Feminist Discursive Institutionalism—A Poststructural Alternative

Abstract

This paper joins the ongoing conversation about the desirability, or undesirability, of feminists becoming “new institutionalists”, which is linked to broader concerns about feminists seeking legitimacy as political “scientists”. With “feminist discursive institutionalism” as exemplar, it introduces the argument that paradigms, and hence methodologies, matter politically because they create different realities. To illustrate this proposition it examines the political implications of the different meanings of discourse, and related concepts of power, ideas, and “agency”/subjectivity, in Habermasian-influenced discursive institutionalism and in Foucauldian-inspired poststructuralist analysis. A key issue, it contends, is the extent to which institutions (and other political categories) are conceptualized as discrete entities or as more open-ended “assemblages”. This analysis, we suggest, solicits feminist researchers to reflect on the political implications of their theoretical investments.

Notes

¹ In their defence of theoretical eclecticism Krook and Squires (2006: 47) pay some attention to interpretive feminist methodologies; however, they make no mention of feminist poststructural theories.

² Campbell and Pedersen (2001a) provide a useful overview of developments in institutional theory, including rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, cultural or sociological institutionalism, and discursive institutionalism.

³ Schmidt's importance in the field of institutional theory is attested to by her numerous publications in recognized journals (see References) and her recent contribution (2011c) on “Discursive Institutionalism” in the International Encyclopedia of Political Science.

⁴ This focus necessarily means that we do not have the space to address the wide range of alternative approaches brought by feminists to the study of politics and institutions. We use Schmidt to illustrate an argument about the relationship between theory and politics that we suggest can be applied to other theoretical approaches—that is, that they be tested in terms of the forms of politics they make possible.

⁵ Schmidt (2011b: 116) acknowledges Habermas's influence on her understanding of discourse as “communicative action”, though she states that she does not accept Habermas's (1989) commitment to ideal speech situations. Still, Schmidt (2010: 17) describes deliberative democracy as occurring “when parties are reasonable and use evidence-based arguments”.

⁶ The Campbell and Pedersen (2001c) collection does not include a contribution from Schmidt, nor is she referenced by those writing under the rubric of “discursive institutionalism” in this collection.

⁷ Although Kjaer and Pedersen (2001: 226, 241) draw upon Foucault and refer to discourses as “orders of knowledge”, they tend to treat discourse as a “textual phenomenon”.

⁸ A wide variety of feminist scholars draw upon more than one understanding of discourse (see, for example, Ferree et al. 2002; Lombardo et al. 2009). The Conclusion addresses the issue of the possible blending of contrasting theoretical perspectives.

⁹ In our view, it might facilitate discussion of these complex and contentious issues if Schmidt and those who adopt her position use the term “communicative discourse” consistently to describe their focus of interest.

¹⁰ Refer to note 5.

¹¹ As Foucault (1984: 45–46) explains, his form of criticism is “not transcendental” as it is not practised “in the search for formal structures with universal values”.

¹² Mackay et al. (2010: 15) acknowledge this “Foucauldian” view of power as constitutive, which they link to Kulawik. However, they say little about its meaning or implications, and neither does Kulawik (2009).

¹³ Importantly Kjaer and Pedersen (2001: 24) theorize “ideas” as “part of a contextually specific process of articulation and institutionalization”, not as “external sources of change”.

¹⁴ Bussolini (2010: 101) makes a convincing case that dispositif ought not to be translated as “apparatus”, which refers to “discrete sets of instruments”. It is preferable to keep the French term, which is intended to capture a “constantly moving dynamic field of relations”.

¹⁵ Rowse borrows the concept of “method assemblage” from Law (2004: 144).

¹⁶ Krook and Squires (2006: 46, 59) contrast the greater acceptance of post-positivist approaches in feminist international relations with work on “gender and politics”, in which they note a return to “institutionalism” as a “structure-based approach”. The analysis in this paper provides support for this argument.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Carol Bacchi

Carol Bacchi is Professor Emerita of Politics, University of Adelaide. She researches and writes in the fields of policy theory, feminist political theory, embodiment and citizenship, and mobility studies. Her work on policy theory (Analysing Policy: What's the problem represented to be? (Pearson Education 2009)) draws on Foucauldian perspectives. She explores Foucault's position on problematization in “Why study problematizations? Making politics visible”, Open Journal of Political Science, 2(1), pp. 1–8. Currently, with Jennifer Bonham, she is developing a poststructural analytic strategy for interview analysis.

Malin Rönnblom is Associate Professor in Political Science and Senior Lectuer in Gender Studies, Umeå University and Karlstads University. Her main research interests are critical policy studies, especially gender equality policy, growth policy and rural policy, urban studies and feminist methodologies. Among her recent publications in English are “Afraid and restricted vs bold and equal: women's fear of violence and gender equality discourses in Sweden”, in European Journal of Women Studies, 20(2) together with Linda Sandberg, and “The political implications of research collaboration”, in Griffin et al. The Social Politics of Research Collaboration (London: Routledge).