Introduction

Abstract

Russia and the United States are the most important countries for many vital security issues. They possess the world's largest nuclear weapons arsenals, are involved in the principal regional conflicts, and have lead roles in opposing international terrorism and weapons proliferation. Despite persistent differences on many questions, mutual interests consistently drive Russians and Americans to work together to overcome these impediments.

This Adelphi Paper argues that opportunities for further improving security cooperation between Russia and the United States exist but are limited. Near-term results in the areas of formal arms control or ballistic missile defences are unlikely. The two governments should focus on improving and expanding their joint threat-reduction and non-proliferation programmes, enhancing their military-to-military dialogue regarding Central Asia and defence industrial cooperation, and deepening their anti-terrorist cooperation, both bilaterally and through NATO. Using more market incentives, expanding reciprocity and equal treatment, and limiting the adverse repercussions from disputes over Iran would facilitate progress.

Russia and the United States will not soon become close allies, but they should be able to achieve better security ties given that, on many issues, their shared interests outweigh those that divide them.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Amira Ali, Nicole Aronzon, Hans Binnendijk, Stephen Blank, Caitlin Brand, Eric Brewer, Chris Brown, Sebastian Elischer, J. Charles Griggs, Adrianne Grunblatt, Edeanna Johnson, Ty Matsdorf, Caroline Patton, Klementina Sula, Noemi Szekely, Samir Tata, Brian Wender, Nick Wetzler, Krystal Wilson, Elizabeth Zolotukhina and several anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, run by Senior Fellow Clark Murdoch and Project Coordinator Kathleen McInnis, organised several conferences that allowed me to deliver presentations on Russian–American security issues. The Hudson Institute's Washington Office, directed by Ken Weinstein, and its Center for Future Security Strategies, directed by S. Enders Wimbush, provided an exceptionally favourable environment for conducting research and writing. Many Russian and US policymakers and experts shared their insights with me on an off-the-record basis. Finally, I benefited enormously from the seminars, presentations and discussions organised by the other think-tanks in the Washington area, whose participants are too numerous to list, but whose ideas continue to drive progress in this vital area.

Notes

¹ Freedom in the World-2005 (New York: Freedom House, 2005), p. 519.

² Final Report on the Presidential Election in the Russian Federation, 14 March 2004 (Vienna: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe), p. 1, at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2004/06/3033_en.pdf. See also Anders Aslund, ‘Putin's Decline and America's Response’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief, no. 41, August 2004, pp. 1–2.

³ See for example Stephen Dinan and Jeffrey Sparshott, ‘Senators Seek To Sanction Russia’, Washington Times, 18 February 2005.

⁴ See James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, ‘What To Do About Russia’, Policy Review, no. 133, October–November 2005, http://www/policyreview.org/oct05/http://www/policyreview.org/oct05/goldgeier.html.

⁵ The transparency problem is discussed in Alexei G. Arbatov, ‘Military Reform: From Crisis to Stagnation’, in Steven E. Miller and Dmitri V. Trenin (eds), The Russian Military: Power and Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 97–98. See also the figures in Michael McFaul, ‘Reengaging Russia: A New Agenda’, Current History, vol. 103, no. 675, October 2004, p. 308. According to surveys of Russian business leaders conducted by the Russian Indem Foundation, Russian business people pay over $300bn in bribes annually. Dmitri Trenin, ‘Reading Russia Right’, Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief, no. 42, October 2005, p. 3. The widespread prevalence of corruption in Russia's economy is also discussed in Steven Myers, ‘Pervasive Corruption in Russia Is “Just Called Business”’, New York Times, 13 August 2005; and ‘Blood Money’, The Economist, 22–28 October, 2005.

⁶ See for example Pavel Felgenhauer, ‘New Détente To Die Young’, Moscow Times, 29 May 2005; Nikolai Sokov, ‘Russian Ministry of Defense's New Policy Paper: The Nuclear Angle’, CNS Reports, at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/sok1003.htm; and ‘Russia Cites US Action for War Exercises’, International Herald Tribune, 11 February 2004.

⁷ The Jackson–Vanik Amendment, contained in Title IV of the 1974 Trade Act, applies to certain countries, including Russia and several other former Soviet republics, with non-market economies that restrict emigration rights. Specifically, it denies them unconditional or permanent normal trade relations with the US unless the president determines that they comply with the amendment's emigration requirements. US presidents have found Russia in compliance with the amendment every year since 1994, but concerns about growing anti-Semitism in the FSU and other malign developments have prevented its repeal despite repeated Russian complaints about its humiliating biannual reviews.

⁸ The present and planned future nuclear forces of Russia and the United States are described in Richard Weitz, ‘Resurgent Russia Confronts US Ally in Europe’, in The Future Security Environment and the Role of US Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), pp. 66–76. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists regularly publishes updates on Russian and US nuclear-weapon programmes and polices; see for example Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, ‘NRDC; Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces, 2005’, in the March–April 2005 edition, vol. 61, no. 2, pp. 70–72; and Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, ‘NRDC; Nuclear Notebook: US Nuclear Forces, 2005’, in the January–February 2005 edition, vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 73–75. The Arms Control Association also produces periodic fact sheets on both countries’ strategic nuclear forces at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/sovforces.asp and http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/usstrat.asp. The Nuclear Threat Initiative puts detailed information about Russia's nuclear stockpiles and other security issues on its website, at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/tc_ru.htm.

⁹ Keith Payne, ‘The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 3, Summer 2005, pp. 143, 146–148.

¹⁰ Although classified, excerpts of the NPR have been posted on the Internet at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm.

¹¹ See for example Statement of Douglas J. Feith, Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on the Results of the Nuclear Posture Review, 14 February 2002, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2002_hr/feith0214.pdf; and DOD, Annual Report to the President and Congress: 2002 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002), p. 89.

¹² For example DOD, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 11, described Russia as a potential threat ‘not because its intentions are hostile, but because it controls the only nuclear arsenal that can physically threaten the survivability of US nuclear forces’. See also Ivan Oelrich, Missions for Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War (Washington DC: Federation of American Scientists, 2005), pp. 14, 41, 44–45, 54.

¹³ This debate is reviewed in Nikolai Sokov, ‘Modernization of Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia: The Emerging New Posture’, May 1998, at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/over/modern.htm; and Frank Umbach, Future Military Reform: Russia's Nuclear & Conventional Forces (Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, August 2002), pp. 11–14.

¹⁴ Yuriy Maslyukov, ‘Pravo na otvetniy udar: Rossiya dolzhna soxranit’ sistemu yadernogo cderzhivaniya', Voenno-Promishlenniy Kur'er, 22–29 October 2003; and Dmitri Trenin, Russia's Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century Environment (Paris: IFRI, Autumn 2005), pp. 11–12. See also Brad Roberts, Trilateral Stability: The Future of Nuclear Relations Among the United States, Russia, and China (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2002), pp. 15, 33.

¹⁵ The government expects to spend almost $340m on nuclear weapons in 2006; see ITAR-Tass, 17 August 2005, in Global Security Newswire, 18 August 2005. Additional information on Russia's nuclear weapons and war plans can be found in David Holley, ‘Russia Seeks Safety in Nuclear Arms’, Los Angeles Times, 6 December 2004; Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, ‘NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces, 2004’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 60, no. 4, July–August 2004, pp. 72–74; and Paul Webster, ‘Just Like Old Times’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 59, no. 4, July–August 2003, pp. 30–35.

¹⁶ For a history of Russian–US nuclear nonproliferation collaboration, see Jim Walsh, Russian and American Nonproliferation Policy: Success, Failure, and the Role of Cooperation, MTA Occasional Paper 2004-01 (Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June 2004). Russia's commitment to non-proliferation is analysed in Dmitri Trenin, ‘Russia and Global Security Norms’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 2, Spring 2004, pp. 63–77.

¹⁷ Andrew Kuchins, Vyacheslav Nikonov and Dmitri Trenin, US–Russian Relations: The Case for an Upgrade (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 7. For a history of Russia's counter-terrorism policies see Dmitri Trenin, ‘Russia and Anti-Terrorism’, in Dov Lynch (ed.), What Russia Sees, Chaillot Paper 74 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of the European Union, January 2005), pp. 99–114.

¹⁸ The latter incident is discussed in GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: US and International Assistance Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening (Washington DC: May 2003), p. 70.

¹⁹ These contrasting perspectives are discussed in Frances G. Burwell, Re-Engaging Russia: The Case for a Joint US–EU Effort (Washington DC: The Atlantic Council, February 2005), esp. p. 2.

²⁰ For a discussion of the initial frictions between the Bush and Putin administrations over Chechnya and other issues, and Putin's surprising decision to support the US military response after the 9/11 attacks, see Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin's Russia and the End of Revolution (New York: Scribner, 2005), pp. 121–123, 129, 132; George Friedman, America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle between America and Its Enemies (New York: Doubleday, 2004), pp. 141–149; and Andrew S. Weiss, ‘Russia: The Accidental Alliance’, in Daniel Benjamin (ed.), America and the World in the Age of Terror: A New Landscape in International Relations (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), pp. 125–134. The Churchill analogy appears in Baker and Glasser, Kremlin Rising, p. 135.

²¹ These joint exchanges between Russian and US executive-branch agencies are discussed in DOS, ‘Europe and Eurasia Overview’, Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, 27 April 2005, at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/45388.htm.

²² The World Bank, Russian Economic Report (Washington DC: February 2004), p. 3.

²³ DOS, ‘Background Note: Russia’, February 2005, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3183.htm.

²⁴ See for example the figures in Michael McFaul, ‘Reengaging Russia: A New Agenda’, Current History, vol. 103, no. 675, October 2004, p. 308.

²⁵ For a discussion of some of these projects, see ‘Has the Russian Space Launch Quota Achieved Its Purpose?’, in Hearing before the International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, US Senate, 19 July 1999.

²⁶ See for example Alexei Arbatov, ‘Superseding US–Russian Nuclear Deterrence’, Arms Control Today, vol. 35, no. 1, January–February 2005, p. 14; George Perkovich, ‘Bush's Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Nonproliferation’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 2, March–April 2003, p. 8; and Jon B. Wolfsthal and Tom Z. Collina, ‘Nuclear Terrorism and Warhead Control in Russia’, Survival, vol. 44, no. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 71–83.

²⁷ Andrey Poshshilin, RIA Novosti, 3 May 2005, reprinted in Yaderniy Kontrol′: Informatsiya, 29 April–5 May 2005, at http://www.pircenter/org/data/publications/yki9-2005.html.

²⁸ Cited in Wade Boese, ‘US–Russian Nuclear Rivalry Lingers’, Arms Control Today, vol. 35, no. 1, January–February 2005, p. 43.

²⁹ Wade Boese, ‘US Sets Missile Defense for Europe, Space’, Arms Control Today, vol. 35, no. 4, May 2005, p. 30.

³⁰ For a review of possible operational arms-control measures involving Russia and the United States see Oleg Bukharin and James Doyle, ‘Transparency and Predictability Measures for US and Russian Strategic Arms Reductions’, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 9, no. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 1–19; Lawrence Korb and Peter Ogden, The Road to Nuclear Security (Washington DC: Fourth Freedom Forum, December 2004); David E. Mosher et al., Beyond the Nuclear Shadow: A Phased Approach for Improving Nuclear Safety and US–Russian Relations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003); and Sergei Rogov et al., ‘Russia and the United States: Reducing Mutual Nuclear Risks’, briefing prepared for the Nuclear Threat Initiative (Moscow: Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2004), at http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Rogov05-20-04presentation.pdf; or as a report, Sergei Rogov et al., Reducing Nuclear Tensions: How Russia and the United States Can Go Beyond Mutual Assured Destruction, 19 January 2005, at http://www.nti.org/c_press/analysis_mad_011905.pdf.