ABSTRACT
An influential argument holds that labour unions are not likely to succeed in their objectives through current European decision-making processes. In addition, the European Union has extensive leverage to introduce negative integration due to asymmetries towards liberalization in the treaties. Given such arguments it is of interest to study a case, where attempts of EU liberalization reform have failed and labour unions claim this is their victory. An in-depth analysis of the decision-making process of the proposal for a Port Directive highlights that labour unions are most influential when they are able to exploit the division of industry interests to resoundingly oppose policy change. Moreover, the analysis highlights the importance of including large societal groups in consultations.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Jarle Trondal, Claudio Radaelli, Eva Lieberherr and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier drafts of this paper as well as to the participants of the Workshop ‘Interest Group Influence in the Era of Multi-Level Governance’ at the ECPR Joint Sessions Conference, 11–14 April 2012. A special thanks also goes out to the interviewees for their time, making it possible to formulate this paper. I would also like to thank the European Commission for inviting me to observe a meeting, where desk officers from different Directorate-Generals met to discuss the Port Directive.
Notes
1. Whilst French and Belgian labour unions were strongly against the proposal and early contacted their national governments and socialist partners in the Parliament, the Spanish and Italian labour unions were initially supportive due to the clause that would allow for self-handling—this could facilitate for more maritime transport between the ports of Genoa and Barcelona (Interview r).