The Rise and Fall of Non-Aligned Mediation, 1961–6

Abstract

From its inception, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) considered itself to be a moderating force in the cold war and in the post-colonial world.  In September 1961, in the wake of the Belgrade Conference and at the height of the Berlin crisis, it dispatched emergency missions to Washington and Moscow, with Sukarno and Keita journeying to Washington and Nehru and Nkrumah flying to Moscow.  Yet, by the decade's end, the movement had moved away from that mission.  Paying particular attention to key turning points of the mid-1960s such as the 1964 Congo crisis and the Americanisation of the Vietnam War, this paper interprets the abandonment of cold war mediation as a product of the Vietnam War, rising anti-colonial sentiment, and organised non-alignment's corresponding shift toward a more militant stance on the world stage. This shift helped to foster a newly antagonistic relationship between the United States and the NAM.

Keywords:

• Non-Aligned Movement
• John F. Kennedy
• Modibo Keita
• Lyndon Baines Johnson

I would like to thank the organisers, participants, and sponsors of the March 2014 conference ‘The Role of the Neutrals and Non-Aligned in the Global Cold War, 1949–1989’, particularly Sandra Bott, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Magnus Meister, Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, Marco Wyss, and Sabina Widmer. I am also grateful for the time and attention of the editorial staff of The International History Review and of two outside readers. Special thanks go to Robert Waters Jr., who shared with me key documents from Ghana.

Notes

1. A.F. Nogueira, The Third World (London, 1968), 13.

2. Ibid., 16. Emphasis added.

3. ‘Neutral Is Left’, National Review, xxxi, no. 39 (Sept. 28, 1979), 1197.

4. Important works include I. Abraham, ‘From Bandung to NAM: Non-Alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947–65, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, xlvi, no. 2 (2008), 195–219. N. Mišković, H. Fischer-Tiné, and N. Boškovska Leimgruber, The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi, Bandung, Belgrade (Abingdon, 2014); R. Kullaa, Non-Alignment and Its Origins in Cold War Europe: Yugoslavia, Finland and the Soviet Challenge (London, 2012); S. Rajak, ‘No Bargaining Chips, No Spheres of Interest: The Yugoslav Origins of Cold War Non-Alignment’, Journal of Cold War Studies, xvi, no. 1 (2014), 146–79; V. Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World (New York, 2007); and J. Byrne, ‘Algiers between Bandung and Belgrade: Guerrilla Diplomacy and the Evolution of the Third World Movement, 1954–1962’ in M. Trentin and M. Gerlini (eds), The Middle East and the Cold War: Between Security and Development (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2012). Still invaluable is G. H. Jansen, Nonalignment and the Afro-Asian States (New York, 1966).

5. See especially Robert Vitalis, ‘The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung (Ban-Doong),’ Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 4, no. 2 (2013): 261-88; Abraham, ‘From Bandung to NAM.’

6. Proximate contributions include Jansen, Nonalignment and the Afro-Asian States; Abraham, ‘From Bandung to NAM’; M.A. Lawrence, ‘The Limits of Peacemaking: India and the Vietnam War, 1962–1968’ in L.C. Gardner and T. Gittinger, The Search for Peace in Vietnam, 1964–1968 (College Station, 2004), 231–59; Mišković, Fischer-Tiné, and Boškovska Leimgruber, The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War, 97–113; A. Das Gupta, ‘The Non-Aligned and the German Question’ in ibid., 143–60; Jovan Čavoški, Das ‘Between Great Powers and Third World Neutralists: Yugoslavia and the Belgrade Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, 1961’ in ibid., 184–206.

7. Although distinct from the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was nevertheless profoundly influenced by the parallel and somewhat senior body. Its leading states were non-aligned and its founding charter, drafted in May 1963, affirms ‘a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs’. See C.O. C. Amate, Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in Practice (New York, 1986), 25–7, 63.

8. J. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946–April 1961 (Delhi, 1961), 14.

9. Ibid., 12.

10. Ibid., 40–1.

11. G. McTurnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955 (Ithaca, 1956), 45–6.

12. Ibid., 64–6. Emphasis added.

13. I. Abraham, ‘From Bandung to NAM, 208–11.

14. A.W. Singham and V. Dinh Tran, From Bandung to Colombo: Conferences of the Non-Aligned Countries, 1955–75 (New York, 1976), 9.

15. Policy Planning Council, ‘Neutralism: Suggested United States Policy toward the Uncommitted Nations’, 29 May 1961, J[ohn] F. K[ennedy] L[ibrary], N[ational] S[ecurity] F[iles], box 303, ‘Neutralism’.

16. See R.B. Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World (New York, 2012), 69–77; R.B. Rakove, ‘Two Roads to Belgrade: The United States, Great Britain, and the First Nonaligned Conference’, Cold War History, xiv, no. 3 (March 2014), 337, no

17. Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries: Belgrade, Sept. 1–6, 1961 (Belgrade, 1961), 27.

18. Ibid., 107–17.

19. Jansen, Nonalignment and the Afro-Asian States, 303.

20. Memcon, Kennedy, and Keita, 13 Sep. 1961, in FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. 23 (Microform Supplement), Doc. 559.

21. A.M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, 1965), 521.

22. M. Keita, ‘The Foreign Policy of Mali’, International Affairs, xxxvii, no. 4 (1961), 438.

23. Prashad, The Darker Nations, 101–2.

24. Kennedy to Stevenson, Bowles, and Kennan, tel. HYWH2, 20 Aug. 1961, JFKL, NSF, box 86a, ‘Berlin, Neutral Nations Support’. See also Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World, 75–7.

25. Non-aligned states, in fact, played a significant role in the crisis. Several African states denied landing rights to Soviet aircraft bound for Cuba. For an excellent account, see P.E. Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy's Courting of African Nationalist Leaders (New York, 2012), 212–22.

26. United Arab Republic Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries and Maṣlaḥat al-Istílāmāt (eds), Conference of Heads of State and Governments of Non-Aligned Countries, Cairo, October 5–10, 1964 (Cairo, 1965), 3, 35, 76, 86–7, 211.

27. Conversation, Kennedy, Komer, and George Ball, Tape 118/A54, Oct. 28, 1963, JFKL, Presidential Recordings.

28. P. Berko Wild, ‘The Organization of African Unity and the Algerian-Moroccan Border Conflict: A Study of New Machinery for Peacekeeping and for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes among African States’, International Organization, xx, no. 1 (1966): 18–36; S.O. Agbi, The Organization of African Unity and African Diplomacy, 1963–1979 (Agodi, 1986), 5–17.

29. Bamako to London, tel. 141, 31 Oct. 1963 [Kew, United Kingdom National Archives], F[oreign] O[ffice Records] 371/172801.

30. Department of State Bulletin, xlix, no. 1274 (Nov. 25, 1963), 817.

31. Bamako to London, tel. 29, 6 Nov. 1963, UKNA, FO 371/172802.

32. M. Wolfers, Politics in the Organization of African Unity (London, 1976), 124–5.

33. W. Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks; a Personal Adventure (New York, 1967), 142–4. See also the recent W. M. LeoGrande and P. Kornbluh, Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana (2014), 72–8

34. Robert C. Haney Oral History, 21 Sep. 2001, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 48.

35. Cairo Conference, 2.

36. Ibid., 26.

37. Ibid., 270. Cairo to Washington, tel. 1228, 9 Oct. 1964, U[nited] S[tates] N[ational] A[rchives], R[ecord] G[roup]-59, C[entral] F[oreign] P[olicy] F[ile], box 1829, ‘POL-8 Neutralism, 10/8/64’.

38. Cairo Conference, 134.

39. Ibid., 249.

40. Ibid., 104–5.

41. On the earlier Congo crisis, see M.G. Kalb, The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa – from Eisenhower to Kennedy (New York, 1982). S. R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964 (Ithaca, 1974); J. Kent, America, the UN and Decolonisation: Cold War Conflict in the Congo (London, 2011); L. A. Namikas, Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960–1965 (Washington, D.C, 2013); R. D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa (New York, 1983).

42. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964, 230–6.

43. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 189–99; Kent, America, the UN and Decolonisation, 185–7.

44. Washington to African Posts, tel. 2451, 28 June 1964, in FRUS, 1964–1968, 23, 261.

45. Washington to Leopoldville, tel. 322, 19 Aug. 1964, in FRUS, 1964–1968, 23: 334.

46. Washington to Leopoldville, tel. 442, 24 Aug. 1964, L[yndon] B[aines] J[ohnson] L[ibrary], [National Security File] C[ountry] F[ile], box 82, ‘Congo, Vol. 4, Cables [2]’.

47. K. Nkrumah, Challenge of the Congo (New York, 1967), 247–8.

48. Bamako to London, letter, 19 Aug. 1964, UKNA, FO 371/176663; Bamako to London, letter 16 Sep. 1964, ibid.

49. Washington to Addis Ababa, tel. 182, 22 Aug. 1964, in FRUS, 1964–1968, 23: 341-342.

50. Addis Ababa to Washington, tel. 237, 23 Aug. 1964, LBJL, CF, box 82, ‘Congo, Vol. 4, Cables [2]’.

51. Addis Ababa to Washington, tel. 361, 5 Sep. 1964, LBJL, CF, box 82, ‘Congo, Vol. 5, Cables [3]’.

52. Addis Ababa to Washington, tel. 400, 10 Sep. 1964, LBJL, CF, box 82, ‘Congo, Vol. 5, Cables [3]’; Addis Ababa to Washington, tel. 401, 10 Sep. 1964, ibid.; Agbi, The OAU and African Diplomacy, 40–6.

53. See Nairobi to Washington, tel. 721, 23 Sep. 1964, LBJL, CF, box 82, ‘Congo, Vol. 5, Cables [1]’.

54. Washington to Nairobi, tel. 1020, 23 Sep. 1964, in FRUS, 1964–1968, 23: 381.

55. Memorandum, William Brubeck to Bundy, 23 Sep. 1964, LBJL, CF, box 82, ‘Congo, Vol. 5, Cables 1’.

56. Conakry to Washington, tel. 204, 24 Sep. 1964, LBJL, CF, box 82, ‘Congo, Vol. 5, Cables [1]’.

57. Washington to Nairobi, tel. 1077, 26 Sep. 1964, in FRUS, 1964–1968, 23: 387–8; Washington to Lagos, tel. 729, 28 Sep. 1964, in ibid., 388–90; circ. 569, 30 Sep. 1964, in ibid, 392–3. See also Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964, 244–6.

58. Agbi, The OAU and African Diplomacy, 47.

59. ‘Tshombe Asserts He Fasted 4 Days’, New York Times, 11 Oct. 1964, 20.

60. Washington to Various Posts, tel. 628, 10 Oct. 1964, in USNA, RG-59, CFPF, 1964–1966, box 1829, ‘POL-8 Neutralism, 10/8/64’.

61. Nairobi to Washington, tel. 1363, 20 Nov. 1964, LBJL, CF, box 83, ‘Congo, Vol. 7, Cables [2]’.

62. Nairobi to Washington, tel. 1406, 23 Nov. 1964, LBJL, CF, box 84, ‘Congo, Vol. 8 Cables [2]’; Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks, 206–14.

63. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 203–6.

64. Johnson Conversation with McGeorge Bundy, 24 Nov. 1964, Tape WH6411.29/6469, LBJL.

65. Nairobi to Washington, tel. 1452, 26 Nov. 1964, LBJL, CF, box 84, ‘Congo, Vol. 9, Cables’.

66. Johnson Conversation with McGeorge Bundy, 24 Nov. 1964, Tape WH6411.29/6472, LBJL. See also M.P.E. Hoyt, Captive in the Congo: Consul's Return to the Heart of Darkness (Annapolis, 2000).

67. Belgrade to Washington, tel. 1581, 4 March 1965, LBJL, [NSF], C[ountry] F[ile]:V[ietnam], box 195, ‘Draft appeal on Vietnam’.

68. Belgrade to Washington, tel. 1595, 8 March 1965, LBJL, CF:V, box 195, ‘Draft appeal on Vietnam’.

69. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LII, No. 1348, 611–12.

70. Washington to Saigon, tel. 2181, 3 April 1965, LBJL, CF:V, box 195, ‘Draft appeal on Vietnam’.

71. Washington to Saigon, tel. 2182, 3 April 1965, ibid.

72. M.A. Lawrence, ‘The Limits of Peacemaking: India and the Vietnam War, 1962–1968’ in L.C. Gardner and T. Gittinger, The Search for Peace in Vietnam, 1964–1968 (College Station, 2004), 245–6.

73. L.-H. T. Nguyen, Hanoi's War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill, 2012), 76–7; Q. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill, 2000), 163–5.

74. Washington to Bamako, tel. 279, 11 June 1965, LBJL, CF, box 94, ‘Mali, Vol. 1’.

75. Memcon, Rusk and N'Doure, 24 June 1965, ibid.

76. Bamako to Washington, tel. 33, 12 Aug. 1965, ibid.

77. Intelligence Information Cable, Central Intelligence Agency, 31 Dec. 1965, ibid.

78. Keita to Johnson, 2 Feb. 1966, LBJL, CF:V, box 145, ‘Exchange of Letters (2)’.

79. Tunis to Washington, tel. 388, 2 Jan. 1966, LBJL, CF:V, box 149, ‘Pinta Vol. 7 (1)’.

80. Washington to Algiers, tel. 1906 (WH), 5 Jan. 1966, LBJL, CF:V, box 148, ‘Pinta Vol. 1 (1)’.

81. Algiers to Washington, tel. 1444, 6 Jan. 1966, LBJL, CF:V, box 148, ‘Pinta Vol. 1 (1)’. In a reply to Jernegan, the State Department authorised clarification of other points, setting aside the question of NLF recognition. See Washington to Algiers, tel. 1928, 6 Jan. 1966, in ibid.

82. See G.C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (Austin, 1994), 9.

83. Ho Chi Minh to Nkrumah, 24 Jan. 1966, N[ationa] A[rchives of] G[hana], RG17/1/472, VIET/PCE/2. I am deeply indebted to Robert Waters Jr. for letting me consult this and the following Ghanaian documents.

84. Bamako to Washington, tel. 189, 15 Jan. 1966, LBJL, CF:V, box 148, ‘Pinta Vol. 1 (1)’.

85. Dakar to Washington, tel. 501, 7 Jan. 1966, LBJL, CF:V, box 148, ‘Pinta Vol. 3 (1).

86. Belgrade to Washington, tel. 972, 2 Jan. 1966, LBJL, CF:V, box 148, ‘Pinta Vol. 2 (1)’. Recent scholarship suggests that Tito had a far better understanding of the internal politics of Hanoi's war than his US counterparts. See Nguyen, Hanoi's War, 76–7; R.K. Brigham, Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF's Foreign Relations and the Viet Nam War (Ithaca, 1998), 53–8

87. W.S. Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957–1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State (Princeton, N.J., 1969), 394–8.

88. Accra to Washington, tel. 701, 27 Jan. 1966, LBJL, CF:V, box 148, ‘Pinta Vol. 1 (1)’.

89. Peking to Accra, tel. PG/108, 28 July 1965, NAG, RG17/1/472, VIET/PCE/2.

90. Nkrumah to Johnson, 12 Aug. 1965, ibid.

91. Nkrumah to Ho, 25 Aug. 1965, ibid.

92. Arkhurst to Michael Dei-Anang, 6 Sep. 1965, ibid.

93. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, 235.

94. See, for example, Accra to Washington, tel. 879, 2 April 1965, in FRUS, 1964–1968, 24: 444–6.

95. Belgrade to Accra, tel. BG/17, 17 Feb. 1966, NAG, RG17/1/472, VIET/PCE/2.

96. While the degree to which the coup was prompted by US action remains open to further investigation, documentary evidence indicates that the Johnson administration was aware of anti-Nkrumah plotting for at least two years. See FRUS, 1964–1968, 24: 412n. See also Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, 397–8

97. Lawrence, ‘The Limits of Peacemaking’, 251–5.

98. Washington to New Delhi, tel. 197663, 18 May 1967, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 25: 859–60.

99. See Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries, ed., Third Non-Aligned Nations Summit Conference, Zambia, 8–10 Sept. 1970 (Lusaka, 1970), 250.

100. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975, 160–1, 175.

101. Bamako to Washington, tel. 210, 2 Feb. 1966, NSF, CF, box 94, ‘Mali Vol. 1’, LBJL

102. Cairo to Washington, tel. 455, 11 Aug. 1965, LBJL, CF, box 159[2], ‘UAR, Vol. 4, Cables [1/2]’.

103. Z. Levey, Israel in Africa, 1956–1976 (Dordrecht, 2012), 10.

104. B. Glad, An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, 2009), 275.

105. Quoted in K.J. Clymer, Troubled Relations: The United States and Cambodia since 1870 (DeKalb, 2007), 139–40.

106. Jansen, Nonalignment and the Afro-Asian States, 330–1.

107. Karachi to Washington, tel. 2041, 23 April 1964, USNA, RG-59, CFPF: 1964–1966, box 1830, ‘POL 8 4/1/64’.