The Effect of Defection in Maximizing Group Benefit

Figures & data

Figure 1. Payoff table of prisoner’s dilemma.

Figure 2. The values of AVG when (a) $T+S<P+R$ and (b) $T+S=P+R$.

Figure 3. $AVG=P$ the values of AVG when (a) P+R<T+S<2R, (b) T+S=2R, and (c) T+S>2R.

Table

	Cooperate (Y)	Defect (Y)
Cooperate (X)	X=Y=4	X=0, Y=10
Defect (X)	X=10, Y=0	X=Y=2

Figure 4. The effect of d values in various conditions.

Figure 5. Payoff table with cost.

Figure 6. The effect of d when (a) C≤P and (b) P<C≤R.

Figure 7. The effect of d when C>R.