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Abstract
This article explores and explains the drivers of the EU-China-Africa trilateral cooperation initiative. In order to do so a qualitative assessment was made of how well the various hypotheses flowing from three candidate theories neorealism, institutionalism and the bureaucratic politics model (BPM) fit this policy initiative. It specifically tests them across three distinct stages of the policy cycle, including issue identification, decision-making and policy implementation. Cutting the dependent variable into policy stages allows us to see if the independent variables truly are powerful. This study demonstrates that institutionalism contributes to a better understanding of every distinct stage of the policy process regarding the EU-China-Africa trilateral cooperation initiative. Aspects of neorealism illuminate some stages of the policy process as well, while BPM is only applicable to a limited degree.
Acknowledgement
The author would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers and the editor for their constructive feedback and encouraging comments.
Notes
1. However, FOCAC mainly functions as a platform for Chinese public relations, rather than a forum for negotiation (Wu Citation2012, 110).
2. However, this trade is limited to a few countries and a few commodities, with the main interests of China in raw commodities including oil, minerals and timber (Mazimhaka Citation2013, 102).
3. For analytical purposes and for manageability reasons we focus on three policy stages thus not including the policy formulation stage. Policy formulation is encapsulated in the decision-making stage though.
4. In 2003 no Summit had place, however on 8-9 December 2007 the second Africa-EU Summit was held in Lisbon and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy was launched (Council of the European Union Citation2007).
5. The Presidency of the Council of the EU (in short ‘The Presidency’) is taken in turn by each of the EU member states according to a rotation system for a predetermined period of six months.
6. Correspondingly, in the Council conclusions of December 2006 the EU member states stated they intend ‘to begin as soon as possible the structured dialogue on Africa with China as agreed at the September 2006 Summit. This is an area of key strategic interest to both the EU and China, demonstrated by the EU's strategy on Africa and the China-Africa Cooperation Forum in Beijing in November 2006’ (Council of the European Union Citation2006: 7).
7. It is worthwhile mentioning the non-existence of concrete ready-to-implement policy instruments through which the EU could limit Chinese influence in Africa (Huliaras and Magliveras Citation2008).
8. The delay of the release of the Commission’s communication that had originally to be presented before the EU-Africa summit in December 2007, can to a large degree be explained by the EU’s difficult consultations with Chinese policy-makers (Stahl Citation2012).
9. RELEX prevailed in the end through a compromise of having their own paper with an Annex written by DG Trade.
10. In terms of debate among constituencies the Nordic countries and the Netherlands were among the member states that had to be convinced to drop strong support for good governance in the initiative.
11. As was mentioned by Carbone, ‘some pressure’ was placed by ‘some European enterprises,’ predominantly those operating in the infrastructure sector, as their main concern was that Chinese firms would be able to win all the contracts tendered by African governments, however these actions had mainly place at the national level (Carbone Citation2011, 214, 215). Hackenesch also mentioned that French construction firms felt the strong competition of Chinese companies and put pressure on their government (Hackenesch Citation2009).
12. In this context, the DFID office in Beijing was relevant. DG DEV and DFID Beijing had meetings, while DG DEV officials also met with the UK Foreign Office.
13. Chinese officials were not pleased with the Commission publishing a paper on China and Africa because it was seen as sensitive, also in their own relations with African countries. However, they accepted it and were pleased that at least DG Development consulted with them on it so they were not taken by surprise and could take preparations (Interview senior EU official November Citation2015).
14. As in most other cases the Commission drafted the Council conclusions.
15. With the establishment of the EEAS there became more continuity, as they took this role over from the rotating Presidency.
16. France and the UK have established their own bilateral dialogues with China on Africa, and Germany has its Ankerländer concept, which focuses on trilateral cooperation with China and other emerging countries.