The EU’s Performance in the United Nations Security Council

Abstract

Performance in the United Nations (UN) is a key element of the EU’s ‘effective multilateralism’ strategy, especially in the UN Security Council (UNSC) that constitutes one of the two most significant political organs of the organization. In this article, we assess the EU’s performance in the UNSC by looking at two particular aspects of the EU-UNSC interaction: first, the broader political and financial contribution of EU member states in the UNSC functioning and second, the engagement of EU member states in the different stages of the UNSC reform process. On the first aspect, the analysis suggests a positive EU performance, with some inevitable variation across the cases examined, reflecting different political constellation dynamics in the intra-EU deliberations. On the second aspect, there is a clear lack of a coherent, articulated EU position beyond the rhetorical adherence to the necessity of institutional reform, highlighting the minimal EU relevance for its priority stakeholders to meet their political aspirations.

Key Words:

• EU
• performance
• UN
• Security Council

Notes

1. See for example European Commission (2005), European Union (2004).

2. Besides the two permanent members (UK and France), EU member states are members of three different regional groups, the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), the Eastern European Group (EES) and Cyprus in the Asian Group. Thus, in theory, six EU members can serve in the UNSC simultaneously.

3. Any UNSC member can (co-)sponsor a resolution; a non-UNSC member can also submit a proposal but it is put to the vote only at the request of a UNSC member (Rule 38 of the UNSC Rules of Procedure).

4. The Presidency statements have had mainly a declaratory and symbolic nature and were usually less than 40 per year. From 2000 to 2006, the EU HR, Javier Solana, was invited to address the UNSC only four times.

5. See, for instance, the statements of the EU HR, Lady Ashton, in the UNSC meetings on 4 May 2010 and 8 February 2011 (UN Doc. S/PV.6306, 4 May 2010 and UN Doc. S/PV. 6477, 8 February 2011). For these UN documents, see http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact.htm

6. However, the two permanent UNSC members have fought hard to preserve the acknowledgement of their special status as enshrined in the EU treaties from Maastricht onwards. This provision has not been challenged in the Lisbon Treaty, which also stipulates that ‘[m]ember states which are members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, defend the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter’ (Art. 34, para 2.ii).

7. Resolution 1958 of 15 December 2010 and Resolution 1973 of 17 March 2011. See http://www.un.org/Docs/sc

8. These are Resolutions 1737 of 2006 (23 December 2006), 1747 of 2007 (24 March 2007), 1803 and 1835 of 2008 (3 March 2008 and 27 September 2008, the latter together with other European non-permanent UNSC members – Italy, Belgium, and Croatia – as well as the US and Russia), and 1929 of 2010 (9 June 2010, together with the US). For these UNSC Resolutions, see http://www.un.org/Docs.sc

9. However, Germany approved the Council legislation set in place to implement Resolution 1973 (Council Decision 2011/ 178/CFSP of 23 March 2011)

10. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of UN peacekeeping operations, UN Doc. A/64/220, 23 September 2009. The data are based on the results of the application of the methodology used in preparing the scale of assessments for the period 2007–2009 to GNI data for the period 2002–2007, and Global Policy Forum (2011).

11. The UfC group is a direct descendant of the ‘Coffee Club’ that blocked the Razali initiative in 1997.

12. See United Nations (2007).

13. The Italian reform proposal can be found in UN Doc. A/AC.247/5 (g), annex, 15 May 1995, found in UN Doc. A/49/965, 18 September 1995. For the Spanish positions, see the remarks of the Spanish Permanent Representative in the UNGA (UN Doc. GAOR, A/50/57, 13 November 1995, pp. 8–9).

14. See the common position of the Nordic countries (UN Doc. A/AC.247/5 (j), found in UN Doc.A/49/965, 18 September 1995). On the positions of the ‘middle powers’ (including the Netherlands), see Laatikainen 2006.

15. See the speech of the Portuguese Permanent Representative in the UNGA (UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, 4 December 1997, pp. 43–44).

16. These criteria comprised the capacity and willingness of the candidate states to contribute to international peace and security though peacekeeping and peacemaking operations and by assuming additional financial obligations. However, they avoided taking a clear position on the thorny question of extending the veto to new permanent members. See UN Doc. A/AC.247/5 (c), 9 May 1995, found in UN Doc. A/49/965, 18 September 1995; and UN Doc. A/50/PV. 59, 14 November 1995, pp. 15–16. On the positions of the ‘new Europe’, see also Johansson-Nogués 2006.

17. For Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Belgium, and Portugal, see UN Doc. A/52/PV.63, 4 December 1997, and for Ireland, UN Doc. A/52/64, 5 December 1997.

18. See UN Doc. A/52/PV.64, 5 December 1997.

19. See the speech of the Italian Permanent Representative in the UNGA (UN Doc. GAOR, A/53/PV.66, 23 November 1998, p. 5).

20. See UN Doc. A/59/L.64, 6 July 2005.

21. See, for instance, for Finland UN Doc. A/60/PV.95, 20 July 2006, p. 18; and UN Doc. A/61/PV. 73, 11 December 2006, pp. 22–23. For Sweden see UN Doc. A/61/PV. 74, 12 December 2006, pp. 21–22. See the speeches of the Slovakian, Bulgarian and Slovenian Permanent Representatives in the UNGA (UN Doc A/60/PV. 96, 21 July 1996, p. 10, UN Doc A/60/PV. 95, 20 July 1996, pp. 25–26; and UN Doc A/60/PV. 95, 20 July 1996, pp. 27–28). See also the statement of the Lithuanian Secretary of Foreign Affairs at the 60th session of UN Plenary Assembly (20 September 2005).

22. See the statement of the Dutch Permanent Representative in the UNGA (UN Doc. A/61/PV. 73, 11 December 2006, pp. 8–10). See the speech of the Cypriot Permanent Representative in the OEWG and the UNGA (UN Doc. A/60/PV. 96, 21 July 2006, p. 27; and UN Doc.A/61/PV.75, 12 December 2006, pp. 22–23).

23. See the speeches of the Italian, Spanish and Maltese Permanent Representatives in the UNGA (UN Doc. A/60/PV65, 20 July 2006, pp. 23–24; and UN Doc. A/60/PV. 96, 21 July 2006, pp. 27–28).

24. Question No. H-856/95 by Mr. Kranidiotis on the representation of the EU in the Security Council, Doc. 95/389, 12 December 1995. According to Mr. Westendorp, then President–in-Office of the Council, the IGC would not be an appropriate venue to discuss the issue, reinstating the lack of a common EU position on this matter.

25. Resolution on the reform of the United Nations, B6-0328-2005, 6 June 2005; and Recommendation to the Council on the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 8 June 2011, based on the Report A7-0189-2011.