Cut from the Same Cloth? A Comparative Study of Domestic Extremists and Gang Members in the United States

Abstract

Despite calls for research on the similarities and differences between violent extremist groups and criminal street gangs, there have been few empirical comparisons. We develop a comparative model that emphasizes explicit, spurious, and indirect linkages between the two groups and use national sources of data on domestic extremists and gang members—the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97)—to compare them across group involvement, demographic, family, religion, and socioeconomic status characteristics. Six percent of domestic extremists in PIRUS have a history of gang ties, which constitutes a minimal proportion of domestic extremists and is likely the rare exception among the population of gang members. Gang extremists more closely resemble non-gang extremists in PIRUS than they do gang members in the NLSY97. While these groups have some similarities, one of the major differences is that gang members are younger than domestic extremists. This likely contributes to many of the other differences between the groups across the life course, including marriage, parenthood, unemployment, and education. Given that the evidence is most consistent with the independence model, further comparative testing is needed before generalizing gang-related policies and programs to domestic extremism.

Keywords:

• extremist violence
• gangs
• radicalization
• United States
• PIRUS
• comparative research

Acknowledgements

The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Justice.

Notes

¹ All individuals included in the database have displayed or expressed adherence to a left wing, right wing, radical Islamist or single-issue ideology. For a full discussion of the characteristics of these four ideological categories, see Jensen et al. (2016).

² FTOs are designated by the US Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended (US Department of State, 2017).

³ When reviewing gang membership of individuals in PIRUS, researchers included in the sample organizations without a clear ideological orientation (e.g. Latin Kings, Black Gangster Disciples, Hot Boys) as well as organizations for which there is evidence of some ideological motivation but nonetheless possess the organizational attributes of street-oriented youth gangs (e.g. 2-1 Fatal, El Rukn, South Bay Nazi Youth).

⁴ The domestic extremists included in PIRUS operated in 48 states (excluding Hawaii and Rhode Island). The year of public exposure ranged from 1948 to 2014 (mean = 1993). A substantial number of the domestic extremists (44%) overlapped with the years we were able to measure gang membership in the NLSY97, which could range from 1985 to 2005. Because historical effects remain a possible threat to the validity of our findings, we conducted supplementary analyses where we restrict our comparisons to post-1980. This ensures greater overlap between PIRUS and NLSY97 data, and also reflects the proliferation and growth of gangs and extremist violence (Klein & Maxson, 2006; LaFree, Dugan, & Miller, 2014). While our main findings did not change substantially, we report any discrepancies between the results of the full sample and the post-1980 subsample.

⁵ “Other Christian” included individuals of Jehovah’s Witness, Mormon, and Unitarian faiths. “New Religion/Other” included individuals of Buddhist. Hindu, Native American/Tribal religion, Scientology, Odinism, Other Eastern (Sikh), and Wicca/Witchcraft/Magic/Pagan faiths.

⁶ The post-1980 subsample reveals a gang-extremist rate of 6.5%—75 of the 1,154 domestic extremists maintained a history of gang involvement.

⁷ In the post-1980 subsample, there were no racial or ethnic differences between the gang and non-gang extremists, which is why we exercise caution in interpreting the racial/black differences in the full PIRUS sample.

⁸ While the median age of the jihadists at first arrest or police contact was 27, the median age of Hezbollah offenders was 37 and Hamas offenders was 43. Consistent with our findings for US political extremists, Klausen et al. find a very large range of ages for the terrorist offenders examined: jihadists, range = 16–64; Hezbollah, range = 22–64; and Hamas, range = 23–59. None of these figures overlap in significant ways with the NLSY97 data on gang membership.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

David C. Pyrooz

David Pyrooz is Assistant Professor of Sociology and Faculty Associate of the Institute of Behavioral Science at the University of Colorado Boulder. His research interests are in the areas of gangs and criminal networks, incarceration and reentry, and developmental and life course criminology. He received the New Scholar Award from the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences in 2015 and the Ruth Shonle Cavan Young Scholar Award from the American Society of Criminology in 2016.

Gary LaFree

Gary LaFree is Director of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) and Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Maryland. His research is on the causes and consequences of violent crime and terrorism. His most recent book (with Martha Crenshaw) is Countering Terrorism, published in 2017 with Brookings Press.

Scott H. Decker

Scott Decker is Foundation Professor in the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Arizona State University. His main research interests are in gangs, violence, and criminal justice policy. He is a Fellow in both the American Society of Criminology and the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences.

Patrick A. James

Patrick James is a Senior Faculty Specialist at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). He is the project manager for the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) project, which seeks to explain the underlying mechanisms and processes of domestic radicalization. He earned his MA in International Studies from the University of Denver, concentrating in political violence, Middle East policy, and international security issues.