Abstract
The EU's agenda in promoting multilateralism faces a few challenges in the eastward direction. The Caspian Sea basin, which has been acquiring increasing importance for the EU in the context of energy, above all gas, supplies from the Caucasus and Central Asia, represents a complex mix of states with different histories, identities, regimes, centres of gravity and regional ambitions. Unlike the Black Sea basin, where the EU has developed the Black Sea Synergy policy, none of the Caspian littoral states is an EU member and this has led to a lack of EU interest in and commitment to the promotion of multilateralism in the area. Thus, in spite of significant energy security interests, the EU lacks the will, the capacity or the consistency to address regional security issues or promote reform. Indeed, economic interests are inevitably likely to clash with the reform promotion objective.
Notes
1Alieva, “Imperial Legacies: Economics and Conflicts”.
2Gelb, Caspian Oil and Gas: Production and Prospects, http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9652.pdf
3Stulberg and Cosijn, Transatlantic Energy Security and Caspian Basin.
4Paliashvili, “Caspian Basin Delimitation”.
5Hobér, Essays on International Arbitration.
6D. Morgan, “Azerbaijan's Riches Alter the Chessboard”, Washington Post, 4 October 1998.
7Mamedov, “International Legal Status of the Caspian Sea”.
8Zhiltsov, Zonn and Ushkov, Geopolitika Kaspiiskogo Regiona, 73.
9Zhiltsov, “Resources of the Northern Caspian”, http://www.ca-c.org/online/2003/journal_eng/cac-06/14.zhieng.shtml, see also Socor, “Azerbaijan Spearheading Initiative on TransCaspian Pipeline”. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=31531
10Zhiltsov, Zonn and Ushkov. Geopolitika Kaspiiskogo Regiona, 101.
11Fedorov, “Area of Cooperation or Sea of Troubles?”.
12“Caspian Sea Summit Ends with Final Declaration”, China View (online) 17 October 2007, http://www.chinaview.cn, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/17/content_6896114.htm
13Events in Georgia in August 2008 show that this is not the case. See the article by Mikhelidze in this issue, 27–42.
14GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) was conceived in Vienna in 1997, but the four members only signed the organisation's charter in Yalta in 2001. Uzbekistan also signed, but then officially withdrew in 2005. Objectives for cooperation include promoting democratic values, ensuring stable development, enhancing international and regional security and speeding up European integration. In May 2006, it was renamed GUAM Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development, with headquarters in Kiev.
15The Nabucco gas pipeline would connect the Caspian region, Middle East and Egypt with Austria and further on Europe via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. On political issues surrounding the Nabucco gas pipeline project, see L. Alieva, “Nabucco Moves Ahead”, Osservatorio Caucaso (online) 6 March 2009 http://www.osservatoriocaucaso.org/article/articleview/10972/1/211andAlieva, Azerbaijan's Gas Policy, http://www.iss.europa.eu/index.php?id=213
17European Commission, Black Sea Synergy - A new Cooperation Initiative.
18European Commission, Report on First Year of Black Sea Synergy, 1.
19The ENP was meant to regulate relations with the Western states of the former Soviet Union, those of the South Caucasus and Russia, as well as the Maghreb states of the Barcelona Process.
20A. Lobjakas, “EU: Conflict Fears Overshadow South Caucasus Action Plans”, RFE/RL, 29 August 2006.
21Trilateral cooperation promoted by Europe in the regional security of three South Caucasus states, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, similar to that of the three Baltic republics.
22A more detailed comparative analysis of South Caucasus Action Plans can be found in Alieva, “EU and the South Caucasus”, http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/2006/2006_Alieva.pdf
23ICG, “Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus”, 1.
24Celac, Emerson and Tocci, A Stability Pact for the Caucasus.
25The Eastern Partnership, officially launched in Prague on 7 May 2009, includes Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. Belarus participates only at the technical level.
26Such as ‘ENP+’ and ‘Ostpolitik’.
27Tsantoulis, Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership, 3.
28Tassinari, “Unwrapping the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership”, 45–57.
30For a more detailed survey of EU relations with Iran, see Posch, “The European Union and Iran”.
31J. Maresca, “A ‘Peace Pipeline’ to End Nagorno Karabakh Conflict in Caspian Crossroads”, OurWorld (online) 1 (Winter 1995), http://ourworld.compuserve.com/HOMEPAGES/USAZERB/6.htm
32Initially, TRASECA included the three South Caucasus states and the five Central Asian states. Later, it expanded to Ukraine, Moldova, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, thus encompassing both the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions, http://www.traceca-org.org/default.php?l=en
33INOGATE was launched in 1995 as a tool to support the development of cooperation between the EU, Black Sea and Caspian Sea states and neighboring countries in areas such as oil and gas, electricity, renewable energy and energy efficiency, http://www.inogate.org/inogate_programme/about_inogate/inogate-expanded-mandate
34“European Commission to Investigate Controversial BTC Pipeline”, Kurdish Human Rights Project (online), http://www.khrp.org/content/view/96/2/; Tsantoulis, Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership.
35A. Vitale, “The EU Wants to Build an Energy Strategy in the Caspian Region”, Caucaz Europe news (online) 9 Jan 2007, http://www.caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_contenu.php?id=293
36“European Commission to Investigate Controversial BTC Pipeline”, Kurdish Human Rights Project.
37Morningstar, Opportunities for Transatlantic Cooperation in Caspian Region.
38“Benita Ferrero-Waldner: Conducting a Referendum is an Internal Affair of Azerbaijan (in Russian), Day.az (online), 21 January 2009, http://www.day.az/news/politics/144386.html
39A. Lobjakas, “Azerbaijan: EU's Taking Note of Baku Strength”, RFE-RL, 7 November 2006.
40 Commission staff working document accompanying Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, 12.