The European Onion? How Differentiated Integration is Reshaping the EU

Abstract

This paper provides an up‐to‐date overview of the gradual development of differentiated integration and the ensuing changes in the nature of European integration. It considers the dynamics of deepening and widening of the EU and proposes the metaphor of a ‘European Onion’ that is designed to capture the bigger picture. Further, this paper expands upon the centripetal effects of differentiated integration and shows its potential to generate more cooperative public opinion in future enlargement rounds. Finally a state of play in European integration theory is offered that incorporates differentiated integration.

Key Words:

• European Union
• European integration
• differentiated integration
• policy implementation
• political theory

Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank Stanley Hoffmann, Stefan Collignon, Jorge de Oliveira e Sousa, Koen Lenaerts, Alex Warleigh, and anonymous referees for their insights and comments; needless to say, of course, the usual disclaimer applies. The author furthermore wishes to extend his gratitude to Professor and Mrs John Kenneth Galbraith for the comfort and quiet of their home’s third floor where this paper took shape.

Notes

1. It is beyond the scope of this paper to give due attention to the specificities of each notion describing the process where a subgroup of European states choose to achieve a greater level of integration. For the sake of simplicity, ‘differentiated integration’ will be used systematically (e.g. Stubb 1996; Egeberg & Trondal 1999; Closa 2005; Kölliker 2005). While incapable of capturing the differences between the many existing notions, differentiated integration is sufficiently descriptive and encompasses the following terminologies: flexible integration (e.g. Stubb 2002); asymmetrical integration (Sbragia 1993); subgroupism (Rosenau 1998); closer cooperation (Amsterdam Treaty); enhanced cooperation (Nice Treaty); structural cooperation (Constitutional Treaty albeit specifically related to ESDP); multi‐speed (e.g. Martin & Ottaviano 1995); double speed (Hoffmann 2000); variable‐geometry (e.g. Pisani‐Ferry 1997); concentric circles (e.g. Usher 1997); à la carte Europe (e.g. Verhofstadt in press); poly‐centric Europe (Wind 1998); vanguard nations (Fischer 2000); pioneer group (Chirac 2000, 2006); core Europe (e.g. Hoffmann in De Schoutheete 2000); “hub and spokes” Europe (Miles 2003); advanced integration (Lenaerts & Van Nuffel in press). Stubb (1996) offered a categorization of differentiated integration based upon the notions of time, space and matter; the terminologies that relate to these distinctions are respectively “multi‐speed”, “variable geometry”, and “à la carte”. While this paper supports the idea that these terminologies are subcategories of differentiated integration, it would question the key distinction that Stubb made between “multi‐speed” and “variable geometry”. Multi‐speed necessarily implies variable geometry, and the latter cannot simply be identified as those modes of differentiated integration “allowing permanent or irreversible separation between hard core and lesser developed integrative units” (Stubb 1996, 285).

2. The author claims originality of the notion of “European Onion” and is grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out that the words have appeared previously in Kempe & Meurs (2002).

3. Admittedly, when Ruggie described the EU as a multiperspectival polity he envisaged it primarily as the “unbundling of territoriality” (Ruggie 1993, 172; 1998, 172, 195). Ruggie concurred that, over time, others have seemingly enlarged the notion to incorporate greater complexity. It would, perhaps, be of interest to research the concepts of the ‘unbundling of sovereignty’ and the ‘unbundling of identity’ within the context of the EU; doing so might parallell Ruggie’s original concept of the “unbundling of territoriality” and perhaps even enrich it.

4. The ‘finalité politique’ of European integration has not been subscribed to by all. Desomer & Lenaerts (2002) claimed European integration to be piecemeal engineering without the explicit consideration of the final goal of European integration. Cohen‐Tanugi (1995, 168) posited that European integration was “having no shared vision, nor even any clear and consensual individual perspective of the future of the European venture”. While EU member states have — for good reason — preferred to refrain from agreeing on a political end‐point of European integration, the “many eurosceptics have long feared that European integration is moving ineluctably in this direction” (Morgan 2005, 5). In this case, the eurosceptics may well be right.

5. Perhaps an argument can be constructed to claim that it was not the developments in the mid‐1980s that were the first manifestations of differentiated integration, as is recorded. Rather, a multi‐layered Europe was conceptualized and introduced with the ‘Association Agreement’ (e.g. as extended to Turkey in 1963). The aim of an Association Agreement is to progressively integrate the associated country into a customs union with the EU. While this does not formally extend EU membership it does allow a country to move onto an outer layer of a European Onion and effectively implicates a country into the process of European integration.

6. The aim of ‘enhanced cooperation’ is to allow a number of member states that are willing and able to further European integration within the ‘single institutional framework’.

7. More recently, the EU concluded “Euro‐Mediterranean Association Agreements” with Syria (October 2004), Tunisia (since 1998), Israel (2000), Morocco (2000), Algeria (2001), Lebanon (2002), Jordan (2002), Egypt (2004) and, on an interim basis, with the Palestinian Authority (1997). The Euro‐Mediterranean Association Agreements govern the bilateral relations which vary across the different Mediterranean Partners. Unlike with Turkey, these agreements do not aim at etablishing a joint customs union.

8. The SAA essentially plays the role of the erstwhile Europe Agreement that was extended to the Central and Eastern European countries before they joined the EU. The SAA is the official policy of the EU for the Western Balkan countries.

9. The European Economic Area entered into force in 1994 and allows three non‐EU countries (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein) to partake in the EU common market; these countries are consulted by the European Commission on the formulation of Community legislation relevant to them, but have no right in decision making.

10. In 1992, Switzerland voted against entering the EEA, in the meanwhile, however, Switzerland has negotiated sixteen bilateral sector agreements through which it has obtained considerable access to the EU common market. Consequently, even though Switzerland never entered an Association Agreement nor a Stabilization and Association Agreement it is evident that Switzerland’s position within European integration is at least equivalent to those European states that do formally benefit from such agreements. Switzerland voted to enter the Schengen Agreement in June 2005.

11. The Treaty of Nice introduced significant changes aimed at simplifying the mechanism of ‘enhanced cooperation’. First, other member states can no longer prevent the establishment of ‘enhanced cooperation’. Secondly, the minimum required number of member states has been set at eight, irrespective of the total number of member states.

12. I follow Zielonka (2001, 515):

The argument here is not that divergence is bad in itself and therefore that the EU would be well advised to forget about enlargement because of the expected impact of divergence. The argument here, let us repeat, is that enlargement makes it less likely for the EU to become a Westphalian type of state. One does not need to be a disciple of Max Weber to acknowledge that ambitious projects of political, economic, and military integration can only work in a relatively homogenous environment. Common laws and administrative regulations cannot cope well with a high degree of diversity, and so various complicated opt‐outs and multi‐speed arrangements ensue.

13. “Schroeder speaks out for multi‐speed Europe”, EUobserver, 15 April 2004.

14. See the original Franco‐German proposal by Fischer and de Villepin (2002) Joint Franco‐German Proposals to the European Convention on an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 28 November, doc. CONV. 435/02.

15. I am indebted to Jorge de Oliveira e Sousa, for drawing my attention to this argument.

16. Of course, it is important to note that European integration as such continues to receive the support of a vast majority of the European public. For example, with the 2005 constitutional referenda, “neither the French nor the Dutch were rejecting Europe per se: opinion polls in both countries show that almost 90 percent want to stay in the European Union” (Leonard 2005, 13).

17. Andrew Moravcsik, Brussels diary (Prospect, October 2005).

18. It is important to note the research carried out by Kölliker on the type of cases that benefit from what is labelled here as the ‘stick’ centripetal effect: “Differentiated integration theory suggests that such centripetal effects of flexible arrangements on initially reluctant outsiders depend both on whether non‐participants can be excluded from the benefits cooperation generates, as well as on whether the consumption of such benefits is rival, neutral, or even complementary” (Kölliker 2005, 19).

19. Flash Eurobarometer 140 “Enlargement of the European Union”, EOS Gallup Europe, March 2003. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/flash_arch_en.htm (accessed 4 September 2006).

20. Special Eurobarometer 255, “Attitudes towards European Union Enlargement”, July 2006. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_255_en.pdf (accessed 4 September 2006).