Delivering the Revolution? Post-uprising Socio-economics in Tunisia and Egypt

Abstract

Two years after the popular mobilisations in Egypt and Tunisia of early 2011, post-uprising authorities, including the Islamist parties that came to power, have failed to deliver on the demands for social justice that triggered those protests. They have responded to past and present socio-economic challenges by adopting measures that are in clear continuity with previous regimes and lacking any coherent long-term vision of economic reform. Indeed, albeit with differences between the two countries, post-uprising authorities, lacking experience and competence, have not fully broken with the old system in reconfiguring power relations within and outside state institutions and have continued to adopt a top-down approach to economic decision-making.

Keywords:

• Egypt
• Tunisia
• post uprising economic policies
• political economy

Notes

¹In Tunisia, the inflation rate as measured by the price consumption index (PCI) increased by 6.0 percent from Jan. 2012 to Jan. 2013 and by 5.1 percent from Jan. 2011 to Jan. 2012 (Institut national de la statique (INS), Indice des prix à la Consommation, January 2013, http://www.ins.nat.tn/communiques/IPC_2013_01.pdf and INS, Note sur l’enquête nationale sur l’emploi 2012, http://www.ins.nat.tn/communiques/IPC_2012_01.pdf, in Arabic). For Egypt, see “Egypt’s Revolution: Egyptians Still Cry for Bread”, Ahram online, 24 January 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/150/63140/Egypt/-January-Revolution/Egypts-revolution-Egyptians-still-cry-for-bread.aspx; World Food Program, “Egyptian Food Observatory”, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/wfp255585.pdf.

²In Egypt, over the last two years, the unemployment rate rose by about 4 percent, from 9 percent in 2010 to 12.7 percent in 2012 (CAPMAS, Labour Force, http://capmas.gov.eg/pepo/Labour%20Force/sdds_lb2_2.pdf, in Arabic). In Tunisia, during the first year following the fall of Ben Ali, the unemployment rate increased from 13 percent in 2010 to 18.3 percent in 2011. Although, there was a slight decrease in total unemployment in 2012, from 18.9 percent in the fourth quarter 2011 to 16.7 percent in fourth quarter 2012 (INS, Note sur l’enquête nationale sur l’emploi 2011 and 2012), these figures are likely to hide growing underemployment and are fraught with inconsistencies (see, for example, “La baisse du chômage: mythe ou réalité?”, La Presse, 7 March 2013).

³“Tunisia: Economic Profile of Ennahda”, Tunisialive, 5 November 2011, http://allafrica.com/stories/201111281920.html. For a general overview of the economic agenda of Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisia, see Saif and Rumman, The Economic Agenda of Islamist Parties.

⁴In Egypt, on 3 July 2013, President Morsi was removed by a military coup after days of popular protests. Backed by popular support, the military suspended the constitution and appointed Adli Mansour, chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court, interim president until next elections are held. As for Tunisia, the country has entered a serious political crisis since the assasination of opposition National Constituent Assembly member Mohamed Brahmi on 25 July 2013. For more details on recent political events in Tunisia and Egypt, see respectively the articles by Guazzone and Pioppi in this issue, 30 and 51.

⁵For Egypt, the analysis goes up to the military coup in July 2013.

⁶Respectively, 30 and 51.

⁷For example, the former finance minister, Samir Radwan, who resigned in mid-July 2011, was appointed by Mubarak at the end of January 2011, while his successor, Hazem Beblawi, was a fervid supporter of the market-oriented agenda pursued by the old regime.

⁸See Pioppi’s article in this issue, 51.

⁹For details of the ministers tied to the previous regime, see “Egypt’s New Economy Ministers: Who’s who”, Ahram online, 3 August 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/49287/Business/Economy/Egypts-new-economy-ministers-Whos-who.aspx.

¹⁰See article in this issue, 51.

¹¹In June 2011, the SCAF rejected the generous package offered by the IMF and the WB in order to avoid conditionality. In January 2012, Ganzouri’s government approached the IMF again, but the parliament’s Islamist majority refused the proposed loan. The FJP was not against borrowing from the IMF, in principle, it merely lamented the lack of transparency and details of the economic plan prepared by the IMF. Morsi reopened talks with the IMF in August 2012.

¹²See the document by the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions, EFITU, Position of Independent Trade Unions towards the International Monetary Fund loan, November 2012, http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/egypt_edlc-efitu_imfstatement_1112.pdf.

¹³See FJP electoral program, http://www.scribd.com/ikhwansocialmedia/d/73955131-FJP-Program-En.

¹⁴A.-H. Al-Sawi, “No Stock-Exchange Tax”, Ikhwanweb, February 2011, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=29623.

¹⁵See for example, “Egypt Brokerages, Investors Voice Opposition to New Stock Market Tax”, Ahram online, March 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/66004/Business/Economy/Egypt-brokerages,-investors-voice-opposition-to-ne.aspx.

¹⁶This means that both buyer and seller pay EGP1 for every EGP1,000 of stocks traded, regardless of how long they are held or whether the transaction represents a profit or a loss.

¹⁷“Shura Council Approves Income Tax Law”, Daily News Egypt, 13 May 2013, http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/05/13/shura-council-approves-income-tax-law/. The previous package of fiscal measures announced by President Morsi in December 2012 amidst growing popular discontent and then presented to the IMF by Qandil’s government in February 2013 proposed widening the income tax exemption level from EGP9,000 to EGP12,000 per year. For a previous version of the fiscal reform package prepared by Qandil for the IMF in November 2012, see “Egypt’s Morsi Raises Sales and Income Taxes, Approves Property Taxes”, Ahram online, 9 December 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/60145/Business/Economy/Egypts-Morsi-raises-sales-and-income-taxes,-approv.aspx.

¹⁸For example, according to the two independent unions, the tax exemption should be raised to EGP18,000 a year (EFITU, Position of Independent Trade Unions).

¹⁹For independent trade unions, see EFITU, Position of Independent Trade Unions; and for the FJP, its election platform, http://www.scribd.com/ikhwansocialmedia/d/73955131-FJP-Program-En.

²⁰Under this new system of smart cards, consumers would receive limited amounts of subsidised fuel, beyond which they will have to pay market prices.

²¹“Egypt Govt Struggles with Ongoing Diesel Fuel Shortages”, Ahram online, 12 February 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/64625/Business/Economy/Egypt-govt-struggles-with-ongoing-diesel-fuel-shor.aspx.

²²Measures implemented during August and September 2012 included: bakeries were provided with easy loans to help them produce higher quality bread; all public bakeries previously closed by the government were reopened and new bakeries opened; home bread delivery was activated by associations in a number of governorates. Nevertheless, bread shortages continued in several governorates. For a critical assessment of Morsi’s measures concerning bread, see the website Morsi Meter, Morsimeter.com.

²³http://www.scribd.com/ikhwansocialmedia/d/73955131-FJP-Program-En, 30.

²⁴See, for example, the position of Nadim Mansour, head of the Egyptian Centre for Economic and Social Rights, “The Wage Conundrum”, Ahram Weekly, 3 May 2012, http://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/29680.

²⁵“Egypt Gov’t Proposes Maximum Wage 36 Times Minimum Wage”, Bikya Masr, 6 Sept. 2011, http://www.masress.com/en/bikyamasr/41378 and EFITU, Position of Independent Trade Unions.

²⁶http://www.scribd.com/ikhwansocialmedia/d/73955131-FJP-Program-En.

²⁷“Egypt Plans Initiative to Tackle Unemployment: State Report”, Ahram online, 30 Sept. 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/54346/Business/Economy/Egypt-plans-initiative-to-tackle-unemployment-Stat.aspx.

²⁸See Paciello, “Youth Exclusion in North African Countries: Continuity or Change?”, http://www.iai.it/pdf/mediterraneo/GMF-IAI/Mediterranean-paper_15.pdf.

²⁹See, for example, “Morsi: Corruption will Never Again Prevail in Egypt”, Ikhwanweb, 5 November 2012, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30354; “FJP’s 2011 Program: Security, Economy, and Corruption as Urgent Issues”, Ikhwanweb, 4 December 2011, and the FJP election platform.

³⁰Mubarak abolished the Port Said duty free zone in 2002 in response to allegations of an assassination attempt by a city resident.

³¹Under Mubarak, the ETUF was the only legal national trade union organisation in Egypt (for more details on it, see Beinin, The Struggle for Worker Rights in Egypt).

³²J. Beinin, “All Unionized and Nowhere to Go”, Sada Journal, 8 January 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/08/all-unionized-and-nowhere-to-go/f04j.

³³Ibid.

³⁴See International Federation of Workers’ Education Associations (IFWEA), “Violations to Trade Unions Freedom during First 100 Days of Mohamed Mursi’s Rule”, 8 October 2012, http://www.ifwea.org/?x103997=337861; J. Beinin, “Workers, Trade Unions and Egypt’s Political Future”, MERIP, 18 January 2013, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero011813.

³⁵See “Labor Leaders Criticize Brotherhood Bill on Trade Union Freedoms”, Egypt Independent, 8 May 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/labor-leaders-criticize-brotherhood-bill-trade-union-freedoms; “Workers’ Movements Unite to Push for Syndicates’ Freedom Law”, Daily News, 15 October 2012, http://www.masress.com/en/dailynews/168827.

³⁶See J. Beinin, “All Unionized and Nowhere to Go”; “Egypt’s Constitution seen to Curtail Labor Rights and Workers Freedoms”, Egypt Independent, 22 January 2013, “http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-constitution-seen-curtail-labor-rights-and-workers-freedoms; “Labor Movement Thrives in the Midst of Unfriendly Legislation”, Egypt Independent, 31 December 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/labor-movement-thrives-midst-unfriendly-legislation.

³⁷“Mubarak Era Tycoons join Egypt President in China”, Ahram online, 28 August 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/51477.aspx.

³⁸In January 2012, the SCAF amended the country’s investment law, giving the government the right to settle disputes with investors who had improperly profited from public funds or property if they returned all the assets in dispute.

³⁹See “Egypt Govt to Facilitate Return of ‘Fleeing’ Businessmen”, Ahram online, 13 February 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/64694/Business/Economy/Egypt-govt-to-facilitate-return-of-fleeing-busines.aspx. “Egypt Eyes $1 bn ‘Reconciliation’ Deal with Fugitive Tycoon Salem”, Ahram online, 9 May 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/71053/Business/Economy/Egypt-eyes-bn-reconciliation-deal-with-fugitive-t.aspx.

⁴⁰“Egyptian Business Development Association Launching New Projects”, Ahram online, 30 July 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egyptian-business-development-association-launching-new-projects.

⁴¹It was through Tawasul, that Hassan Malek engaged in reconciliation with a number of Egyptian businessmen abroad accused of corruption. “In Reconciling with Regime Figures, Officials opt for Quick Cash over Formal Trials”, Egypt Independent, 23 February 2013, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/reconciling-regime-figures-officials-opt-quick-cash-over-formal-trials#sthash.Jgq3Y9cy.dpuf.

⁴²For a detailed analysis of the political performance of the Islamist-led governments, see Guazzone’s article in this issue, 30.

⁴³For the list of ministers, see “Tunisie: Ennahdha prend le pouvoir économique, pour faire quoi?”, Webmanagercenter, 23 Dec. 2011, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/actualite/societe/2011/12/23/114180/opinion-tunisie-ennahdha-prend-le-pouvoir-economique-pour-faire-quoi.

⁴⁴This is frequently denounced by many political and social forces. See, for example, ASECTU (Association Tunisienne des Economistes), “Communiqué”, 25 Feb. 2013, http://www.asectu.org/actualités/69-communiqué; “Politique: Maya Jeribi appelle à rompre avec la politique des quotas”, Webmanagercenter, 25 Feb. 2013, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/actualite/societe/2013/02/25/131584/tunisie-politique-maya-jeribi-appelle-a-rompre-avec-la-politique-des-quotas.

⁴⁵For example, Ennahda’s attempt to extend control over the Central Bank by presenting a bill to the CA granting the prime minister the power to appoint the Central Bank governor, deputy governor and board of directors, was aborted following strong protests from Central Bank personnel (“Mustapha Kamel Nabli: l’homme qu’Ennahdha veut abattre”, Business News, 19 Jan. 2012, http://www.businessnews.com.tn/details_article.php?t=519&a=28861&temp=1).

⁴⁶The Deauville Partnership was launched at the G8 Summit in May 2011 in response to the popular uprisings in Arab countries to financially assist their political transition.

⁴⁷Similar examples can be found in Ennahda’s appointment of the new heads of three major state-run media institutions (January 2012) who formerly held posts close to Ben Ali’s political party.

⁴⁸For details, see “Tunisie: pas d’accord autour du limogeage de Kamel Nabli”, Jeune Afrique, 2 July 2012, http://economie.jeuneafrique.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11748&catid=294.

⁴⁹The 2012 and 2013 budgets, for example, were opened to public consultation with civil society associations (e.g. through the creation of local committees for development, formed by members of the CA, trade unions and local administrations in July 2012; an interactive website devoted to proposals from social forces regarding the 2013 budget launched in October 2012, etc) and discussed and approved by the CA. However, according to a survey conducted by the international organisation, International Budget Partnership, and published in February 2013, there is still scarce transparency in Tunisia regarding budgets, as it is classified 85th out of 100 countries (“La Tunisie classée 85e sur 100 pays en matière de Transparence budgétaire”, Economiste Maghrebin, 2 Dec. 2013, http://www.leconomistemaghrebin.com/2013/02/12/la-tunisie-classee-85eme-sur-100-pays-en-matiere-de-transparence-budgetaire/).

⁵⁰http://ddata.over-blog.com/1/35/48/78/Tunisie/programme-ENNAHDHA.pdf.

⁵¹See, for example, “Tunisie – Budget 2013: Augmentation des ressources du Fonds de depollution”, Webmanager, 27 Dec. 2012, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/actualite/economie/2012/12/27/129227/tunisie-budget-2013-augmentation-des-ressources-du-fonds-de-depollution.

⁵²See comments by the Observatoire National pour la Protection du Consommateur, “Lassaad Dhaouadi: l’Etat recourt au terrorisme fiscal”, Mosaique, 1 March 2013, http://www.mosaiquefm.net/fr/index/a/ActuDetail/Element/17862-lassaad-dhaouadi-l-etat-recourt-au-terrorisme-fiscal; and the UGTT, “Mouldi Jendoubi: la décision de prélèver 1% des salaires inadmissible”, Mosaique, 1 March 2013, http://www.mosaiquefm.net/fr/index/a/ActuDetail/Element/17854-mouldi-jendoubi-la-decision-de-prelever-1-des-salaires-inadmissible.

⁵³“Tunisie – Mongi Rahoui: C’est Ennahdha qui a décidé de prélever 1% des salaires”, Tunisie Numerique, 1 March 2013, http://www.tunisienumerique.com/tunisie-mongi-rahoui-cest-ennahdha-qui-a-decide-de-prelever-1-des-salaires/167663.

⁵⁴According to which they pay a fixed amount of taxes on the basis of an annual amount of profit.

⁵⁵“Tunisie – Compensation – Augmentation des prix: Des experts dénoncent les solutions de facilité”, Webmanager, 27 Feb. 2013, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/magazine/economie/2013/02/27/131661/tunisie-compensation-augmentation-des-prix-des-experts-denoncent-les-solutions-de-facilite.

⁵⁶See “Tunisie: près de 15,7% du budget de l’etat 2013 destinés aux dépenses de compensation”, Espace Manager, 21 Dec. 2012, http://www.espacemanager.com/finance/tunisie-pres-de-157-du-budget-de-l-etat-2013-destines-aux-depenses-de-compensation.html.

⁵⁷Ibid.; According to the first finance minister of the Jebali government, Houcine Dimassi, fuel subsidies divert significant state resources from job creation, namely TND4.5 billion which could create 150,000 jobs (“Tunisie: La subvention des hydrocarbures empêche la création de 150.000 emplois”, Webmanager, 11 April 2012, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/actualite/economie/2012/04/11/118342/tunisie-la-subvention-des-hydrocarbures-empeche-la-creation-de-150-000-emplois).

⁵⁸As denounced by consumer defence organisations and Tunisian economists, the risk is that citizens’ purchasing power will further deteriorate (see the Observatoire de Protection du Consommateur ILEF, “Abdejlil Dhahri: Des propositions présentées en vue de préserver la capacité d’achat du citoyen”, Mosaique, 25 Jan. 2013, http://www.mosaiquefm.net/fr/index/a/ActuDetail/Element/16448-abdejlil-dhahri-des-propositions-presentees-en-vue-de-preserver-la-capacite-d-achat-du-citoyen; “Hausse des prix des hydrocarbures:ILEF dépose une plainte”, Mosaique, 10 March 2013, http://www.mosaiquefm.net/fr/index/a/ActuDetail/Element/18230-hausse-des-prix-des-hydrocarbures-ilef-depose-une-plainte. There is evidence that, in March 2013, the inflation rate had increased compared with one year before owing, among others, to a dramatic surge in fuel and electricity prices.

⁵⁹See, for example, ministers’ declarations in April and May 2012 (“Pas d’augmentation de salaire en 2012!”, Webmanager, 6 April 2012, http://directinfo.webmanagercenter.com/2012/04/06/pas-daugmentation-de-salaire-en-2012/; “Taux d’augmentation des salaires... la difficile entente entre gouvernement et l’UGTT”, Webmanager, 22 May 2012, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/actualite/economie/2012/05/22/119984/tunisie-taux-d-augmentation-des-salaires-la-difficile-entente-entre-gouvernement-et-l-ugtt).

⁶⁰The first package of short-term labour market measures was launched by Finance Minister Jalloul Ayed in April 2011; the Jasmin Plan (stratégie de développement économique et social 2012-2016), which deals with youth unemployment problems more coherently, was launched in September 2011.

⁶¹As an example, see the Programme d’Encouragement à l’Emploi launched in August 2012 and recently extended until 2014 (“Tunisie: Le programme d’encouragement à l’emploi a démarré”, Webmanager, 22 August 2012, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/actualite/economie/2012/08/22/123685/tunisie-le-programme-d-encouragement-a-l-emploi-a-demarre); and the agreements reached with the private handcrafts sector (“Accord-cadre entre le ministère de l’Emploi et l’UTICA pour promouvoir le rendement de la formation professionnelle”, Webmanager, 2 Nov. 2012, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/actualite/societe/2012/11/26/127870/tunisie-accord-cadre-entre-le-ministere-de-l-emploi-et-l-utica-pour-promouvoir-le-rendement-de-la-formation-professionnelle).

⁶²With regard to Intilak, young people claim that the amount of credit is insufficient to create sustainable projects. See “Démarrage à Bizerte des inscriptions du programme ‘INTILAK’”, Webmanager, 12 Nov. 2012, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/actualite/economie/2012/11/12/127226/tunisie-demarrage-a-bizerte-des-inscriptions-du-programme-intilak.

⁶³For critiques of AMAL, see K. Mejri, “Le chômage dans la Tunisie post 14 janvier [Part6]: L’accompagnement vers l’emploi, l’exemple du programme Amal”, Nawaat, 07 May 2012, http://nawaat.org/portail/2012/05/07/le-chomage-dans-la-tunisie-post-14-janvier-part6-laccompagnement-vers-lemploi-lexemple-du-programme-amal/; for the position of the Union for Unemployed Graduates, “Unemployed Graduates Take to the Streets Across the Country”, Tunisialive, 22 March 2012, http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/03/22/unemployed-graduates-take-to-the-streets-across-the-country/. Similar considerations were made by the former social affairs minister in March 2012 (“La pauvreté, ‘un fléau plus important’”, Le Economiste Maghrébin, 21 March 2012, http://www.leconomistemaghrebin.com/2012/03/21/la-pauvrete-un-fleau-plus-important/).

⁶⁴In 2011, 34,000 individuals were recruited into the public sector (K. Mejri, “Special Report: Unemployment in Post-revolutionary Tunisia [Part 2] The Public Sector, Object of Desire”, Nawaat, 20 Sept. 2012, http://nawaat.org/portail/2012/09/20/special-report-unemployment-in-post-revolutionary-tunisia-part-2-the-public-sector-object-of-desire/). The creation of a further 25,000 new jobs in the public sector was planned in the 2012 budget and 30,000 in the 2013 budget (“Emploi: Plus 2350 nouveaux recrutements dans l’enseignement en 2012”, Webmanager, 20 April 2012, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/actualite/economie/2012/04/20/118739/tunisie-emploi-plus-2350-nouveaux-recrutements-dans-l-enseignement-en-2012).

⁶⁵In May 2012, the minister in charge of administrative reform, Mohamed Abbou, claimed that corruption was still a major problem in all Tunisian institutions (“Les Trabelsi remplacés par des milliers de corrompus, selon Abbou”, Investir en Tunisie, 16 May 2012, http://www.investir-en-tunisie.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14709:-tunisie--les-trabelsi-remplaces-par-des-milliers-de-corrompus-selon-abbou&catid=39:eco-finance&Itemid=128). In June 2012, he resigned as a result of the controversy about expanding his prerogatives to fight corruption. He wanted to create an administrative corruption monitoring mechanism, which Ennahda did not accept (“La Tunisie souffre d’une ‘croissance économique atone’, dixit Mahmoud Ben Romdhane”, Webmanager, 7 August 2012, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/actualite/economie/2012/08/07/123158/-la-tunisie-souffre-d-une-croissance-economique-atone-dixit-mahmoud-ben-romdhane).

⁶⁶“Economie – Gouvernement: Le chant de la crise”, Webmanager, 20 Feb. 2013, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/actualite/economie/2013/02/20/131353/tunisie-economie-gouvernement-le-chant-de-la-crise.

⁶⁷See the accusations levelled by the Association Tunisienne pour la Transparence Financière (ATTF) (“Sami Remadi dénonce une gestion douteuse de l’argent public”, Business News, 15 August 2012, http://www.businessnews.com.tn/Tunisie---Sami-Remadi-dénonce-une-gestion-douteuse-de-l’argent-public,520,32863,3) and the Tunisia holding group, whose offer for the Bank of Tunisia was turned down to the advantage of a foreign group (“Tunisie – Tunisia Holding, met en doute l’intégrité de l’opération de vente de la Banque de Tunisie”, Tunisie Numerique, 22 Nov. 2012, http://www.tunisienumerique.com/tunisie-tunisia-holding-met-en-doute-lintegrite-de-loperation-de-vente-de-la-banque-de-tunisie/153999).

⁶⁸See the list of infrastructure projects announced by the Jebali government in March 2012 (“Tunisie: Une kyrielle de grands projets en 2102 pour booster l’emploi”, Webmanager, 19 March 2012, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/management/article-117525-tunisie-une-kyrielle-de-grands-projets-en-2102-pour-booster-l-emploi); May 2012 (“Tunisie - Projets de développement: Où trouverons-nous les 70 mrds $ pour financer nos 50 Grands projets?!”, Webmanager, 18 May 2012, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/management/article-119843-tunisie-projets-de-developpement-ou-trouverons-nous-les-70-mrds-%24-pour-financer-nos-50-grands-projets); and January 2013 (“Tunisie: Le gouvernement prépare un boom des infrastructures”, Webmanager, 28 Jan. 2013, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/actualite/economie/2013/01/28/130399/tunisie-le-gouvernement-prepare-un-boom-des-infrastructures-1). At the end of February 2013, the government announced the new regional development strategy for 2013. For specific interventions in Sidi Bouzid (August 2012), see “Sidi Bouzid s’invite dans un Conseil ministériel à La Kasbah”, Webmanager, 24 August 2012, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/actualite/economie/2012/08/24/123792/tunisie-sidi-bouzid-s-invite-dans-un-conseil-ministeriel-a-la-kasbah; and in Tataouine (October 2012), see “Régions: Des mesures en faveur de l’emploi à Tataouine”, Webmanager, 29 Sept. 2012, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/actualite/economie/2012/09/29/125386/tunisie-regions-des-mesures-en-faveur-de-l-emploi-a-tataouine.

⁶⁹For Kasserine, see, for example, “Régions – Kasserine: Lenteur dans la réalisation des projets inscrits au budget de 2012”, Webmanager, 1 March 2013, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/actualite/economie/2013/03/01/131798/tunisie-regions-kasserine-lenteur-dans-la-realisation-des-projets-inscrits-au-budget-de-2012.

⁷⁰See “Une enveloppe de 19 millions de dinars accordée à la santé”, Le Economiste Maghrébin, 6 Sept. 2012, http://www.leconomistemaghrebin.com/2012/09/06/une-enveloppe-de19-millions-de-dinars-accordee-a-la-sante/; “Hassine Dimassi: ‘Le gonflement du budget de fonctionnement, inhabituel et irrationnel’ en Tunisie”, Webmanager, 16 Jan. 2013, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/magazine/idees-et-debats/2013/01/16/129934/hassine-dimassi-le-gonflement-du-budget-de-fonctionnement-inhabituel-et-irrationnel-en-tunisie.

⁷¹See, for example, “Tunisie – Violences à Siliana: Les trois erreurs du gouvernement”, Webmanager, 29 Nov. 2012, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/actualite/societe/2012/11/29/128057/tunisie-violences-a-siliana-les-trois-erreurs-du-gouvernement.

⁷²This problem, for example, has been denounced by unemployed youth in the Gafsa governorate (“Tunisie: Des sans-emplois de Mdhilla poursuivent une grève de la faim”, Webmanager, 4 Oct. 2012, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/actualite/societe/2012/10/04/125595/tunisie-des-sans-emplois-de-mdhilla-poursuivent-une-greve-de-la-faim).

⁷³Public authorities used opposition from the UGTT to justify the exclusion of new trade unions from social dialogues. See, for example, the interview with former Social Affairs Minister Khalil Zaouia, “La pauvreté, ‘un fléau plus important’”, L’Economist Maghrébin 573, 21 March 2012, http://www.leconomistemaghrebin.com/2012/03/21/la-pauvrete-un-fleau-plus-important/.

⁷⁴After an initially positive reaction by Samir Dilou, Minister of Human Rights in the Jebali government in June 2012, the initiative was rejected by Ennahda in October 2012.

⁷⁵See, for example, “Labor Union Serves as Link Between Ghannouchi and Opposition”, Tunisialive, 20 August 2013, http://www.tunisia-live.net/2013/08/20/labor-union-serves-as-link-between-ghannouchi-and-opposition/.

⁷⁶See, for example, “Ghannouchi soutient la proposition de K.Saied et appelle à une réconciliation avec les hommes d’affaires”, Tuniscope, 15 March 2013, http://www.tuniscope.com/index.php/article/22747/actualites/tunisie/t-ghan-454316#.UZpJjqVRaoQ.

⁷⁷“Pourquoi Ennahdha a-t-elle bloqué la convention de l’OCDE sur l’évasion fiscale?”, Webmanager, 11 Jan. 2013, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/actualite/finance/2013/01/11/129788/tunisie-pourquoi-ennahdha-a-t-elle-bloque-la-convention-de-l-ocde-sur-l-evasion-fiscale.

This article, together with those by Laura Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi, was written as part of the research project, “Islamism and Transitions”, funded by the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’.

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Maria Cristina Paciello

Maria Cristina Paciello is Associate Senior Fellow at IAI, Rome. Email: [email protected].