A Pragmatic Actor — The US Response to the Arab Uprisings

Abstract

After the US had initially assessed the Arab uprisings as an opportunity and displayed a dual role understanding as an anchor of security and modest advocate of democracy, the second role understanding faded the more the US perceived the uprisings as a risk rather than an opportunity. In respect to practice, the US response did not show clear patterns in terms of goals or instruments it pursued, which would correspond to the development of these role understandings or to predefined geostrategic interests. Indeed, it seems that the US has switched from default to ad hoc modus in its foreign policy in the region which challenges both, the rational actor, as well as the normative actor model. Instead, it might be more appropriate to speak of a pragmatic actor who had to navigate through an array of constraints, including new realities in the MENA region on one hand and domestic and bureaucratic politics in the US on the other.

Key Words:

• US
• Arab uprisings
• security
• democracy
• foreign policy

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the editors of this volume, as well as Nathalie Tocci and Riccardo Alcaro for their comments on earlier versions of this article.

Notes

1. Note that in the remainder of this article, the terms ‘stable order’ and ‘security’ will be used in this specific US understanding, i.e. a stable order is one that the US sees as beneficial for the security of the US, Israel, and the flow of energy.

2. As Halliday (2005) has argued, paradoxically Arab countries enjoyed more freedom during the cold war than since the fall of the USSR.

3. On the pitfalls of politicizing an academic theory, see Ish-Shalom (2008).

4. Another good example is Obama’s address to the nation on the situation in Libya in which he states his belief that ‘this movement of change cannot turned back’ and that ‘(f)or generations, the United States of America has played a unique role as an anchor of global security and as an advocate for human freedom’ (italics added), that only the people in the region can dictate the pace and scope of change, but that the US ‘can make a difference’ (Obama 2011b).

5. It should be noted that US administrations have differentiated between militant and political Islam which became maybe most obvious in the aftermath of 9/11 when US politicians started to present Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) as a model worthy of emulation in the whole region, see Taspinar (2007) and the article of Ayata (2014).

6. In his keynote address on the Arab Spring in May 2011, Obama argued that the road to democratization would go through economic liberalization: ‘We think it’s important to focus on trade, not just aid; and investment, not just assistance. The goal must be a model in which protectionism gives way to openness; the reigns of commerce pass from the few to the many, and the economy generates jobs for the young. America’s support for democracy will therefore be based on ensuring financial stability; promoting reform; and integrating competitive markets with each other and the global economy’ (Obama 2011c).

7. After a crackdown on civil society in Egypt, the administration threatened to withhold aid not in response to the crackdown, but to press Cairo on lifting a travel ban on American civil society representatives which had fled in the US embassy. In March 2012, when the travel ban was lifted, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton waived new legal conditions of Congress on US aid to Egypt ‘on the basis of America’s national security interest’ (Department of State 2012a).

8. On a detailed overview of aid delivery and Congressional legislation on the issue, see Greenfield, Hawthorne, and Balfour (2013), Sharp (2013), and McInerney and Bockenfeld (2014).

9. Forty-five per cent prefer to keep economic aid, 41% think it should be decreased or stopped (up 7% points since 2010). Regarding military aid, 15% want to increase it, 45% prefer to keep it, and 38% want to decrease or stop it (Smeltz 2012, 31).