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Abstract
After winning the 2011 elections, the Ennahda Islamist Party was the majority partner in successive coalition governments, whose poor performance – namely in the economic and security fields – disappointed the people’s high post-revolutionary expectations. Opponents accused Ennahda of incompetence, greed for power and double talk. Many of the Ennahda-led governments’ failures were due to factors beyond their control, but some did indeed depend on Ennahda’s own political weaknesses. Nevertheless, Ennahda contributed positively to the overall development of Tunisia’s political transition thanks to its moderation and pragmatism and its contribution remains paramount for the democratic consolidation of Tunisia and other political Islamic actors.
Notes
1 Al-Anani, “Islamist Parties Post-Arab Spring”.
2 See Pioppi, “Playing with Fire”, and Paciello, “Delivering the Revolution?”, for an in-depth analysis of the Egyptian case. For an initial assessment of regional repercussions of the coup, see Le Monde, Dossier “L’Islam politique est-il-dans l’impasse?”, 11 July 2013, http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/visuel/2013/07/11/l-islam-politique-est-il-dans-l-impasse_3446323_3232.html?xtmc=l_islam_politique_est_il_dans_l_impasse&xtcr=2; C. Ayad, “La crise égyptienne rebat les cartes diplomatiques dans la region”, Le Monde, 19 August 2013, http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2013/08/19/la-crise-egyptienne-rebat-les-cartes-diplomatiques-dans-la-region_3463232_3210.html; Brumberg, “Will Egypt’s Agony save the Arab Spring?”.
3 Born in 1981 as the Mouvement de la Tendence Islamique (MTI), the movement changed its name to Haraka al-Nahda (Renaissance Movement) in 1989; in Western languages the party refers to itself as Ennahda (Renaissance).
4 On electoral results, see R. Bustos, “Election Report: TUNISIA/Constituent Assembly Elections 23 October 2011”. OPEMAM Analysis, 27 Nov. 2011, http://www.opemam.org/publicaciones/20?language=en; on their reading, Gana, “Processus électoraux et territoires”, 6–7; International Crisis Group, Tunisie: relever les défis, 3-5.
5 A comprehensive, updated history of Ennahda is still lacking, but see Allani, “The Islamists in Tunisia”;Shahin, Political Ascent; Hermassi, “The Rise and Fall”; and Burgat, L’islamisme au Maghreb.
6 Although most charges were fabricated, in 2011 the party leadership admitted that individuals affiliated with Ennahda had indeed been implicated in acts of violence, namely the infamous Bab al-Souika attack in 1991 that left one person dead (“Tunisie: le mouvement Ennahda se veut rassurant et reconnaît son erreur de 1991”, Espace Manager.com, 8- February 2011, http://www.espacemanager.com/politique/tunisie-le-mouvement-ennahda-se-veut-rassurant-et-reconnait-son-erreur-de-1991.html).
7 The term ‘transition’ is used here in keeping with the language of the Tunisian debate. However, according to Stepan, one of the fathers of the democratisation theory, Tunisia would in fact have passed on to the stage of democratic consolidation (Stepan, “Tunisia’s Transition”, 90).
8 Murphy, “The Tunisian Elections”, 233.
9 Chater, “Le constitutionnalisme en Tunisie”; Rivet, Le Maghreb à l’épreuve, 135-50; and Murphy, Ibid. 232, 243-4.
10 Roy, “Transformation of the Arab World”, 8; Roy, like others, argues that political inclusion has pushed post-Arab Spring Islamist movements towards political moderation, transforming them into “reluctant agents of democratization”. For a systematic analysis, see Schwedler, “Can Islamists Become Moderates?”.
11 The movement committed itself implicitly to the democratic process in the 1981 founding charter of the (never legalised) Mouvement de la Tendence Islamique (MTI) and more explicitly in the 1988 Ennahda charter. For the ideological bases of Ennahda’s commitment, see Ghannouchi, Civil Liberties in the Islamic State.
12 “Une ‘Déclaration du processus transitoire’ signée par 12 partis”, Tunisiawatch.com, 15 Sept. 2011, http://www.tunisiawatch.com/?p=4331.
13 See R. Bustos, “Election Report”.
14 This was the unanimous opinion of trade unions, business organisations, opposition parties and media representatives interviewed in Tunis by the author in late January 2013; in September 2012, criticism also came from the Ennahda youth movement ‘Ekbess’.
15 For a detailed analysis, see Paciello, “Delivering the Revolution?” in this issue, 7.
16 Institut National de la Statistique, “Note sur l’enquête nationale sur l’emploi 4 ème trimestre 2011”, 2, (in Arabic); by December 2012, the unemployment rate had decreased to 17.6 percent, but remained on the rise among youth with higher education: S. Ben Hamadi, “Promotion chômage”, Jeune Afrique, 3 Jan. 2013, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/JA2711p072_075.xml0/.
17 ICG, Tunisie: relever les défis, 15-9; E. Byrne, “Tunisian Racketeers Grow Rich on State Jobs Scheme”, The Guardian, 9 Dec. 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/feb/09/tunisian-job-scheme-corruption-racketeers; S. Chayes, “Corruption is Still Tunisia’s Challenge”, Los Angeles Times, 10 June 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/10/opinion/la-oe-chayes-tunisia-corruption-20120610.
18 See F. Ghiles, “Tunisia at Risk”, BBC Business, 17 Dec. 12, http://www.passfail.com/news/bbc/viewpoint-tunisia-at-risk/viewpoint-tunisia-at-risk.htm; and Paciello, “Delivering the Revolution?”.
19 “Labor Union Suspends General Strike in Siliana for 15 Days”, Tunisialive.net, 3 Dec. 2012, http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/12/03/ugtt-decides-to-suspend-the-general-strike-in-siliana-for-15-days/.
20 For a detailed analysis, see ICG, Tunisie: Violences et défi salafiste; Marks, “Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism”.
21 Scripturalist Salafis are apolitical and quietist. They advocate the establishment of the Islamic state through political means while jihadists advocate fighting violently for the Islamic state; both these trends have partially merged after the revolution, see A. Allani “Islamism and Salafism in Tunisia after the Arab Spring”, 2 Oct. 2012, 4, http://www.righttononviolence.org/mecf/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/allani-presentation-en.pdf.
22 For a history of Tunisian Salafiyya, see F. Merone, and F. Cavatorta, “The Emergence of Salafism in Tunisia”, Jadaliyya, 17 August 2012, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6934/the-emergence-of-salafism-in-tunisia, and Allani, “The Islamists in Tunisia”, 265-6. For the connection with international jihadism, see ICG, Violences et défi salafiste, 5-6, and G. Ghassan Ben Khalifa, “The Secret of the Salafists Appeal in Tunisia”, al-Safir, 21 April 2013, http://arabi.assafir.com/article.asp?aid=844&refsite=assafir&reftype=home&refzone=slider (in Arabic). On the struggle at the Algerian border in Kasserine province, see I. Mandraud, “Au mont Chaambi, la guerre asymétrique de l’armée tunisienne contre Al-Qaida”, Le Monde, 17 June 2013, http://www.lemonde.fr/tunisie/article/2013/06/17/au-mont-chaambi-la-guerre-asymetrique-de-l-armee-tunisienne-contre-al-qaida_3431192_1466522.html.
23 ICG, Tunisie: relever les défis and Tunisie: lutter contre l’impunité.
24 ICG, Tunisie: lutter contre l’impunité; Amnesty International, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?
25 Haugbølle and Cavatorta, “Will the Real Tunisian Opposition”; and Brody-Barre, “The Impact of Political Parties”.
26 Allani, “Post-revolution Tunisian Constituent Assembly”.
27 Allani, Ibid., 134–5; Brody-Barre, “The Impact of Political Parties”, 217-20. In April 2012, a number of parties merged to create al-Massar (a social-democratic coalition) and al-Joumhouri (a liberal-democratic one); in June 2012, Nida’ Tunis (a liberal-democratic party, including former regime party members) was formed by Béji Caïd Essebsi, former interim prime minister; in October 2012, twelve leftwing parties and associations formed the Front Populaire; in February 2013, al-Massar, al-Joumhouri and Nida’ Tunis agreed to the Union for Tunisia electoral alliance.
28 A. Shahid, “Tunisia Faces a Balancing Act of Democracy and Religion”, New York Times (NYT), 30 Jan. 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/world/africa/tunisia-navigates-a-democratic-path-tinged-with-religion.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Ben Mbarek Msaddek, Je prendrai les armes.
29 A notorious case of nepotism was the appointment of Ghannouchi’s son-in-law, Rafik Abdessalem, as foreign minister in the Jebali government; Abdessalem was criticized for various mismanagements: see, for instance, “Relations tendues entre Rafik Abdessalem et le personnel du ministère des AE”, Businessnews.com, 29 Jan. 2012, http://www.businessnews.com.tn/Tunisie---Relations-tendues-entre-Rafik-Abdessalem-et-le-personnel-du-minist%25C3%25A8re-des-AE,520,29033,1; and “Le Collectif des 25 porte plainte contre Rafik Abdessalem”, Businessnews.com, 2 Jan. 2013, http://www.businessnews.com.tn/Tunisie-%E2%80%93-Le-Collectif-des-25-porte-plainte-contre-Rafik-Abdessalem,520,35439,3. As for politically motivated appointments of incompetent personnel, the opposition claimed that at least 1,200 nominations had to be reconsidered (see “Hamma Hammami: Le referendum ne nous fait pas peur”, Businessnews.com, 7 Aug. 2013, http://www.businessnews.com.tn/hamma-hammami--le-referendum-ne-nous-fait-pas-peur-audio,520,40020,3).
30 Personal interview with Salim Chaker (Youth and Sport Minister in the Essebsi government and responsible for the Nida’ Tunis socio-economic program), Tunis, 31 January 2013.
31 ICG, Tunisie: relever les defies, 21-2; cfr. the government’s emphatic defence of the Ennahda governor of Siliana in Nov. 2012, followed by his removal in December (“Montassar Jarray nommé gouverneur de Siliana en remplacement d’Ahmed Ezzine Mahjoubi”, Webmanager.com, 27 Dec. 2012, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/actualite/societe/2012/12/27/129216/tunisie-montassar-jarray-nomme-gouverneur-de-siliana-en-remplacement-d-ahmed-ezzine-mahjoubi).
32 Le Programme du Mouvement Ennahda – Document resumé, 9-10, http://www.slideshare.net/Ennahdha/programme-du-parti-ennahdha; see, for instance, “La HAICA voit enfin le jour”, Reporter sans frontières, 7 May 2013, http://fr.rsf.org/tunisie-la-haica-voit-enfin-le-jour-07-05-2013,44578.html; for the Jebali government’s own assessment, see Head of Government, Results of the Government’s Activities Year 2012, 89-93.
33 A. Eychenne, “Tunisie: qui se cache derrière les ligues de protection de la révolution?”, L’Express, 7 Feb. 2013, http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/tunisie-qui-sont-les-ligues-de-protection-de-la-revolution_1217881.html.
34 V. Duhem, “Heurts devant le siège de l’UGTT entre syndicalistes et islamistes tunisiens”, Jeuneafrique.com, 4 Dec. 2012, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20121204174836/; AFP, “Le rassemblement d’une milice pro-Ennahda interdit”, Jeuneafrique.com, 1 June 2013, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20121204174836/.
35 F. Dahmani, “Après deux mois de grève de la faim, décès du jihadiste Mohamed Bakhti”, Jeuneafrique.com, 17 Nov. 2012, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20121117102618/.
36 Marks, “Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism”, 112-4; G. Usher, “The Reawakening of Nahda in Tunisia”, Merip Online, 30 April 2011, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero043011; “Rached Ghannouchi: ‘Si on diabolise les salafistes tunisiens, ils seront au pouvoir dans dix ou quinze ans’”, Le Monde, 18 Oct. 2012, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20121019084431/.
37 C. Dieng, “Tunisie: les détenus salafistes livrent des secrets, le parti Ennahda se divise”, Afrik.com, 22 May 2013, http://www.afrik.com/tunisie-les-detenus-salafistes-livrent-des-secrets-le-parti-ennahda-se-divise.
38 ICG, Tunisie: Violences et défi salafiste, 37-44; “Le congrès des salafistes d’Ansar al-charia interdit”, Le Monde, 17 May 2013, http://www.lemonde.fr/tunisie/article/2013/05/17/le-bras-de-fer-de-l-etat-tunisien-avec-les-djihadistes-d-ansar-al-charia_3261799_1466522.html; I. Mandraud, “Tunis désigne le groupe salafiste Ansar Al-Charia comme organisation terroriste”, Le Monde, 29 Aug. 2013.
39 Such as when Ghannouchi declared “that the forces that failed in the elections were trying to push the country towards chaos and a military coup” as well as that “the UGTT should be a trade union not a radical opposition party” (see “Rached Ghannouchi hanté par le spectre d’un coup d’état militaire”, TunisTribune.com, 12 Jan. 2013; and “Crise en Tunisie: l’UGTT lance un appel à la grève générale le 13 décembre”, Jeuneafrique.com, 6 Dec. 2013, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20121206093000/). On the other hand smearing Ennahda is the trademark of most of the francophone Tunisian press close to the opposition.
40 Tarjem, “L’UGTT et Ennahda: les enjeux d’un conflit”.
41 Ennahda’s preference for and efforts to achieve consensus politics was strongly stressed by Abdelhamid Jelassi, Ennahda vice president and general coordinator, in a personal interview (Tunis, 30 Jan. 2013); political consensus as a strategic goal was also set down in the final statement of the July 2012 Ennahda congress.
42 “Tunisie: accord sur la Constitution et élections générales le 23 juin”, Le Monde, 14 Oct. 2012, http://mobile.lemonde.fr/tunisie/article/2012/10/14/tunisie-accord-sur-la-constitution-des-elections-generales-le-23-juin_1775271_1466522.html; “Une ‘Déclaration du processus transitoire’ signée par 12 partis”, Tunisiawatch.com, 15 Sept. 2011, http://www.lemonde.fr/tunisie/article/2012/10/14/tunisie-accord-sur-la-constitution-des-elections-generales-le-23-juin_1775271_1466522.html.
43 “Hamadi Jebali: Pas d’accord sur le remaniement ministériel, mais les négociations se poursuivent”, Businessnew.com, 21 Jan. 2013, http://www.businessnews.com.tn/Hamadi-Jebali--Pas-d%E2%80%99accord-sur-le-remaniement-minist%C3%A9riel,-mais-les-n%C3%A9gociations-se-poursuivent-(vid%C3%A9o),520,35906,3. For the issues behind the enlargement debate, see “Les faucons d’Ennahdha veulent plonger la Tunisie dans l’incertitude”, Businessnew.com, 3 Feb. 2013, http://www.businessnews.com.tn/Les-faucons-d%E2%80%99Ennahdha-veulent-plonger-la-Tunisie-dans-l%E2%80%99incertitude,519,36058,1.
44 “Le Conseil de la Choura d’Ennahdha rejette la proposition de Hamadi Jebali”, Businessnew.com, 10 Feb. 2013, http://www.businessnews.com.tn/Tunisie---Le-Conseil-de-la-Choura-d%E2%80%99Ennahdha-rejette-la-proposition-de-Hamadi-Jebali,520,36225,3.
45 “Le dernier projet de constitution finalisé”, Businessnews.com, 1 June 2013; “Vivement critiqué, le projet de Constitution devrait être modifié”, JeuneAfrique.com, 3 June 2013, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20130603143627/.
46 The law would disqualify personalities such as the president of Nida’ Tunis, and former prime minister Caid Essebsi; see Human Right Watch, “Tunisia: Sweeping Political Exclusion Law. Proposal Violates Fundamental Rights”, Communiqué, 15 June 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/15/tunisia-sweeping-political-exclusion-law. The request to adopt the law was dropped by Ghannouchi on 25 August to further the political compromise then under discussion.
47 “Nidaa Tounes, Major Opposition Party, Calls for Dissolution of Government”, Tunisialive.net, 4 July 2013, http://www.tunisia-live.net/2013/07/04/nidaa-tounes-major-opposition-party-calls-for-dissolution-of-government/; “New Tunisian Protest Movement Takes Cue from Egypt”, Reuters.com, 3 July 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/03/us-tunisia-opposition-idUSBRE9620ZC20130703.
48 C. Gall, “Protesters Press Tunisian Government to Resign, as Ruling Party Supporters Rally”, NYT, 28 July 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/29/world/africa/protesters-press-tunisian-government-to-resign-as-ruling-party-supporters-rally.html.
49 The UGTT declaration contained a number of collateral requests (such as the dissolution of the League For the Protection of the Revolution and the review of all recent political appointments in the administration) and provided a stringent timetable (one week for the formation of the new government; three weeks for the revision and approval of the constitution): see UGTT, “The Emergency Council asks for the Dissolution of the Government and makes a Proposal to all Parties” (in Arabic), Communiqué, 29 July 2013.
50 “Gouvernement de compétences: Ennahdha retire son veto”, Leaders.com, 22 Aug. 2013, http://www.leaders.com.tn/article/gouvernement-de-competences-ennahdha-retire-son-veto?id=12097; T. Amara “Tunisia’s Ruling Islamists to Step Down, Pave Way for Vote”, Reuters.com, 28 Sept. 2013.
51 For Ennahda’s history, see Allani, “The Islamists in Tunisia”; Shahin, Political Ascent; Hermassi, “The Rise and Fall”; and Burgat, L’islamisme au Maghreb.
52 See Shahin, Political Ascent, 101-2.
53 Ibid., 103.
54 When Ben Ali pardoned 600 Ennahda members in 1999, many condemned in absentia, some of them returned to Tunisia; the last Ennahda detainees were released in 2008.
55 See Khiari and Lamloum, “Tunisie: des élections en trompe-l’œil”; Braun, “A quoi servent les partis tunisiens?”; Cavatorta and Haugbølle, “The End of Authoritarian Rule”.
56 This description owes much to the interview with Ajmi Lourimi, Ennahda vice president responsible for Education, Youth and Culture (Tunis, 29 Jan. 2013).
57 For a detailed and sympathetic analysis of Ghannouchi’s life and thought, see Tamimi, Rachid Ghannouchi.
58 Geisser and Gobe, “Des fissures dans la ‘Maison Tunisie?’”.
59 The alliance was formed by individual members of legal and illegal opposition parties who, on 18-19 October. 2005, at the opening of the World Forum of the Information Society in Tunisia, staged a hunger strike to protest against repression in the country; the alliance was dissolved prior to the October 2011 elections: see “Les clivages idéologiques ont eu raison de l’opposition d’hier”, Le Temps.com, 17 Oct. 12, http://www.letemps.com.tn/article-70751.html.
60 F. Merone, and F. Cavatorta, “The Emergence of Salafism in Tunisia”, Jadaliyya, 17 August 2012, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6934/the-emergence-of-salafism-in-tunisia.
61 The precursor (the Jund Assad ibn al-Furat group) to today’s main pro-jihadism Tunisian group, Ansar al-sharia, was established in 2006 (Ibid., 3).
62 See Haugbølle and Cavatorta, “Beyond Ghannouchi”.
63 For an analysis of Ennahda mobilisation in the 2011 electoral campaign, see Santilli “Al-Nahda e il processo di transizione”, 60-3.
64 Ibid, 70-1.
65 See Ghannouchi, Civil Liberties in the Islamic State, and Saeed, “Rethinking Citizenship Rights”.
66 Haraka al-Nahda, Le Programme du Mouvement Ennahda – Document resumé, http://ddata.over-blog.com/1/35/48/78/Tunisie/programme-ENNAHDHA.pdf, 7; the idea of ‘civilian state’ is a key concept in the current ideological debate among Islamist movements in the Arab world, for an introduction to the debate, see Campanini, “Longing for Democracy”; and De Poli, “Laicità, islamismo e democrazia”.
67 Torelli, “The ‘AKP Model’ and Tunisia”.
68 See Haraka al-Nahda, Communiquées on the Anniversary, 54.
69 F. Merone and F. Cavatorta, “Ennahda: A Party in Transition”, Jadaliyya.com, 25 March 2013, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/10762/ennahda_a-party-in-transition.
70 “QA with Ennahda Ajmi Lourimi”, Egypt Independent, 6 Aug. 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/qa-ennahda-s-ajmi-lourimi.
71 For instance in March 2013, Ellouze spoke in favour of female circumcision, forcing Ghannouchi to clarify that this was against the party line (see “Tunisia Ruling Islamist Party ‘Against’ Female Circumcision”, Ahramonline, 15 March 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/66938/World/Region/Tunisia-ruling-Islamist-party-against-female-circu.aspx).
72 See, for instance, A. Djait, “Hbib Ellouze: Un faucon à l’assaut…”, Webmanagercenter.com, 1 March 2013, http://www.webmanagercenter.com/magazine/societe/2013/03/01/131771/hbib-ellouze-un-faucon-a-l-assaut%85.
73 See F. Merone and F. Cavatorta, “Ennahda: A Party in Transition”; even the moderate Jebali contributed to this ambiguity talking about “a divine moment in a new state, and in – hopefully – a 6th Caliphate”, in a rally with a Hamas representative (see A. Ajmi, “Ennahdha Discourse: The Sixth Caliphate or a Misunderstanding?”, Tunisialive.net, 14 Nov. 2011, http://www.tunisia-live.net/2011/11/16/ennahdha-flipflopping-the-sixth-caliphate-a-misunderstanding/).
74 “QA with Ennahda Ajmi Lourimi”, Egypt Independent, 6 Aug. 2012.
75 B. Barrie, “9th Conference: Ghannouchi remains leader as Ennahda denies any conflict within the movement”, Nawat.org, 18 July 13, http://nawaat.org/portail/2012/07/18/ninth-conference-ghannouchi-remains-leader-as-ennahda-denies-any-conflict-within-the-movement/; Santilli and Longo, “Tunisia: modelli di stato islamico”.
76 Haraka al-Nahda, Final Statement of the 9th Congress of Ennahda, 4.
77 See footnote 41.
78 It is interesting to note that this long-term approach is typical of most ideological parties – to which Islamist parties clearly belong – which see politics as a way to construct a new society (Diamond and Gunther, Political Parties, 9 ff)
79 Stepan “Religion, Democracy”, and “Tunisia’s Transition”.
80 See footnote 10.
81 For a discussion of these concepts, see Schwedler, “Can Islamists Become Moderates?”.
82 F. El-Issawi, “Islamists of Tunisia Reconciling National Contradictions”, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2012/04/islamists-of-tunisia-reconciling-national-contradictions/; Torelli, “L’Islam politico in Tunisia”, 93-6.
This article, as well as those by Paciello and Pioppi in this issue, are a part of the “Islamism and Transitions” research project the author directs at La Sapienza.
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Notes on contributors
Laura Guazzone
Laura Guazzone is Associate Professor of Contemporary History of Arab Countries, Dept. of Oriental Studies, University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’. Email: [email protected].