ABSTRACT
Research on EU-related politicization has advanced in the empirical measurement of controversy within and between political arenas, but continues to debate the impacts of political contestation on policy-making on a theoretical level. While postfunctionalism predicts a ‘constraining dissensus’, empirical accounts present mixed evidence, suggesting the ability of executives to avoid or circumvent such political constraints. The article harnesses discursive institutionalism (DI) to revise postfunctionalist theory, arguing that the resulting theoretical model – labelled discursive postfunctionalism – better specifies the triggers, transmission, and eventual effects of politicization. A key element is to highlight the role of ‘interfaces’: those institutional venues, political agents, and acts of discursive framing that either establish a linkage between or shield supranational decision-making from public controversy at the domestic level. The article presents a sequential model of discursive postfunctionalism and illustrates its analytical potential with reference to three empirical examples: the Eurozone crisis, the EU-Canada trade agreement, and Brexit.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).