US–Russian threat-reduction programmes

Abstract

Russia and the United States are the most important countries for many vital security issues. They possess the world's largest nuclear weapons arsenals, are involved in the principal regional conflicts, and have lead roles in opposing international terrorism and weapons proliferation. Despite persistent differences on many questions, mutual interests consistently drive Russians and Americans to work together to overcome these impediments.

This Adelphi Paper argues that opportunities for further improving security cooperation between Russia and the United States exist but are limited. Near-term results in the areas of formal arms control or ballistic missile defences are unlikely. The two governments should focus on improving and expanding their joint threat-reduction and non-proliferation programmes, enhancing their military-to-military dialogue regarding Central Asia and defence industrial cooperation, and deepening their anti-terrorist cooperation, both bilaterally and through NATO. Using more market incentives, expanding reciprocity and equal treatment, and limiting the adverse repercussions from disputes over Iran would facilitate progress.

Russia and the United States will not soon become close allies, but they should be able to achieve better security ties given that, on many issues, their shared interests outweigh those that divide them.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Amira Ali, Nicole Aronzon, Hans Binnendijk, Stephen Blank, Caitlin Brand, Eric Brewer, Chris Brown, Sebastian Elischer, J. Charles Griggs, Adrianne Grunblatt, Edeanna Johnson, Ty Matsdorf, Caroline Patton, Klementina Sula, Noemi Szekely, Samir Tata, Brian Wender, Nick Wetzler, Krystal Wilson, Elizabeth Zolotukhina and several anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, run by Senior Fellow Clark Murdoch and Project Coordinator Kathleen McInnis, organised several conferences that allowed me to deliver presentations on Russian–American security issues. The Hudson Institute's Washington Office, directed by Ken Weinstein, and its Center for Future Security Strategies, directed by S. Enders Wimbush, provided an exceptionally favourable environment for conducting research and writing. Many Russian and US policymakers and experts shared their insights with me on an off-the-record basis. Finally, I benefited enormously from the seminars, presentations and discussions organised by the other think-tanks in the Washington area, whose participants are too numerous to list, but whose ideas continue to drive progress in this vital area.

Notes

¹ State Department, United States Initiatives to Prevent Proliferation, 2 May 2005, at http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/other/45456.htm. About $7bn of this total has been spent on enhancing the security of Russia's nuclear weapons; see Carla Anne Robbins and Alan Cullison, ‘In Russia, Securing Its Nuclear Arsenal is an Uphill Battle’, Wall Street Journal, 26 September 2005. The relative financial importance of these programmes is evident in the State Department chart, ‘US Assistance to Russia – Fiscal Year 2005’, 1 June 2005, at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/48458.htm, and the corresponding fact sheets for earlier years.

² Strictly speaking, the term Cooperative Threat Reduction only applies to DOD programmes, but analysts often group all US government threat-reduction activities in Russia under the ‘CTR’ label.

³ National Intelligence Council, Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces (Langley, VA: Central Intelligence Agency, December 2004), at http://www.cia.gov/nic/special_russianuke04.html). See also CIA Director Porter Goss's remarks concerning missing Russian nuclear material during his 16 February 2005 testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, at http://intelligence.senate.gov/0502hrg/050216/goss.pdf.

⁴ ‘Russia Plans Security Exercises at Nuclear Sites’, Global Security Newswire, 3 July 2004.

⁵ Charles L. Thornton, ‘The G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction’, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 9, no. 3, Autumn/Winter 2002, p. 143.

⁶ Rose Gottemoeller, ‘Nuclear Weapons in Current Russian Policy’, in Miller and Trenin (eds), The Russian Military, p. 209.

⁷ The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia (Washington DC: DOE, 10 January 2001), at http://www.seab.energy.gov/publications/rpt.pdf.

⁸ The 9-11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004), p. 381.

⁹ Office of the Democratic Whip, Ensuring America's Strength and Security: A Democratic National Security Strategy for the 21st Century, September 2005, p. 5, at http://democraticwhip.house.gov/docuploads/nationalsecdofinal.pdf.

¹⁰ James Kitfield, ‘Reducing the Threat’, National Journal, 30 April 2005, p. 1,311.

¹¹ Bryan Bender, ‘Cut in Funds for Securing Nuclear Materials Rejected’, Boston Globe, 7 January 2005. The White House overturned the reduction. William Hoehn has written helpful summaries of the DOD, DOE and DOS FY2006 threat-reduction budget requests at http://www.ransac.org/Publications/Congress%20and%20Budget/Federal%20Budget%20and%20Congressional%20Updates/index.asp.

¹² For more on these incidents see Justin Bernier, ‘The Death of Disarmament in Russia?’, Parameters, vol. 34, no. 2, Summer 2004, pp. 90–91; Office of the DOD Inspector-General, Cooperative Threat Reduction: Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Liquid Propellant Disposition Project, no. D-2002-154, Washington DC, September 2002; Office of the DOD Inspector General, Cooperative Threat Reduction: Solid Rocket Motor Disposition Facility, no. D-2003-131, Washington DC, September 2003; and GAO, Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Improved Its Management and Internal Controls, But Challenges Remain, Washington DC, June 2005, Appendix I, pp. 25–27. See also Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 2006 (Washington DC: DOD, 2005), pp. 4–10.

¹³ Igor Kudrik et al., The Russian Nuclear Industry: The Need for Reform, Bellona Report, vol. 4 (Oslo: Bellona Foundation, 2004), pp. 115, 164.

¹⁴ See for example the testimony of Ambassador Linton Brooks, then acting administrator of the NNSA, at the Hearings of the House Armed Services Committee, 4 March 2003; the testimony of Paul Longsworth, NNSA deputy administrator, at the Hearings of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, 24 May 2005; and Joel Wit and Ian Woodcroft, ‘United States’, in Robert J. Einhorn and Michele A. Flournoy (eds), Protecting Against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons: An Action Agenda for the Global Partnership, vol. 3 (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2003), p. 242.

¹⁵ Michael Nguyen, ‘Russia Expects To Double Funding for Chemical Weapons Disposal Activities’, Arms Control Today News Update, 7 September 2004, at http://www.armscontrol.org/aca/midmonth/2004/September/Russia.asp.

¹⁶ Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia's Nuclear Cities Face Challenges (Washington DC: GAO, 3 May 2001).

¹⁷ William Hoehn, ‘Update on Congressional Activity Affecting International Threat Reduction and Cooperative Nonproliferation Programs’, RANSAC Policy Update, August 2005, p. 21, at http://www.ransac.org/Publications/Congress%20and%20Budget/Federal%20Budget%20and%20Congressional%20Updates/index.asp.

¹⁸ US National Academies Committee on US–Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Russian Academy of Sciences Committee on US–Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Non-proliferation, Development, Security and Cooperation, National Research Council, Overcoming Impediments to US–Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2004), p. 44.

¹⁹ ‘US–Russia: No Verification Measures Planned for Moscow Treaty’, Global Security Newswire, 24 July 2003.

²⁰ For a detailed description of these localities, see Yuriy Rumyantsev and Aleksey Kholodov, ‘Conversion Challenges in Russian Nuclear Cities’, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 10, no. 3, Autumn/Winter 2003, pp. 167–182.

²¹ Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed To Facilitate US Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites (Washington DC: GAO, March 2003), p. 7.

²² GAO, Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Improved, pp. 5, 19.

²³ For an assessment of the effects of Russian regional and local actors on threat-reduction issues, see Adam N. Stulberg, ‘Nuclear Regionalism in Russia: Decentralization and Control in the Nuclear Complex’, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 9, no. 3, Autumn/Winter 2002, pp. 31–46.

²⁴ Nabi Abdullaev, ‘A Bush Deal and a Missing Paragraph’, Moscow Times, 1 March 2005; and Pavel Felgenhauer, ‘Stymied by Nuclear Secrecy’, ibid., 26 April 2005.

²⁵ For a history of the Trilateral Agreement on Biological Weapons of 10 September 1992, see Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, second edition (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 61; and Michael Moodie, ‘The Soviet Union, Russia, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention’, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 8, no. 1, Spring 2001, pp. 62–63.

²⁶ See, for example, Paula A. DeSutter, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 4 March 2003, at http://www.state.gov/t/vc/rls/rm/18736.htm; State Department, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, Washington DC, August 2005, pp. 27–31; and Kenneth N. Luongo et al., ‘Building a Forward Line of Defense: Securing Former Soviet Biological Weapons’, Arms Control Today, vol. 34, no. 6, July–August 2004, pp. 18–23.

²⁷ Jeff Zeleny, ‘Strains from Biological Weapons Program Sent to US’, Chicago Tribune, 2 September 2005.

²⁸ Cited in Simon Saradzhyan, ‘FSB Says Terrorists Are Trying To Secure WMD’, Moscow Times, 22 August 2005.

²⁹ Hoehn, ‘Update on Congressional Activity’, pp. 15–16.

³⁰ GAO, Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Improved, p. 19.

³¹ DOS, Adherence and Compliance, p. 61.

³² Ibid., pp. 59, 60.

³³ DOD, Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 2005, Washington DC, 2004, p. 4.

³⁴ Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives (Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government, May 2005), pp. 28, 31.

³⁵ Kenneth Luongo and William Hoehn, ‘An Ounce of Prevention’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 61, no. 2, March–April 2005, p. 30. A ‘trusted agent’ in this context would be a Russian individual or legal entity who enjoyed the trust of the American government and access to sensitive Russian sites, and who could convincingly verify the implementation of threat-reduction projects.

³⁶ David Holley, ‘US–Russian Efforts To Protect Arsenal Gain Steam’, Los Angeles Times, 27 August 2005.

³⁷ ‘Russia Continues To Resist US Access to Nuclear Sites Despite Security Cooperation, NNSA Chief Says’, Global Security Newswire, 3 October 2005.

³⁸ ‘Russia Not To Allow Observers To Visit Nuclear Sites – DM’, MosNews, 9 August 2004, at http://www.mosnews.com/news/2004/08/09/ivanov.shtml. For descriptions of Avaria 2004, see Aleksandr Emel'Yanenkov, ‘Avariya’ na pyat' s plyusom', Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 7 August 2004; Sergey Severinov, ‘“Krash-test” dlya Yadernyx Boezaryadov’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 August 2004; and ‘Nuclear Weapons Accident Response Exercise Held in Murmansk Region’, NATO Update, 25 August 2004, at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/08-august/e0803a.htm.

³⁹ Office of the White House Press Secretary, ‘President Holds Press Conference’, 20 December 2004, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/12/20041220-3.html.

⁴⁰ Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005, p. 28

⁴¹ The 12th Main Directorate is abbreviated as GUMO in Russian.

⁴² Interview with chief of the Ministry of Defence's 12th Main Directorate Igor Valinkin, Izvestiya, 24 May 2005.

⁴³ ‘US, Russia Plan to Defend Nuclear Installations’, Agence France-Presse, 12 July 2005, at http://www.spacewar.com/news/nuclear-blackmarket-05zi.html.

⁴⁴ Rose Gottemoeller, ‘Arms Control in a New Era’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 2, Spring 2002, pp. 53–54.

⁴⁵ GAO, Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Improved, pp. 5, 16–17; and Overcoming Impediments to US–Russian Cooperation, pp. 7, 10, 34, 94–95.

⁴⁶ Additional data on the types and numbers of employees (technicians as well as weapon scientists) at each Russian WMD facility, each site's future expansion or downsizing plans and the activities of their retirees and other former employees would be especially helpful; see John V. Parachini et al., Diversion of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Expertise from the Former Soviet Union: Understanding an Evolving Problem (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), p. 43.

⁴⁷ ‘Brickbat: Visa Rub’, Albuquerque Tribune, 5 April 2004, at http://web.abqtrib.com/archives/opinions04/050504_opinions_edwed.shtml; and James W. Brosnan, ‘Guests of Labs See Visa Trouble’, Scripps Howard News Service, 5 April 2004, at http://web.abqtrib.com/archives/news04/050404_news_visa.shtml.

⁴⁸ Border Security: Streamlined Visa Mantis Program Has Lowered Burden on Foreign Science Students and Scholars, but Further Refinements Needed (Washington DC: GAO, February 2005).

⁴⁹ Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia's Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed (Washington DC: GAO, February 2001), p. 15.

⁵⁰ ‘Russia Reducing Foreign Inspections at Chemical Sites, Increasing Technical Monitoring, Official Says’, Global Security Newswire, 12 November 2004.

⁵¹ US Department of State, ‘Midpoint of the Successful Implementation of the Highly Enriched Uranium Agreement Between the United States and Russia’, Press Statement, 30 September 2005, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/54146.htm.

⁵² Julian Evans, ‘Alarm Over Radioactive Waste Site’, Moscow Times, 15 July 2005.

⁵³ Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier and John P. Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan (Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government, March 2003), pp. 76–77.

⁵⁴ Charles Digges and Igor Kudrik of the Bellona Foundation describe the programme as the Russian nuclear industry's ‘lifeblood’ (‘US Funding in Russia Should Encourage Nuclear Reform in Moscow’, Bellona Position Paper, 3 June 2005), at http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/nuke_industry/co-operation/38312.html. See also Oana C. Diaconu and Michael T. Maloney, ‘Russian Commercial Nuclear Initiatives and US Nuclear Nonproliferation Interests’, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 10, no. 1, Spring 2003, pp. 104–106.

⁵⁵ Gunnar Arbman et al., Eliminating Stockpiles of Highly Enriched Uranium: Options for an Action Agenda in Co-operation with the Russian Federation, Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, April 2004.

⁵⁶ Peter Slevin, ‘US–Russia Plutonium Disposal Project Languishing’, Washington Post, 10 May 2004; and Matthew Wald, ‘US–Russian Plan to Destroy Atom-Arms Plutonium is Delayed’, New York Times, 9 February 2004.

⁵⁷ Unlike conventional nuclear fuel, MOX is a blend containing about 5% plutonium oxide and 95% uranium oxide. The process of irradiating the plutonium agents in a commercial nuclear reactor makes them unusable for weapons production. Experts disagree, however, whether the resulting spent nuclear fuel will be sufficiently radioactive to discourage terrorist use, and about the security and safety risks of transporting and manufacturing MOX fuel. The arguments for and against this technique are summarised in Charles Digges, ‘Technical Agreement for Plutonium Disposition Allowed To Lapse by US’, Bellona Foundation, 30 July 2003, at http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/navy/co-operation/30596.html.

⁵⁸ For a summary of the shutdown agreement and a detailed assessment of its potential problems, see Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Effort To Close Russia's Plutonium Production Reactors Faces Challenges, and Final Shutdown Is Uncertain (Washington DC: GAO, June 2004).

⁵⁹ For a description of the different immobilisation procedures and other issues related to MOX, see Charles Digges, ‘MOX Eludes Mention at Evian G-8 Summit’, 13 June 2003, at http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/nuke_industry/co-operation/29844.html.

⁶⁰ Siegfried S. Hecker, ‘Thoughts about an Integrated Strategy for Nuclear Cooperation with Russia’, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 8, no. 2, Summer 2001, pp. 10, 16. See also Kudrik et al., The Russian Nuclear Industry, pp. 160–161. For signs that some influential Americans may be changing their views, see Steve Fetter and Frank N. von Hippel, ‘Is US Reprocessing Worth the Risk?’, Arms Control Today, vol. 35, no. 7, September 2005, pp. 6–12.

⁶¹ Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005, p. 71.

⁶² David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, ‘Tracking Plutonium Inventories’, ISIS Plutonium Watch, August 2005, p. 2.

⁶³ Einhorn and Flournoy (eds), Protecting Against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, vol. 1, pp. 13–15, 32.

⁶⁴ GAO, Security of Russia's Nuclear Material Improving, p. 18.

⁶⁵ ‘US, Russia Resolve Some Issues Plaguing Chem Demil Program’, Inside the Pentagon, 23 September 2004.

⁶⁶ Igor Khrippunov, ‘Export Control Assistance to Russia and Other FSU States’, in Protecting Against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, vol. 2, pp. 152–53.

⁶⁷ Parachini et al., Diversion of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Expertise from the Former Soviet Union. Survey data suggest that foreign grant programmes have established relationships between Russian and Western weapon scientists that have helped discourage the former from working with rogue states and non-state actors; see Deborah Yarsike Ball and Theodore P. Gerber, ‘Russian Scientists and Rogue States: Does Western Assistance Reduce the Proliferation Threat?’, International Security, vol. 29, no. 4, Spring 2005, pp. 50–77, esp. pp. 72–74, 76–77.

⁶⁸ Steve Goldstein, ‘Experts: Program to Secure Enriched Uranium “Slow”’, Philadelphia Inquirer, 9 February 2004.

⁶⁹ Peter Scoblic, ‘United States, Russia Approve New “HEU Deal” Contract’, Arms Control Today, vol. 32, no. 6, July–August 2002, p. 20.

⁷⁰ Possible ways to accelerate the purchase and elimination of Russia's HEU stocks are discussed in George Perkovich et al., Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2005), pp. 105–107; and Robert L. Civiak, ‘Closing the Gaps: Securing High Enriched Uranium in the Former Soviet Union’ (Washington DC: Federation of American Scientists, May 2002), at http://www.fas.org/ssp/docs/020500-heu/. See also the options developed by a joint Russian–US expert group established at the May 2002 Bush–Putin summit, as described in ‘Joint Statement: Secretary Abraham and Minister Rumyantsev’, 16 September 2002, at http://www.ne.doe.gov/home/09-16-02.html. The Nuclear Threat Initiative is funding a Russian study to assess various options for increasing the amount of Russian HEU blended down annually; see NTI Annual Report 2004, Washington DC, 2004, p. 18.

⁷¹ For a summary of the ISTC's activities in Russia, see its 2004 Annual Report at http://www.istc.ru.istc/website.nsf/html/04/en/index.htm.

⁷² Jeffrey Read, ‘Reported Accomplishments of Selected Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs, By Agency, for Fiscal Year 2004’, RANSAC Policy Update, July 2005, p. 6, at http://www.ransac.org/Publications/Reports%20and%20Publications/Reports/index.asp.

⁷³ These problems are reviewed in Derek Averre, Kenneth N. Luongo and Maurizio Martellini (eds), Advancing Bio Threat Reduction: Findings From an International Conference (Washington DC: Russian–American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, 2004); Maurizio Martellini and Kenneth Luongo, ‘The G-8 Global Partnership Initiative: Prioritizing Nonproliferation and Security Concerns’, 5 May 2003, unpublished paper at http://www.sgpproject.org/events/LuongoMartelliniPaper050503.htm; and Reshaping US–Russian Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the Second Decade (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Russian–American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, 2002), pp. 34–35.

⁷⁴ On the more general problems with US-funded threat-reduction efforts to promote commercially viable defence conversion in the FSU, see Henry D. Sokolski and Thomas Riisager (eds), Beyond Nunn–Lugar: Curbing the Next Wave of Weapons Proliferation Threats from Russia (Washington DC: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, April 2002).

⁷⁵ Kenneth N. Luongo et al., ‘Security Culture in the NIS’, University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security Monitor, vol. 11, no. 1, Spring 2005, pp. 5–6.

⁷⁶ John Mintz and Joby Warrick, ‘US Unprepared Despite Progress, Experts Say’, Washington Post, 8 November 2004.

⁷⁷ Sue Vorenberg, ‘Siberian Challenges Beckon to Bioscientists’, Albuquerque Tribune, 10 November 2003.

⁷⁸ Derek Averre, ‘From Co-option to Cooperation: Reducing the Threat of Biological Agents and Weapons’, in Einhorn and Flournoy (eds), Protecting Against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, vol. 2, p. 45.

⁷⁹ Russian military activities in this area are discussed in ‘Tsena protivoyadiya ot bioterrorizma’ [interview with Lt-Gen. Vladimir Filippov], Krasnaya Zvezda, 13 November 2004.

⁸⁰ Additional areas of possible collaboration between Russian and US weapon scientists are described in Strategies for Russian Nuclear Complex Downsizing and Redirection: Options for New Directions (Washington DC: Russian–American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, June 2003), pp. 3, 25.

⁸¹ ‘Observations on US Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs in Russia’, Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade, GAO, Before the House Armed Services Committee, Washington DC, 5 March 2003, pp. 1–2, 5–6.

⁸² For a discussion of Russia's persistent economic weaknesses, see Eugene B. Rumer and Celeste A. Wallander, ‘Russia: Power in Weakness?’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 1, 2003, pp. 57–73.

⁸³ See, for example, Einhorn and Flournoy (eds), Protecting Against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapon, vol. 1, pp. 3, 12–13; and Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid, ‘How to Effectively Confront Nuclear Threat from Terrorists’, USA Today, 25 August 2005.

⁸⁴ Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005, pp. 32–34, 67–68; and National Intelligence Council, Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces, February 2002, at http://www.cia.gov/nic/special_russiannnucfac.html.

⁸⁵ Zhanna Voronova, RIA Novosti, 17 June 2005, reprinted in Yaderniy Kontrol′: Informatsiya, 15–22 June 2005, at http://www.pircenter/org/data/publications/yki16-2005.html.

⁸⁶ Michael Nguyen, ‘Russia Speeds Chemical Weapons Disposal’, Arms Control Today, vol. 35, no. 1, January–February 2005, p. 44.

⁸⁷ ITAR-TASS, 30 June 2005, reprinted in Yaderniy Kontrol′: Informatsiya, 29 June–6 July 2005, at http://www.pircenter/org/data/publications/yki18-2005.html.

⁸⁸ ‘Russia No Longer Funding Bioterrorism Countermeasures Research, Scientist Says’, Global Security Newswire, 2 February 2005.

⁸⁹ Jenifer Mackby and Ola Dahlman, ‘Bioterrorism and a Layered Approach to Biodefense’, SGP Issue Brief, no. 5 (October 2005), at http://www.sgpproject.org/publications/publications_index.html#SGPIssueBriefs.

⁹⁰ Ivan Lebedev, ITAR-TASS, 17 June 2005, reprinted in Yaderniy Kontrol′: Informatsiya, 15–22 June 2005, at http://www.pircenter/org/data/publications/yki16-2005.html.

⁹¹ C. J. Chivers, ‘Keeping That Special Glow Safe at Home’, New York Times, 2 May 2005.

⁹² For more on the taxation issue, see Overcoming Impediments to US–Russian Cooperation, pp. 28–29, 79–81, 95. Specific recommendations for changing the Russian tax code appear in US National Academies Committee on US and Russian Cooperative Nuclear Nonproliferation and Russian Academy of Sciences Committee on US and Russian Cooperative Nuclear Nonproliferation, Strengthening US–Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2005), pp. 25–26.

⁹³ Paul F. Walker of Global Green USA, presentation at RANSAC 2005 Congressional Seminar Series, 15 July 2005.

⁹⁴ The CTR Umbrella Agreement's formal name is ‘Agreement Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage, and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation’. For a discussion of the conditions pertaining to its provisional extension in 1999, see Susan Koch, ‘Cooperative Threat Reduction Negotiations: Lessons Learned’, in Strengthening US–Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation, pp. 61–68.

⁹⁵ Peter Eisler, ‘Renewal of Deal To Help Secure Russian Arms in Doubt’, USA Today, 14 December 2004.

⁹⁶ See, for example, Rumyantsev's comments in an interview in Andrey Zlobin, ‘Na chustvetel'nye yadernie ob'ekti Rossii dostup amerikantsam zakritt’, Vremya Novostey, 12 May 2005, reprinted in Yaderniy Kontrol′: Informatsiya, 5–12 May 2005, at http://www.pircenter/org/data/publications/yki10-2005.html.

⁹⁷ Keith J. Costa, ‘US Trumpets Progress with Russia on Plutonium Disposition Liability’, Inside the Pentagon, 12 May 2005.

⁹⁸ Christine Kucia, ‘Liability Concerns Jeopardize Renewal of Nonproliferation Programs With Russia’, Arms Control Today, vol. 33, no. 7, September 2003, p. 40. The NCI has since been incorporated into DOE's new Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention programme.

⁹⁹ See for example the remarks of John Bolton, cited in Mike Nartker, ‘Bolton Takes Heat for Plutonium Disposal Effort’, Global Security Newswire, 16 June 2004.

¹⁰⁰ ‘Reframe Liability Talks with Russia, US Nuclear Vendors Tell Rice’, Nuclear Fuel, 6 June 2005, at http://construction.ecnext.com/coms2/summary_0249-47259_ITM_platts. For a discussion of possible ways to overcome the liability dispute, see R. Douglas Brubaker and Leonard S. Spector, ‘Liability and Western Nonproliferation Assistance to Russia: Time for a Fresh Look?’, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 10, no. 101, Spring 2003, pp. 1–39.

¹⁰¹ For more on the proposed agreement, see ‘Liability Agreement with Russia: A Reversal of US Hard Line’, RANSAC Press Release, 21 July 2005; Simon Saradzhyan, ‘Key Nuclear Dispute Is Resolved’, Moscow Times, 20 July 2005; ‘Sen. Domenici: US, Russia Agree on Liability for Plutonium Disposition’, Inside the Pentagon, 21 July 2005; and Office of Senator Pete Domenici, ‘Long-Awaited US–Russia Plutonium Liability Agreement Is Critical Step in Right Direction’, 19 July 2005, at http://domenici.senate.gov/news/printrecord.cfm?id=240897. As of mid-October 2005, the Russian government was still evaluating the text of the proposed agreement, which had already been cleared by the US National Security Council; see ‘Moscow's OK for Cooperative Security Liabilities Deal Expected Soon’, Inside the Pentagon, 13 October 2005.

¹⁰² See for example Task Force of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia, January 2001, p. 2; Bunn, Wier and Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads, pp. xi, xiv, 38–39, 42, 93, 99–101; Richard A. Clarke et al., Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Action (New York: Century Foundation, 2004), p. 7; and Agenda for Security: Controlling the Nuclear Threat (Washington DC: Center for American Progress, February 2005), p. 15.

¹⁰³ Office of the White House Press Secretary, ‘Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation with Russia’, 30 June 2005, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050630-4.html.

¹⁰⁴ A Russian study has highlighted the value of encouraging presidential involvement in the bilateral relationship: ‘The presidents are more supportive of closer cooperation between the two countries than probably 90 percent of their respective bureaucracies’. See Kuchins et al., US–Russian Relations, p. 15. The role of former President Clinton in promoting bilateral threat-reduction initiatives is highlighted in Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), p. 76. The importance of individual initiative became apparent in 2003, when a months-long freeze in new CTR projects only ended after Senator Richard Lugar personally lobbied Bush to intervene to break the congressional logjam responsible for the hiatus; see Martin Schram, ‘Tighten Controls on Russian Arsenals’, Newsday, 13 October 2004.

¹⁰⁵ Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better Integration (Washington DC: GAO, January 2005). A helpful matrix on the ‘Bureaucratic Overlap and Diffused Responsibility’ afflicting the US agencies involved in threat reduction in Russia appears in Brian Finlay and Andrew Grotto, The Race To Secure Russia's Loose Nukes: Progress Since 9/11 (Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center and Center for American Progress, September 2005), p. 19.

¹⁰⁶ Cited in Joe Fiorill, ‘New DHS Office To Have Some Authority over Threat Reduction, Export Controls, Says Acting Head’, Global Security Newswire, 21 April 2005. The reorganisation of the State Department's non-proliferation and arms-control offices will require new mechanisms of interagency cooperation. The restructuring is discussed in Office of the DOS Spokesman, ‘Beginning To Transform the State Department To Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century’, 29 July 2005, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/50371.htm; and Wade Boese, ‘State Department Announces Reorganization’, Arms Control Today, vol. 35, no. 8, October 2005, pp. 33.

¹⁰⁷ John Mintz and Joby Warrick, ‘US Unprepared Despite Progress, Experts Say’, Washington Post, 8 November 2004.

¹⁰⁸ Einhorn and Flournoy (eds), Protecting Against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, vol. 4, pp. 11, 129. See also the assessment of British BW expert Derek Averre in Next Generation Threat Reduction: Bioterrorism's Challenges and Solutions, report of the third meeting of the New Defence Agenda's Bioterrorism Reporting Group (Brussels: Bibliotheque Solvay, 25 January 2005), pp. 51–52.

¹⁰⁹ For more on Putin's decision, and an assessment of how to coordinate threat-reduction programmes within the Russian government, see Einhorn and Flournoy (eds), Protecting Against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, vol. 4, pp. 19–20.

¹¹⁰ Matthew Bouldin, ‘Russian Government Restructuring and the Future of WMD Threat Reduction Cooperation: A Preliminary Analysis’, RANSAC Policy Update, March 2004, at http://www.ransac.org; and Cristina Chuen, ‘The 2004 Russian Government Reforms’, 13 July 2004, at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040713.htm.

¹¹¹ ‘Russian Government Restructuring and the Future of WMD Threat Reduction Cooperation’, RANSAC Policy Update, May 2004, at http://www.ransac.org.

¹¹² ‘New Developments’, Global Partnership Update, no. 4, May 2004, p. 4, at http://www.sgpproject.org/publications.

¹¹³ Kudrik et al., The Russian Nuclear Industry, pp. 27–28.

¹¹⁴ Ivan Safronov, ‘Sergey Ivanov Otvetit za Poluraspad’, Kommersant, 10 August 2004.

¹¹⁵ GAO, Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Improved, p. 21.

¹¹⁶ GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate US Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites, p. 53.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 40.

¹¹⁸ RIA Novosti, 10 September 2004, reprinted in Yaderniy Kontrol′: Informatsiya, 8–15 September 2004, at http://www.pircenter/org/data/publications/yki32-2004.html.

¹¹⁹ The utility of the Gore–Chernomyrdin Commission is evident in the accounts of James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose: US Policy Toward Russia after the Cold War (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2003), pp. 106, 158, 164; and Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 2002), pp. 59, 69, 142. The body's formal title was the US–Russian Bi-national Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation.

¹²⁰ Michael McFaul, Re-engaging Russia and Russians: New Agenda for American Foreign Policy (Washington DC: Center for American Progress, 25 October 2004), p. 5.

¹²¹ Gottemoeller, ‘Arms Control in a New Era’, pp. 50–51.

¹²² David Smigielski, ‘An Overview of the 2002 CT Certification Crisis’, Russian–American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, April 2003, at http://www.ransac.org.

¹²³ ‘Senate Passes Legislation To Lift CTR Funding Restrictions in Russia’, Inside Missile Defense, 3 August 2005.

¹²⁴ For more on the new performance measures for CTR projects see DOD, Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 2005, Washington DC, 2004, pp. 8, 16.

¹²⁵ GAO, Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Improved, Appendix II, pp. 28–29.

¹²⁶ The Commission on America's National Interests and Russia, Advancing American Interests and the US–Russian Relationship (Washington DC: The Nixon Center, September 2003), at http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/fr.htm.