https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7982-0401
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ABSTRACT
Inconsistent policy implementation has been widely observed in Chinese institutional reforms. The central government has experimented with policymaking in a strategic way against tensions between inherited regulatory deficiencies and ongoing development. And, despite the central government’s authority over local governments, the latter operate with a remarkable degree of discretion. By synthesizing policy experimentation theories and policy entrepreneurship, we consider the Wujin District government, as a policy entrepreneur that identified and acted within a “policy window” and explore how it interpreted and actualized policy tasks set by the central government in relation to the rural land reform. The central government designated 33 county-level administrations as testbeds for removing institutional obstacles to coordinated urban-rural land governance. The Wujin District was granted greater administrative autonomy pertinent to local reform initiatives. Further, the Wujin District reorganized its inter-governmental relations by delegating power downward to forge a reform coalition. Critically, Wujin succeeded in aligning local development priorities with central policy goals. Taking an agent-centric perspective, we also examine historical and contextual factors relevant for behavioral changes. The findings indicate that the Wujin District government acted as an effective policy entrepreneur and on this basis made crucial contributions to policy innovation.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. Rural land was collectively administered by the commune, production brigade, and production team.
2. Nanhai LSC began in the 1980s. It re-collectivized rural land from individual households. Contract and operation rights were separated. It was a spontaneous effort by indigenous villagers to capture land value appreciation.
3. It is also a land-based shareholding cooperative where collective assets are valued and individual property rights are clarified. Standard factories and workers’ dormitories were built and leased to enterprises under the management of cooperatives.
4. Available at: http://www.landjs.com/jtjsyd/.
5. Retrieved from http://www.wj.gov.cn/html/czwj/2019/FAOHPMEF_0820/306908.html.
6. 1 mu equals 666 m2.
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Notes on contributors
Changchang Zhou
Changchang Zhou is a postdoctoral researcher in the School of Geography at the University of Nanjing Normal University. She focuses on rural land system reform and the roles of local governments in policy experimentations. Her work has also been published in Land Use Policy, Urban Studies, and Annals of the American Association of Geographers.
Roger C. K. Chan
Roger C. K. Chan is a professor in the Division of Social Sciences, Humanities and Design of the College of Professional and Continuing Education at The Hong Kong Polytechnic University. Professor Chan’s field of research is regional and urban development with a primary interest in cross-border planning, mega cities and urban agglomeration, and (economic) free trade zones. His work has also been published in Land Use Policy, Cities, Habitat International, and Geoforum.
Xianchun Zhang
Xianchun Zhang is an associatet professor from the School of Public Affairs at Zhejiang University. He focuses on urban and regional governance, spatial planning and urban growth, and land policy studies. His work has also been published in Urban Geography, Cities, Urban Studies, Annals of the American Association of Geographers, Landscape and Urban Planning, and Eurasian Geography and Economics.