Policy Success or Intelligence Failure?

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Notes

1 Huntington attempted to define the relationship between military professionals and their civilian masters. He was worried about how the Cold War hurt this civilian control over the military. If generals and admirals had the technical expertise and experience, why could they not have more say in national security matters traditionally held in the politician’s domain. House uses this tension to build out his argument of the issues between operators and intelligence. House also cites Huntington’s definitions of a profession to discuss why intelligence can be classified at treated as such by decisionmakers. He also attempts to translate Huntington’s three responsibilities (representative, advisory, and executive) for military leaders to equivalent functions of senior intelligence leaders.

2 House cites Huntington’s argument that a soldier owed absolute obedience and “presumption of legality” to any order without the option to resign in protest. House argues that blind obedience is untenable for an ethical and responsible military leader.

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Notes on contributors

Scott A. Moseman

Scott A. Moseman has a Ph.D. in History from Kansas State University. He works in the Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations at Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Moseman was an officer in the United States Navy from 1996 through 2016. The author can be contacted at [email protected].