ABSTRACT
After the Lisbon Treaty came into effect, the European Parliament has seen its powers over the negotiations of the European Union’s annual budget reduced. This article shows that, despite initial setbacks and a position of relative weakness in the budgetary negotiations, the Parliament can extract, through threat of veto, significant concessions in the three pillars of the budget: annual expenditure; long-term expenditure; and the revenue side. Through process tracing and interviews with key actors, the article evaluates the Parliament’s successes and failures in negotiating the 2013 budget package and the circumstances under which the Parliament can maximise its limited power.
Disclosure statement
The author was one of the independent experts who co-authored the Study for the High Level Group on Own Resources on the 'Potential and Limitations of Reforming of the Financing of the EU Budget'. He has consulted on the subject of the EU budget for the European Parliament and the European Investment Bank.
Interviews
#1: European Commission Officials, 10 January 2018.
#2. EU Council official (country X), 15 December 2011.
#3. EU Council official (country Y), 12 January 2018.
#4. EP secretariat official A, 21 June 2011.
#5. EP secretariat official B, 10 January 2018.
#6. EP secretariat official B, 11 July 2018.
#7. EP political group official A, 10 January 2018.
#8. EP political group official B, 11 July 2018.
#9. EP political group officials C and D, 11 July 2018
Notes
1. Until 2009, expenditure was deemed compulsory or non-compulsory. Compulsory expenditure was covered by the treaties as an obligation for the EU and pertained to agriculture and some expenditure outside the EU’s borders. Nearly everything else was non-compulsory.
2. The EU budget uses a system of double accounting: commitments and payments. Commitments are the promissory notes issued for spending programmes. Payments are the real money, which follow during the next three years (the n + 3 system) as recipients comply with conditions.