Later it was RAAF Article XV squadrons in which Australia was poorly represented that needed to be ‘infiltrated’. The term was somewhat adopted as the technical description of the process for bringing in new men to an existing squadron—indeed on at least one occasion it was employed by Canadian officials in discussions—but strikingly Australia never got beyond its use to a larger conception of its aims. See for instance A5954, 236/5, NAA; for Canadian use of the term, by Air Vice-Marshal Breadner, Chief of the Air Staff, see Breadner to Prime King, 12 Oct. 1940, RCAF Graduates of BCATP attached to RAF—Article 15 of BCATP Agreement, RCAF papers, vol. 5178, LAC.

[53] Menzies to Bruce, 26 March 1940, A5954, 236/5, NAA.

[54] See, for instance, the government response to domestic critics, reported in The Herald, 22 July 1941, A5954, 236/5, NAA.

[55] Australians and New Zealanders were to be dispersed widely among Canadian schools– particularly in the most densely populated areas—so that their presence would have the maximum impact, but never placed in groups of fewer than 15 men to combat homesickness. Deschamps to DEA, 17 April 1940, 20 May 1940, A3095, 1/1/10 Part 1, NAA; Report of the Chief of the Air Staff to the Members of the Supervisory Board, 6 May 1940, AIR 1/720, 29/1/11 Part 1, ANZ.

[56] Canberra stated that the Air Ministry had agreed to man the proposed 18 BCATP RAAF squadrons ‘with 100 per cent Australian personnel when the personnel are available’, Menzies to Bruce, 12 June 1941, AA1966/5, 326, NAA. On Australian ground staff being on appointments duty to help protect Australian interests, see Department of Defence Minute for the Prime Minister, 25 June 1941, AA1966/5, 326, NAA.

[57] A5954, 236/8, NAA.

[58] Kellway to Glasgow, 4 April 1942, A3095, 1/1/16 Part 1, NAA; Section 9, 1942 Discussions and Commitments, in Notes on the Empire Air Training Scheme Negotiations, AA1966/5, 326, NAA.

[59] Australia called for a fairer distribution of imperial air power and the War Cabinet overruled its air staff, with the latter supporting the position that Australia should continue to send recruits to Canada. Australia recommenced with its North American training obligations in February but revised its overall air contribution, including terminating its limited participation in the Southern Rhodesian air training scheme. A5954, 236/11, NAA.

[60] The UK initially proposed four-party discussions to be held in London over the issue. The Canadian government promptly responded that the discussions were to be bilateral only and held in Ottawa. If an agreement was satisfactorily reached in Ottawa, Canada was happy to meet for four-party talks in London. When a new agreement on identity was reached at the Ottawa Air Training Conference of 1942, it was first made between Canada and the UK, with the proviso that it could be extended to Australia and New Zealand if they ‘should so desire’, highlighting how the Pacific dominions were excluded from the process. Eden to Skelton and reply, 24 Feb., 5 March 1940, BCATP (General File) Part 2, Department of External Affairs papers, vol. 6287 file part [1.2], LAC; Appendix ‘T’ of Minutes of Third Meeting of Chairmen's Committee held 26 May 1942, Air Training Conference 1942—Minutes of Formal Committees, RCAF papers, vol. 5389, LAC.

[61] King wrote of the Australian delegation leader Fairbairn, upon the latter's arrival to initially negotiate the scheme in Ottawa, that the ‘impression I got from … him was that he was … prepared to do anything the British might wish’. King diary, 1 Nov. 1939, MG26 J13 series, Mackenzie King papers, LAC.

[62] Bruce to Menzies, 1 and 8 Feb. 1940, A5954, 236/5, NAA.

[63] It was Balfour who expressed the commonwealth element as a discussion of ‘family’ problems. Citizen, 22 May 1942, Air Training Conference, May 1942—Press Clippings, RCAF papers, vol. 3528, LAC.

[64] Ottawa Air Training Conference, May—June, 1942, Memorandum, 16 April 1943, 7–8, Air Training Conference 1942—Historical Record, RCAF papers, vol. 5388, LAC.

[65] Evans, ‘The Empire Air Training Scheme’, AWM. The most significant factors were the sheer size of Canada's role in the scheme and Australia's dominant interest in the Pacific Theatre.

[66] For the Air Ministry using the operational risk argument, see Bruce to Fadden, 21 May 1941, A5954, 236/5, NAA; for Australian acceptance of it, see ‘Notes for Empire Air Training Scheme Conference in London—April, 1940, EATS', A5954, 236/5, NAA. For Canada, see Massey to Skelton, 24 Dec. 1940, RCAF Graduates of BCATP attached to RAF—Article 15 of BCATP Agreement, RCAF papers, vol. 5178, LAC.

[67] It was estimated that aircrews constituted only 15 percent of fighter squadrons and 16 per cent of bomber squadrons. See ‘The Empire Air Scheme: What It Involves and How It Increases Australian Security’, Press Statement, A5954, 236/5, NAA. In a recruitment drive, Ralston stated of ground-crews that, though ‘their efforts may not be clothed with a glamorous sheen, nor fully appreciated by persons without knowledge of aeronautics, the flying personnel give them the credit that warms many a heart with pride in the performance of a difficult task’. ‘RCAF and Air Training Scheme 1940', Speeches by J .L. Ralston 1923–48, MG 27 III B II, J .L. Ralston papers, vol. 166, LAC.

[68] King acknowledged the compromise in a draft speech on the Ralston-Sinclair Agreement, noting that the ‘Canadian air crew output of the Air Training Plan will eventually exceed by many thousands the number of pilots, gunners and observers required to man the twenty-five RCAF squadrons provided for under the supplementary agreement. On the other hand, the United Kingdom will be furnishing not only the ground crews for these squadrons but the necessary personnel for the administration and lines of communication which call for many thousands of men to be furnished by the United Kingdom.’ Skelton to Massey, 29 Jan. 1941, BCATP (General File) Part 2, Department of External Affairs papers, vol. 6287 file part [1.2], LAC.

[69] Power to Philpott, 2 Feb. 1944, Box 58 II, Ministerial Files ‘D’ Series, D1028–D1029, Power papers, LAC.

[70] This was despite aircrew numbers correlating with a larger number of squadrons. Ralston to King and Power, undated, BCATP (General File) Part 2, Department of External Affairs papers, vol. 6287 file part [1.2], LAC.

[71] An example of this is Bruce to Commonwealth Government, 11 Dec. 1942, A2671, 4/1943, NAA.

[72] Secretary of State for External Affairs to Canadian High Commissioner in the UK, 29 Jan. 1941, BCATP (General File) Part 2, Department of External Affairs papers, vol. 6287 file part [1.2], LAC.

[73] Air Vice-Marshal Carnegie to Chief of the Air Staff, RCAF, 16 July 1945, Training of RAF Personnel: Post BCATP Period, RCAF papers, vol. 5264, LAC. Overproduction of aircrews had become an issue as early as November 1943, when Malcolm MacDonald confirmed, with considerable embarrassment, shortly after the UK encouraged the scheme's expansion, that air training needed to be reduced for fighter pilots. The UK requested that RAF schools in Canada, rather than BCATP schools, should be closed, mainly to release British ground-crews for operational squadrons. Power to Robertson, 13 Nov. 1943 and following Aide Memoire, BCATP (General File) Part 4, Department of External Affairs papers, vol. 6287 file part [1.2], LAC.

[74] Power was able to announce in the Canadian House of Commons in 1944 that Canada had trained over 114,000 men in ground trades, although he did crucially remark that this almost met its requirements ‘for training establishments and for operational requirements in the western hemisphere’ (emphasis added). The burden outside Canada remained largely the UK's. House of Commons Debates, 29 Feb. 1944, recorded in BCATP (General File) Part 4, Department of External Affairs papers, vol. 6287 file part [1.2], LAC.

[75] He added that this ‘discussion has been going on for a year now, and one can only hope that it is not hindering the development of Empire air strength. The Canadians seem to be very difficult.’ Minute Sheet, minute 19, 7 Feb. 1942, A1196, 12/501/75, NAA.

[76] Over 50 per cent of Bomber Command aircrews were killed, and just 25 per cent escaped the war having evaded death, capture or serious injury. Murray, War in the Air, 24. See also note 38.

[77] Francis, The Flyer, 37–38.

[78] Power made the statement on national prestige, while Air Vice-Marshal Edwards (RCAF)—a key figure in the drive for ‘Canadianization’—added the operational proviso, to which Power agreed. Minutes of a Meeting of the Chairmen's Committee, 23 May 1942, Air Training Conference 1942—Conference Diary Minutes, RCAF papers, vol. 5389, LAC.

[79] Canada noted examples of its Article XV RCAF squadrons being equipped with obsolescent aircraft. On losses, Power stated in a letter to King that the prime minister should visit the Canadian No. 6 Bomber Group while in the UK, explaining that he was ‘convinced that the Canadian people would appreciate your going up to see these boys at their battle stations and before they take off for their mission to the Continent. Their casualties, as you know, have been heavy and they have kept the name of Canada in the forefront for a long time now.’ Other accounts portray Canada's 6 Group as an ill-disciplined collective, with rates of venereal disease five times higher than any other Group in Bomber Command, which was nevertheless rewarded with the best facilities for political reasons. BCATP Agreement Amended Appendix IV, 19, Air Training Conference 1944—Agenda, RCAF papers, vol. 5390, LAC; Power to King, 25 April 1944, CG Power—Correspondence, Correspondent sub-series, Box 6, CG Power, I Correspondence (c) King, Right Hon. WLM, Charles Power papers, Queen's University Archives (QUA). An example of a negative portrayal is Hastings, Bomber Command, 214, 235.

[80] ‘[T]he Canadian Government had a moral responsibility in regard to their [Canadian airmen] general conditions and welfare while serving with the RAF … the connection between them and their Home Government must be more than a gesture, particularly in regard to ranks below commissioned rank.’ Notes of a meeting held at the Air Ministry, London, 8 July 1941, BCATP (General File) Part 2, Department of External Affairs papers, vol. 6287 file part [1.2], LAC.

[81] This was attributed to Power in the Journal, 23 May 1942, Air Training Conference, May 1942—Press Clippings, RCAF papers, vol. 3528, LAC.

[82] These results are questionable, however, because the HQ was known to favour the policy and to be widely disliked by those who preferred imperial association in squadrons, possibly meaning these men would have been excluded from the survey process. Luk to Power, 31 May 1943, CG Power, Box 58 II, Ministerial Files ‘D’ Series, D1028–D1029, Canadianization of the RCAF, Power papers, LAC; Minutes of a Meeting of the Chairmen's Committee, 23 May 1942, Air Training Conference—Conference Diary Minutes, RCAF papers, vol. 5389, LAC.

[83] For instance, in the ‘Formation of All-Canadian Squadrons' report, 14 Dec.1942, it was claimed that ‘[n]umerically, there is not much to choose between the “ayes” and the “noes” encountered by censorship on this subject’. A.I.S. Report, Box 58 II, Ministerial Files ‘D’ Series, D1028-D1029, Power papers, LAC.

[84] A. Lower to C. Power, 24 March 1943, Morale and Morale Surveys—Policy, RCAF papers, vol. 3541, LAC.

[85] ‘Comment on this subject appears in many uses to be strongly influenced by what the writer hopes to gain or fears he will lose by the establishment of all-Canadian Squadrons, but the aircrew man who has put in a number of operational hours with a mixed crew regards the proposal as a serious menace to his personal well-being and to the progress of the war; the man whose chances of promotion while attached to the RAF appear to him to be remote, looks to Canadianization as his Shangri-La.’ ‘Formation of All-Canadian Squadrons' report, 14 Dec. 1942, A.I.S. Report, Box 58 II, Ministerial Files ‘D’ Series, D1028–D1029, Power papers.

[86] It was not uncommon for airmen to contrast the political class unfavourably with vaunted colleagues. Francis, The Flyer, 39–40.

[87] Power also argued that this lack of press attention would undermine recruiting efforts and harm Canada's national pride. Meeting at the Air Ministry, London, 8 July 1941. BCATP (General File) Part 2, Department of External Affairs papers, vol. 6287 file part [1.2], LAC.

[88] For the censor's report, see A.I.S. Report, Box 58 II, Ministerial Files ‘D’ Series, D1028–D1029, Power papers, LAC.

[89] These factors were easily emphasised by perceived and actual cultural differences. Edwards argued that Canadians ‘liked to hear a Canadian voice in religious services; they would never accept cricket for football’. It was perhaps fortunate then that football could form part of the physical training of aircrews. Reported in the Citizen, 21 May 1942, Air Training Conference, May 1942—Press Clippings, RCAF papers, vol. 3528, LAC; Marshall, ‘British Commonwealth Air Training Plan’.