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Abstract
Over the last 20 years, sex offender policies, specifically in terms of community corrections, have increased in scope. One of the most controversial and pervasive sex offender policies is that of registration. In response to the consumption of already limited resources, jurisdictions have imposed increasingly higher community supervision fees onto the offenders, requiring them to pay for their own re-entry. However, to date no research study has examined the statutory language associated with registration fees collected post release from formal community sanctions. Using a statutory analysis within the United States, this research finds and quantifies the imposition of a registration fee on offenders who are legally compelled to pay these registration costs, regardless of whether they are still currently under community supervision. Results show that more than half of U.S. states (n = 28) incorporate statutory language authorizing registration fees, ranging anywhere from $5 per registration to up to $250 per year. These findings, as well as suggestions for future research and policy recommendations, are discussed.
Notes
Disclosure Statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
1 See Wolin, Democracy Incorporated.
2 See National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, “Map of Registered Sex Offenders.”
3 See Ewing, “Justice Perverted.”
4 Justice Policy Institute, “What Will it Cost States?”
5 Ibid., 2.
6 See Human Rights Watch, “US: Sex Offender Laws.”
7 See Ettner et al., “Benefit–Cost.”
8 See Oklahoma Statute 22 O.S. section 991a and 57 O.S. section 510.10.
9 See Walker, Window with a View.
10 See e.g., Farkas and Miller, “Reentry and Reintegration”; Hipp et al., “Are Sex Offenders Moving”; Lasher and McGrath, “Impact of Community Notification”; Mercado et al., “Specialized Sexual Offender Legislation”; Tewksbury, “Collateral Consequences.”
11 See Stern, Creating Criminals.
12 See Wolin, Democracy Incorporated; Garland, Culture of Control.
13 See Kernsmith et al., “Public Attitudes”; Pickett et al., “Vulnerable Victims.”
14 See Jenkins, Moral Panic.
15 See O’Hear, “Perpetual Panic.” See also Makin et al., “Are We Interested?”, examining Google Search interest associated with sex offender registries.
16 See Douard, “Sex Offender as Scapegoat.”
17 Ibid., 50.
18 See Picket et al., “Vulnerable Victims.”
19 See Agan, “Sex Offender Registries”; Maguire and Kaufman Singer, “False Sense of Security.”
20 See Maguire and Kaufman Singer, “False Sense of Security.”
21 See Gur-Arye, “Legitimacy of Judicial Responses.”
22 Ibid., 3.
23 See Pickett et al., “Vulnerable Victims.”
24 For the history of Washington State’s Community Protection Act, see Lieb, Washington’s Sexually Violent Predator Law.
25 See Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders Registration Act, Pub. L. No., 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 [2000]).
26 See Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104–145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d) [1994]).
27 See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Child Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006).
28 See Hipp et al., “Are Sex Offenders Moving.”
29 See e.g., Andrews and Bonta, Psychology of Criminal Conduct.
30 According to SORNA, registration for Tier I sex offenders is mandated for 10 years, Tier II sex offenders must register for a period of 25 years, and Tier III SOs register for life.
31 See Texas Criminal Code of Procedure [CCP], Article 62.001 (2005).
32 See California Penal Code, Section 290 (a)(1)(A) (2006); and Alabama Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 15-20-33 (2016).
33 See Revised Code of Washington [RCW] Section 9A.44.140 (2010); and Texas CCP, Article 62.001.
34 See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017).
35 See Millard et al. v. Rankin, 265 F.Supp.3d 1211 (D. Colo. 2017).
36 See Campagna et al., “Restrictions on Citizenship Rights”; Mauer and Chesney-Lind, Invisible Punishment; Tewksbury and Lees, “Perceptions of Sex Offender Registration.”
37 See Clear, Imprisoning Communities; Hagan and Dinovitzer, “Collateral Consequences”; Tewksbury and Zgoba, “Perceptions and Coping”; Tewksbury and Lees, “Perceptions of Sex Offender Registration.”
38 See Campagna et al., “Restrictions on Citizenship Rights”; Mauer and Chesney-Lind, Invisible Punishment.
39 See Rubinstein and Mukamal, “Welfare and Housing.”
40 See Clear, Imprisoning Communities; Tewksbury and Humkey, “Prohibiting Registered Sex Offenders.”
41 See Chesney-Lind, “Criminalizing Victimization”; Greene, “Entrepreneurial Corrections.”
42 See Travis, “Invisible Punishment”; Travis, Solomon, and Waul, From Prison to Home.
43 See Bonnar-Kidd, “Sexual Offender Laws”; Hughes and Kadleck, “Sex Offender Community Notification”; Mercado et al., “Specialized Sex Offender Legislation”; Tewksbury, “Collateral Consequences.”
44 See Farkas and Miller, “Reentry and Reintegration”; Levenson and Cotter, “Sex Offender Residence Restrictions.”
45 See Mercado et al., “Specialized Sex Offender Legislation”; Tewksbury, “Collateral Consequences”; Zevitz and Farkas, “Sex Offender Community Notification.”
46 See Hipp et al., “Are Sex Offenders Moving”; Lees and Tewksbury, “Understanding Policy.”
47 See Mercado et al., “Specialized Sex Offender Legislation”; Tewksbury, “Collateral Consequences.”
48 See Edwards and Hensley, “Contextualizing Sex Offender Management.”
49 See Duwe and Donnay, “Effects of Failure to Register”; Walker, Window with a View.
50 See Hamilton and Campbell, “Dark Figure of Corrections”; Rowland, “Too Many Going Back”; Duwe and Donnay, “Effects of Failure to Register”; Washington State Department of Corrections, “Sex Offender Treatment Program.”
51 See Clear, Imprisoning Communities; Petersilia, When Prisoners Come Home.
52 See Sample and Bray, “Are Sex Offenders Dangerous”; Zevitz and Farkas, “Sex Offender Community Notification.”
53 See Payne and DeMichele, “Sex Offender Policies.”
54 See Rhode Island General Laws, Title 11, Chapter 11-37.1-4 (2013).
55 See Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 40-39-204(b) (2010).
56 See Ohio Revised Code Title 3, Chapters 311.171 and 311.172 (2013).
57 See Wyoming Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 7-19-310 (2017).
58 See State v. Depeche, 2011, 242 Or. App. 147.
59 See Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs, “Frequently Asked Questions.”
60 See Ohio Revised Code Title 29, Chapter 2950 (2011).
61 See Louisiana Revised Codes, Section 15.542.1.4 (2016).
62 See Massachusetts General Law, Sections 178H. (a)(1) and (2) (2011).
63 See Revised Code of Washington [RCW] 9A.44.132 (2010).
64 See Bradshaw v. State, 152 Wn.2d 528,531, 98 P.3d 1190 (2004).
65 See Garland, Culture of Control.
66 See Freiberg, “Affective Versus Effective Justice.”
67 See Wolin, Democracy Incorporated.
68 See Harvey, Brief History of Neoliberalism; Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity.
69 See Wolin, Democracy Incorporated.
70 See Garland, Culture of Control; Wolin, Democracy Incorporated.
71 See Wolin, Democracy Incorporated.
72 See ibid.
73 See Foucault, Technologies of the Self; Foucault and Blasius, “About the Beginning”; Vásquez et al., “Influence of Sex Offender Registration.”
74 See Kernsmith et al., “Public Attitudes”; Zevitz and Farkas, “Sex Offender Community Notification.”
75 See Tewksbury and Jennings, “Assessing the Impact”; Vasquez et al., “Influence of Sex Offender Registration.”
76 See Beck, World Risk Society.
77 See Lyon, “Globalizing Surveillance.”
78 See Pickett, “Vulnerable Victims”; Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972–1990.
79 See Harvey, Brief History of Neoliberalism; see also Lyon, “Globalizing Surveillance.”
80 See Packer, Limits of Criminal Sanction.