Breaking the Mold? Venezuela's Defiance of the Neoliberal Agenda^*

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Notes

¹⁰⁴ Chávez explained that although the military will train, prepare and equip the reserves, only the officers would be armed. Sarah Wagner, “Venezuela to Create Military Reserve Force of 1.5 Million,” Venezuela Analysis, available online at: < http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news.php?newsno = 1572> (accessed June 11, 2005).

¹⁰³ As of this writing, US money and influence are still flowing to parties and “civil society” organizations composed of Chávez's opponents in continuing attempts to charge Chávez with “undemocratic” and authoritarian actions. There has been some suspicion that the oil industry faces continuing sabotage, and the US has even tried to pin Bolivia's current turmoil on Chávez.

¹⁰² Harnecker, op. cit., p. 44.

¹⁰¹ John Lindsay-Poland, “U.S. Military Bases in Latin America and the Caribbean,” Foreign Policy in Focus, August 2004, available online at: < http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/intervention/2004/08lamericabases.htm> (accessed June 9, 2005).

¹⁰⁰ Situacion de los Derechos Humanos en Venezuela, Informe Anual Octubre 2003/Septiembre 2004, PROVEA (2004) (Caracas: Programa Venezolano de Educación-Acción en Derechos Humanos).

⁹⁹ The successful OAS candidate, Chile's Insulza, really represented a triumph for Chávez, as he was Venezuela's choice.

⁹⁸ “Telesur, a Counter-Hegemonic Project to Compete with CNN and Univisión,” La Jornada, Venezuela Information, available online at: < http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles/php?artno = 1388> (accessed June 1, 2005).

⁹⁷ Wilpert, “Venezuela's Other Path,” op. cit., p. 23.

⁹⁶ Diane Taylor, “The Venezuelan Bank That Likes to Say Yes—If You're a Woman,” The Guardian, April 5, 2005, reprinted in Venezuela Information, available online at: < http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno = 1415> (accessed June 1, 2005).

⁹⁵ Thomás Gorman, “Fourth Letter from Venezuela—on Workers' Co-management,” available online at: < http://handsoffvenezuela.org/letter_workers_co-management 280405.htm> (accessed May 30, 2005).

⁹⁴ Author's notes.

⁹³ Final Declaration from the First Cuba-Venezuela Meeting for the Application of the ALBA, Venezuela Information, available online at: < http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles/php?artno = 1433> (accessed June 8, 2005).

⁹² Author's notes.

⁹¹ Author's notes.

⁹⁰ America Vera-Zavala, “Venezuela: The Country of Parallels,” ZNet, available online at: < http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID = 45&ItemID = 7841> (accessed May 30, 2005).

⁸⁹ UNDP, Democracy in Latin America, op. cit., p. 28.

⁸⁸ Gregory Wilpert, “Venezuela's Other Path,” Dissent, Spring, 2005, p. 22.

⁸⁷ Russián interview, op. cit; C.P. Pandya and Justin Podur, “The Chávez Government's Economic Policies,” ZNet, November 21, 2003, available online at: < http://zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID = 45&ItemID = 4544>; Jonah Gindin, “Venezuela Could Hold Referendum to Decide Future of International Reserves,” Venezuela Information, May 16, 2005, available online at: < http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news.php?newsno = 1622> (accessed June 1, 2005).

⁸⁶ Interestingly, the non-oil sector grew much more rapidly than the oil sector: 8.7% for oil; 17.8% non-oil. Sarah Wagner, “Venezuela Experienced Record Growth of 17% in 2004,” Venezuela Analysis, available online at: < http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news.php?newsno = 1512> (accessed May 31, 2005).

⁸⁵ Ohep interview, op. cit.

⁸⁴ Rafael Ramirez, “A National, Popular, and Revolutionary Oil Policy for Venezuela,” Venezuela Analysis, available online at: < www. venezuel analysis.com/ articles.php?artno = 1474> (accessed June 11, 2005). “The Main Obstacle is the Administrative Structure of the Venezuelan State,” interview with Alí Rodriguez, President of PDVSA, by Gregory Wilpert, July 24, 2004, available online at: < http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno = 1224>. PDVSA's current president, Raphael Ramirez, said in February 2005 that it would take five years to recover the oil industry. Marianna Parriaga, “Venezuela's Energy and Oil Minister: ‘We Are Rethinking Our Oil Industry,’” El Universal, reprinted in Venezuela Information, available online at: < http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno = 1372> (accessed June 1, 2005).

⁸³ Of course, Cha´vez's opponents paint an entirely different picture of what happened, blaming Chávez for politicizing the oil industry, appointing incompetents to run it, and engaging in corruption. An example is Elio Ohep, editor of Petroleum World, who received his BA from Loyola University of New Orleans and his MBA from Northwestern. Ohep claimed to the author that the oil strike was led by ordinary workers—that oil executives were “not political, not involved”—that the government is distorting oil industry figures to hide its own ineptness, that no investment is going on, and that the Chávez administration is “sort of like a dictatorship.” At another point, however, he lumped Chávez in with “all politicians” who are “corrupt” but said that Chávez is more “efficient” than the old politicians. Ohep interview, op. cit.

⁸² Despite the fact that the strike was a lockout in which PDVSA managers and executives sabotaged equipment, changed access codes and locked workers out of computer information systems, the private media industry in both Venezuela and internationally characterized it as a general workers strike, supported by laborers and business owners throughout the country. Golinger, op. cit., pp. 133–138.

⁸¹ Cleto A. Sojo, “Venezuela's PSVSA's President Outlines State of Company and Strategic Goals,” Venezuela Information, February 9, 2005, available online at: < http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news.php?.newsno = 1496>.

⁸⁰ Wilpert, Interview with Elio Ohep, editor of Petroleum World, Caracas, April 11, 2005

⁷⁹ Wipert, Interview with Elio Ohep, editor of Petroleum World, Caracas, April 11, 2005

⁷⁸ Wilpert, Interview with Elio Ohep, editor of Petroleum World, Caracas, April 11, 2005

⁷⁷ Critics claimed that by appointing a board that did not come from within PDVSA, Chávez broke with that tradition for the first time, thus earning him the charge of breaking with meritocracy, even though previous presidents had sometimes appointed non-PDVSA employees. Wilpert, Interview with Elio Ohep, editor of Petroleum World, Caracas, April 11, 2005

⁷⁶ Interview with Elio Ohep, editor of Petroleum World, Caracas, April 11, 2005.

⁷⁵ For analyses of Chávez's oil policy, see: Gregory Wilpert, “The Economics, Culture and Politics of Oil,” op. cit.; Bernard Mommer, “Subversive Oil,” in Ellner and Hellinger, op. cit., pp. 131–145.

⁷⁴ Julia Buxton, “Economic Policy and the Rise of Hugo Chavez,” in Ellner and Hellinger, op. cit., pp. 124–125; Steve Ellner, “The Radical Potential of Chavismo in Venezuela: The First Year-and-a Half in Power,” Latin American Perspectives 28:5 (2001), pp. 17–20.

⁷³ Some observers, however, have pointed out that there is a loophole in the language which states that the state shall own all shares of PDVSA, Articles 313, 316.

⁷² Some observers, however, have pointed out that there is a loophole in the language which states that the state shall own all shares of PDVSA, “except those of subsidiaries, strategic associations, businesses, and whatever other that has constituted or constitutes PDVSA as a result of the development of its business.”

⁷¹ Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic, op. cit., Title VI.

⁷⁰ Gindin, op. cit.

⁶⁹ “Chávez Promises New Venezuelan Education Model to Combat Imperialist Values,” Venezuela Information Service, May 16, 2005, available online at: < http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news.php?newsno = 1621> (accessed May 29, 2005).

⁶⁸ Interviews with members of Funda Latin, Caracas, April 10, 2005.

⁶⁷ Interview with Hector Fernandez, Caracas, April 9, 2005.

⁶⁶ Benjamin Dangl, “Radio Rebelde,” Resource Center of the Americas, April 28, 2004, available online at: < http://www.americas.org/item_19281> (accessed May 23, 2005).

⁶⁵ The circles, though perfectly public, have their origin in the clandestine cells Chavez and his fellow officers formed in the early 1990s. López Maya, op. cit., pp. 73–92 See also Gindin, op. cit.; Garcia Guadilla, op. cit., pp. 190–192; Valencia Ramirez, op. cit., pp. 79–97.

⁶⁴ The circles, though perfectly public, have their origin in the clandestine cells Chávez and his fellow officers formed in the early 1990s. López Maya, op. cit., pp. 73–92.

⁶³ Interviews with Charles Hardy, Susana and others, Caracas, April 9–18, 2005.

⁶² Jonah Gindin, “Chavistas in the Halls of Power, Chavistas on the Street,” NACLA Report on the Americas 38:5 (2005), p. 27

⁶¹ Jonah Gindin, “Chavistas in the Halls of Power, Chavistas on the Street,” NACLA Report on the Americas 38:5 (2005), p. 27

⁶⁰ Jonah Gindin, “Chavistas in the Halls of Power, Chavistas on the Street,” NACLA Report on the Americas 38:5 (2005), p. 27.

⁵⁹ For more about the role of the NED and USAID in “supporting democracy,” see Golinger, op. cit.; Joan Roelofs, Foundations and Public Policy: The Mask of Pluralism (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2003).

⁵⁸ Ellner, UNDP; Lopez Maya, op. cit., p. 83; Cristóbal Valencia Ramirez, “Who Are the Chavistas?” Latin America Perspectives 32:3 (2005), pp. 79–97.

⁵⁷ UNDP, “Democracy in Latin America,” op. cit.

⁵⁶ Garcia-Guadilla, op. cit., pp. 186–187.

⁵⁵ For example, the MVR-dominated Constituent Assembly and National Assembly that followed were accused of acting as a clientelist party, particularly “in the way members of the judicial, citizen and electoral branches were designated, the form in which certain electoral norms were modified, and the way in which the parties—including Chávez's own—selected their own candidates.” Alvarez, op. cit., pp. 158–159.

⁵⁴ A UNDP study published in 2004 concluded that poverty and inequality were eroding citizens' confidence in their democracies in Latin America. See United Nations Development Program, “Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens' Democracy,” available online at: < http://democracia.undp.org/Informe/Default.asp?Menu =  15 Idioma = 1>. This report on failing support for democracy was challenged by researchers at the Brookings Institution who see a more nuanced picture. See: Carol Graham, “Latin America is Far from Rejecting Democracy,” Financial Times, August 2, 2004, available online at: < http://www.brookings.edu/printme.wbs?page = /pagedefs/ea32e4940b3eff3e2e13b2c10a1415cb.xml> (accessed June 2, 2005).

⁵³ Chávez speaking to the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 1999, quoted in Angel E. Alvarez, “State Reform Before and After Chávez's Election,” in Ellner and Hellinger, op. cit., p. 154.

⁵² Ten percent of registered voters can initiate a referendum. The constitution also gives other branches of government the power to call Constituent Assemblies.

⁵¹ Interview with Clodosbaldo Russián, Comptroller General, Caracas, April 11, 2005.

⁵⁰ Citizens can recall any elected official as well as judges through a petition signed by 20% of the registered voters in the appropriate electoral jurisdiction.

⁴⁹ Interview with Lisa Sullivan Rodriguez, June 10, 2005.

⁴⁸ Bolivarian Constitution, Preamble, Title III, Article 21, No. 2.

⁴⁷ Preamble, Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

⁴⁶ Chávez's speech to the Tercer Encuentro, op. cit.

⁴⁵ Garcia-Guadilla, op. cit., p. 187.

⁴⁴ Personal interview with Lisa Sullivan Rodriguez, Ossining, NY, May 18, 2005.

⁴³ Maria Pilar Garcia-Guadilla, “Civil Society: Institutionalization, Fragmentation, Autonomy,” in Ellner and Hellinger, op. cit., p. 186.

⁴² Golinger, op. cit., p. 33.

⁴¹ Steve Ellner, “Interview with Luis Miquilena—President Hugo Chavez's Right Hand,” Northeast Research Associates, available online at: < http://www.neravt.com/left/contributors/ellner3.htm> (accessed June 11, 2005).

⁴⁰ For a detailed investigation of the sectors that have sought to topple the Chavez regime and the US's role in supporting them, see Golinger, op. cit. Golinger, a Venezuelan-American attorney, obtained her information through FOIA requests. The brief that she has written is an eye-opening primer on how the US undermines democracy in the modern era through its ostensible “democratization” programs.

³⁹ Ellner and Hellinger, op. cit. See especially Ellner's concluding chapter.

³⁸ Steve Ellner, “The Radical Thesis on Globalization and the Case of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez,” Latin American Perspectives 29:6 (2002), p. 89.

³⁷ See Sheila D. Collins, The Rainbow Challenge: The Jackson Campaign and the Future of U.S. Politics (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987).

³⁶ J. M. Briceno, “The Labyrinth of the Three Minotaurs,” as translated by Francisco Toro, available online at: < http://www.caracaschronicles.blogspot.com> (accessed May 9, 2005).

³⁵ Hugo Chavez, “Speech at the Urban Land Titling Ceremony, La Vega, Caracas, January 11, 2003,” in Chavez, op. cit., pp. 124, 135.

³⁴ López Maya, op. cit., p. 84. Edgardo Lander, “Venezuelan Social Conflict in a Global Context,” Latin American Perspectives 32:2 (2005), pp. 30–31.

³³ For an example of the US Right's view of Chavez and his revolution, see: J. Michael Waller, “What To Do About Venezuela,” Occasional Paper No. 6, May 2005, Center for Security Policy, available online at: < http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org> (accessed June 2, 2005); Pamela Hess, “U.S. ‘Hands Tied’ in South America,” UPI, April 9, 2005, available online at: < http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno = 1418> (accessed May 29, 2005).

³² The April 11, 2005 issue of the National Review featured a picture of Fidel and Chavez in their military fatigues on the cover under the headline “The Axis of Evil.”

³¹ Chávez was not averse to American aid, but was conscious of the role American military penetration of the continent had played and wanted no part of it. Eva Golinger, The Chavez Code: Cracking U.S. Intervention in Venezuela (Havana: Editorial José Martí, 2005), pp. 54–55.

³⁰ “Natural Disaster in Venezuela: Vargas,” Ministry of Planning and Development, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, January 2000, available online at: < http://wwwmpd.gov.ve/memycta/pvndisaster.pdf> (accessed May 16, 2005).

²⁹ Harnecker, op. cit., pp. 36–37.

²⁸ CIA World Fact Book, Venezuela, 2005.

²⁷ A large majority of Venezuelan and US academics are hostile to Chavez, whose rise to power refutes the exceptionalism thesis on which they had built their academic reputations. Parker, op. cit., pp. 39–40.

²⁶ Chávez was backed by a three-party coalition called the Polo Patriotico, composed of the MVR, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) and a new leftist party, Patria Para Todos (PPT). The MAS later turned against Chávez in the 2004 recall referendum.

²⁵ Hugo Chávez Friás, op. cit., pp. 304–305.

²⁴ Interviews with Charles Hardy, Lisa Sullivan Rodriguez, Caracas, April 9-April 18, 2005.

²³ Pérez was later impeached on corruption charges and now lives in Miami.

²² Steve Ellner, “The Radical Potential of Chavismo in Venezuela: The First Year-and-a-Half in Power,” Latin American Perspectives 28:5 (2001), p. 4; Margarita López Maya, “Hugo Chávez Frías: His Movement and His Presidency,” in Ellner and Hellinger, op. cit., p. 77. For an understanding of the particular history and role of the military in Venezuela in comparison to other countries, see: Deborah L. Norden, “Democracy in Uniform: Chavez and the Venezuelan Armed Forces,” in Ellner and Hellinger, op. cit., pp. 93–112. See also “The Military in the Revolution and Counterrevolution,” interview with Hugo Chavez, conducted by Marta Harnecker, available online at: < www.venezuelanalysis. com/articles.php?artno = 1039>.

²¹ Chávez's speech to the Tercer Encuentro en Solidaridad con La Revolución Bolivariana, Teatro Teresa Carreño, Caracas, April 13, 2005, translated by Zach Hurwitz.

²⁰ Hugo Chávez Friás, “Address at a Meeting of Solidarity with the Bolivarian Revolution Held at the World Social Forum, Porto Alegre, Brazil, January 26, 2003,” in Hugo Chávez Friás, The Fascist Coup Against Venezuela, Speeches and Addresses December 2002-January 2003, 2nd edn, augmented (Havana: Ediciones Plaza, 2003), pp. 302–303.

¹⁹ Interview with Charles Hardy, Caracas, April 10, 2005.

¹⁸ Between 1984 and 1995, poverty increased from 36% to 66%, while the proportion of those living in extreme poverty increased from 11% to 36%. Kenneth Roberts, “Social Polarization and the Populist Resistance,” in Ellner and Hellinger, op. cit., p. 59.

¹⁷ Marta Harnecker, “After the Referendum: Venezuela Faces New Challenges,” Monthly Review 56:6 (2004), p. 35.

¹⁶ Venezuela, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, available online at: < http://countrystudies.us/Venezuela/7.htm>. Lander interview, op. cit.

¹⁵ In interviews in Venezuela with both Chavez supporters and leaders of one of the new opposition parties, Primero Justicia, both sides appeared to agree that there had been a failure of democratic institutionalization during the 40-year period of the Punto Fijo regime.

¹⁴ Lander interview, op. cit.

¹³ For a detailed study of the political role played by Venezuela's oil industry, see: Bernard Mommer, “Subversive Oil,” in Ellner and Hellinger, op. cit., pp. 131–145. Dick Parker, “Chavez and the Search for an Alternative to Neoliberalism,” Latin American Perspectives 32:2 (2005), pp. 41–43.

¹² Interview with Edgardo Lander, Professor of Social Sciences, Universidad Central de Venezuela, Caracas, Venezuela, April 9, 2005.

¹¹ Ronald D. Sylvia and Constantine P. Danopoulos, “The Chavez Phenomenon,” Third World Quarterly 34:1 (2003), p. 64.

¹⁰ According to Hellinger, corruption flowed from the surfeit of oil revenues from the OPEC oil boom (1973–1983) which the country could not absorb. Daniel Hellinger, “Political Overview: The Breakdown of Puntofijismo and the Rise of Chavismo,” in Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger, op. cit., p. 30.

⁹ Steve Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas, “The Venezuelan Exceptionalism Thesis: Separating Myth from Reality,” Latin American Perspectives 32:2 (2005), p. 9.

⁸ Lander quoted in Olga R. Rodriguez, “The Past, Present and Future of the Venezuelan Crisis,” report of a conference held at the Center for Latin American Studies, University of California, Berkeley, April 16, 2003, available online at: < http://www.clas.berkeley.edu:7001/Events/spring2003/04-16-03-venezuelapanel> (accessed May 6, 2005).

⁷ Gregory Wilpert, “Mission Impossible? Venezuela's Mission to Fight Poverty,” Venezuela Analysis, November 11, 2003, available online at: < http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno = 1051>.

⁶ Members of the Communist and other leftist parties were excluded from this “pacted democracy.”

⁵ Although the period appeared relatively peaceful, it was not without violence. Leftist groups that were left out of the accord that set up the liberal democracy following the dictatorship were active as guerrillas operating in the mountains but were severely repressed, with many deaths.

⁴ Fernando Coronil, “Magical Illusions or Revolutionary Magic? Chavez in Historical Context,” NACLA Report on the Americas 33:6 (2000), p. 35.

³ Melissa Dell, “The Devil's Excrement,” Harvard International Review 26:3 (2004), pp. 38–41; “The Devil's Excrement,” The Economist, May 22, 3003, available online at: < http://www.economist.com/finance/displayStory.cfm?story_id = 1795921> (accessed May 15, 2005); Jerry Useem, “‘The Devil's Excrement,’” Fortune Magazine 147:2 (2003), p. 96.

² John V. Lombardi, “Prologue: Venezuela's Permanent Dilemma,” in Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger (eds), Venezuelan Politics in the Chavez Era: Class, Polarization & Conflict (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. 1–6.

¹ Venezuela has the largest reserves of conventional oil (light and heavy crude) in the Western hemisphere and the largest reserves of non-conventional oil (extra-heavy crude) in the world. Gregory Wilpert, “The Economics, Culture and Politics of Oil in Venezuela,” Venezuela Analysis, August 30, 2003, available online at: < http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/print.php?artno = 1000> (accessed May 28, 2005).

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Notes on contributors

Sheila D. Collins

* I am grateful for the helpful feedback of members of the Research Committee on Globalization and Empire of the International Political Science Association at whose meeting this paper was first presented, and to Ana Mallen for helpful corrections and perspectives based on her own research in Venezuela. I also benefited from ongoing conversations with my daughter and son-in-law, a veteran of Latin America's turbulent politics, and from the materials and access provided by Global Exchange. But most of all it I owe this paper's inspiration and much of the perspective contained herein to the wonderful people I met in Venezuela, especially Lisa Sullivan Rodriguez, and Charlie Hardy.