The Sino–Soviet Intelligence War: The KGB Counterintelligence Perspective

Abstract

Declassified documents of the State Committee for Security (KGB) demonstrate how Soviet intelligence viewed Chinese intelligence, after two communist neighbors split apart ideologically, and their vast border became a theater of war in the late 1960s. First, in response to the massive influx of Chinese immigrants, Soviet counterintelligence made tremendous efforts to uncover false defectors sent by Chinese intelligence, employing unique techniques. These include “in-cell” cultivation (i.e., the placement of KGB agents in the same cell with a detained Chinese suspect), and the interregional secondment (marshrutirovanie) of proven KGB agents of Chinese nationality to be deployed in Chinese settlements. Second, fighting Chinese intelligence required coordinated efforts among KGB counterintelligence, military counterintelligence, and the border guards’ intelligence. Third, the KGB developed a comprehensive operational psychology for handling Chinese targets. Three key recruitment fundamentals—ideology, money, and kompromat—were tailored to the social and cultural characteristics of the Chinese population. While Soviet intelligence utilized all available human resources, attempts to establish illegal intelligence positions in China had limited success in the 1970s. Overall, the fundamental approaches of Soviet intelligence toward China were largely determined by geopolitical and cultural underpinnings and the autocratic nature of both regimes.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to the editor and reviewers for their constructive suggestions. My special thanks are extended to the archivists of the Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

I have no potential conflict of interest to declare.

Notes

1 In 1949, Stalin gave the cold shoulder to Mao Zedong, who won the Civil War against the Kuomintang-led government and declared a resolute “Leaning to One Side” policy to support the communist bloc and fight U.S.-led capitalism. Mao’s first visit to Moscow lasted as long as two months before the two communist leaders agreed on the Sino–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance due to their disagreements over a host of postwar legacy issues including Stalin’s demands on Soviet interests in Manchuria and Xinjiang. Mineo Nakajima, Chusotairitsu to Gendai: Sengo Ajia No Sai Kosatsu [Sino-Soviet Conflict and Contemporary Times: Reconsidering Postwar Asia], (Tokyo: Chuokoronsha, 1978), pp. 98–104.

2 For example, see Thomas W. Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, No. 4 (1972), pp. 1175–1202. https://doi.org/10.2307/1957173; Y. Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,” Cold War History, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2000), pp. 21–52. https://doi.org/10.1080/713999906; Lorenz M. Lüthi, “Restoring Chaos to History: Sino-Soviet-American Relations, 1969,” The China Quarterly, Vol. 210 (2012), pp. 378–397. https://doi.org/10.1017/S030574101200046X

3 Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky (eds.), Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975–1985 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 203–210.

4 Konstantin Preobrazhensky, KGB v Yaponii. Shpion, kotoryi lyubil Tokio [KGB in Japan. The Spy Who Loved Tokyo] (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2000), Chap. 2, “Skol’zkaya verbovka kitaitsev.”

5 Oleg N. Glazunov, Kitaiskaya Razvedka (Moscow: Algoritm, 2008), Chap. 3, “Tainye operatsii spetssluzhb KNR v Rossii.”

6 Filip Kovacevic, “The Soviet-Chinese Spy Wars in the 1970s: What KGB Counterintelligence Knew, Part IV,” Wilson Center, 9 June 2021, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/soviet-chinese-spy-wars-1970s-what-kgb-counterintelligence-knew-part-iv

7 For example, see Peter L. Mattis, “Assessing Western Perspectives on Chinese Intelligence,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2012), pp. 678–699. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2012.678745; Peter L. Mattis and Matthew J. Brazil, Chinese Communist Espionage: An Intelligence Primer (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019); Ariane Knüsel, “Swiss Counterintelligence and Chinese Espionage during the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2020), pp. 4–31. https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00949.

8 For example, compare M. F. Gololobov, Vospominaniya Voennogo Kontrrazvedchika (Ivanovo: Izd-vo “Ivanovo,” 2000); and F. Shevchenko and M. Gololobov, “Ne oslablyat’ bditel’nost’ v bor’be protiv kitaiskikh spetssluzhb” [Do Not Relax Vigilance in the Fight against Chinese Intelligence Services], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 71 (1977), pp. 42–47. https://photos.app.goo.gl/JEDwipN64ejzEfFr5

9 Sbornik served a similar function to the U.S. Studies in Intelligence as a platform for sharing professional intelligence experiences. However, there are notable differences between them. While Studies in Intelligence has many unclassified and declassified articles, Sbornik remains classified in Russia. Studies in Intelligence, managed by the Central Intelligence Agency–affiliated Center for the Study of Intelligence, focuses more on foreign intelligence, whereas Sbornik’s primary focus is on counterintelligence. Furthermore, Sbornik, issued by the KGB Inspection Directorate, typically reflected the policies of the KGB leadership, occasionally publishing its directives as well as addressing topics deemed important by the KGB leadership. For the backgrounds of the KGB Sbornik, see also Sanshiro Hosaka, “Perestroika of the KGB: Chekists Penetrate Politics,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence (2022), pp. 1–30, https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2022.2074810; Sanshiro Hosaka, “The KGB and Glasnost: A Contradiction in Terms?,” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2022), pp. 57–90.

10 F. Reveko and E. Kolesnikov, “Iz praktiki kontrrazvedyvatel’noi raboty sredi kitaiskikh grazhdan” [From the Practice of Counterintelligence Work among Chinese Citizens], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 4 (51) (1971), p. 33. https://photos.app.goo.gl/YXnVZcDLfyA1PZXa6

11 “Nekotorye osobennosti chekistkoi raboty sredi lits kitaiskoi natsional’nosti” [Some Features of the KGB Work among People of Chinese Nationality], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 3 (54) (1972): 88, https://photos.app.goo.gl/WVEcR6rykG7JtmuSA. In September 1976, the KGB sent to its residencies abroad a similar but updated report titled “On Certain National-Psychological Characteristics of the Chinese, and their Evaluation in the Context of Intelligence Work.” See Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions, pp. 185–195.

12 Е. Podshivalov and V. Agban, “Uspekh marshrutirovaniya—v udachnom vybore agenta” [The Success of Routing Is in the Successful Choice of Agent], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 1 (56) (1973), p. 38. https://photos.app.goo.gl/Gcsv6Q8irA8iUGE27

13 This catalog was issued at a ten-year interval, helping Chekists in their search for relevant publications by subject. Articles are also indexed by the names of authors, operatives, and agents (codenames), anti-Soviet citizens, enemy intelligence officers and agents, and foreign organizations used by enemy intelligence services.

14 A. I. Zhivchikov (ed.), “Bibliograficheskii spravochnik statei, opublikovannykh v Sbornike KGB (1959–1969 gg.)” [Bibliographic Reference of Articles Published in the KGB Collection (1959–1969)] (Vysshaya krasnoznamennaya shkola Komiteta gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti pri Sovete ministrov SSSR imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskogo, 1973), https://photos.app.goo.gl/ZjEp6vVvcU8gzZ9i7. In the 1960s, “General Issues” of “VIII. Subversive Activities of Enemy Intelligence Agencies Against the USSR” include only two articles partially related to China.

15 I. M. Dmitrieva and A. I. Zhivchikov (eds.), “Bibliograficheskii spravochnik statei, opublikovannykh v Sbornike KGB (1970–1980 gg.)” [Bibliographic Reference of Articles Published in the KGB Collection (1970–1980)] (Vysshaya ordena oktyabr’skoi revolyutsii krasnoznamennaya shkola KGB SSSR imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskogo, 1985), https://www.kgbdocuments.eu/assets/books/other/compendium_biblio.pdf

16 The Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania, “KGB Journals and Books,” KGB Documents, https://www.kgbdocuments.eu/kgb-journals-and-books/

17 I collected China-related articles for this research at the SBU archive in July and October 2021. I made my collection accessible via Google Photos links shown in the references.

18 Christopher Andrew, “Intelligence, International Relations and ‘Under-Theorisation,’” in Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Peter Jackson and L. V. Scott (Routledge, 2004), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203504420

19 Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, and Elena Grossfeld, “The Autocrat’s Intelligence Paradox: Vladimir Putin’s (Mis)Management of Russian Strategic Assessment in the Ukraine War,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations (29 December 2022), p. 387. https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481221146113

20 Nikolai Leonov, cited in Christopher M. Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World (London and New York: Allen Lane, 2005), Chap. 15, “The People’s Republic of China.”

21 Mattis and Brazil, Chinese Communist Espionage, Chap. 1 “Chinese Communist Intelligence Organizations”; Roger Faligot, Chinese Spies: From Chairman Mao to Xi Jinping, translated by Natasha Lehrer (Updated English ed.; London: Hurst & Company, 2019), pp. 42–43.

22 Faligot, Chinese Spies, p. 58.

23 Nikolai Leonov, cited in Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive II, Chap. 15, “The People’s Republic of China.”

24 Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Litai Xue, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 74.

25 Vladislav Zubok and Constantin Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 61; the testimony of KGB officer Ivan Baibakov in “Messengers from Moscow—Part 2 of 4 (BBC 1995),” 22 December 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=daNcbvj-1Aw

26 Mattis and Brazil, Chinese Communist Espionage, Chap. 1, “Chinese Communist Intelligence Organizations.”

27 Faligot, Chinese Spies, p. 61.

28 Oleg Penkovsky and Frank Gibney, The Penkovsky Papers, translated by Peter Deriabin (New York: Ballantine Books, 1982), p. 363. For the context of the preparation of The Penkovsky Papers, see Jerrold L. Schecter and Peter Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World: How a Soviet Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1992). The CIA presented the book in Penkovsky’s voice, as if he himself had penned it, masking the roles of the CIA and MI6. During the clearance process, the CIA removed passages deemed “politically or diplomatically sensitive” from the manuscipt, whereas a CIA memorandum that listed these edits does not include any that might pertain to China. See Schecter and Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World, pp. 384–385.

29 Roger Faligot and Rémi Kauffer, The Chinese Secret Service, translated by Christine Donougher (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1989), p. 284.

30 John Barron pointed out that operations against all other foreign embassies were taken charge of by numbered departments of the SCD, while such activities toward the Chinese were taken care of by the larger Political Security Service responsible for internal political matters because Moscow especially feared the Chinese propaganda and subversion against the Soviet people. John Barron, KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents (New York: A Bantam Book, 1974), p. 117. Another source states that counterintelligence against China was the sixteenth department of the SCD. See Valentin Mzareulov, “16-i Otdel [16th Department],” Istoriya otechestvennykh spetssluzhb i pravookhranitel’nykh organov, https://shieldandsword.mozohin.ru/kgb5491/structure/2GU/16_2.htm

31 Barron, KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents, p. 101.

32 A. A. Baigarin, “Operativnoe soveshchanie v Komitete gosbezopasnosti Kazakhstana” [Operational Meeting in the State Security Committee of Kazakhstan], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 49–50 (1971), p. 126. https://photos.app.goo.gl/dFnMLv3MPtNwgeaA6

33 Ibid., p. 127.

34 M. Dzhandil’dinov, “Operativnoe soveshchanie v Komitete gosbezopasnosti Kazakhstana” [Operational Meeting in the State Security Committee of Kazakhstan], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 49–50 (1971), pp. 104–105. https://photos.app.goo.gl/dFnMLv3MPtNwgeaA6

35 Shevchenko and Gololobov, “Ne oslablyat’ bditel’nost’,” pp. 46–47.

36 A. Draga, “O vzglyadakh kitaiskogo rukovodstva na ispol’zovanie narodnogo opolcheniya v sovremennoi voine” [On the Views of the Chinese Leadership on the Use of the People’s Militia in Modern Warfare], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 83 (1979), pp. 100–101. https://photos.app.goo.gl/QuV62rzQGEEjDfpk7

37 L. L. Bessarab, “Operativnoe soveshchanie v Komitete gosbezopasnosti Kazakhstana” [Operational Meeting in the State Security Committee of Kazakhstan], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 49–50 (1971), p. 106. https://photos.app.goo.gl/dFnMLv3MPtNwgeaA6

38 “Nekotorye osobennosti chekistkoi raboty,” p. 83.

39 Ibid.

40 “Vyshe uroven’ boevoi i mobilizatsionnoi gotovnosti. Soveshchanie rukovoditelei organov i voisk gosbezopasnosti na Dal’nem Vostoke i v Zabaikal’e” [Higher Level of Combat and Mobilization Readiness. Meeting of the Heads of State Security Agencies and Troops in the Far East and Transbaikalia], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 86 (1980), p. 17. https://photos.app.goo.gl/hpXSUixMqaeDHh296

41 A. S. Rakhimov, “Operativnoe soveshchanie v Komitete gosbezopasnosti Kazakhstana” [Operational Meeting in the State Security Committee of Kazakhstan], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 49–50 (1971), p. 121. https://photos.app.goo.gl/dFnMLv3MPtNwgeaA6

42 Bessarab, “Operativnoe soveshchanie,” p. 107.

43 Ibid., p. 106.

44 Rakhimov, “Operativnoe soveshchanie,” p. 121.

45 Bessarab, “Operativnoe soveshchanie,” pp. 106–107.

46 Ibid., p. 107.

47 F. Vasil’ev, “O nekotorykh osobennostyakh verbovki agentov iz chisla kitaitsev” [On Some Features of the Recruitment of Agents from among the Chinese], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 51 (1971), pp. 23–31. https://photos.app.goo.gl/awQW64vUap7473ku7

48 S. G. Gazizov, “Operativnoe soveshchanie v Komitete gosbezopasnosti Kazakhstana” [Operational Meeting in the State Security Committee of Kazakhstan], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 49–50 (1971), p. 120. https://photos.app.goo.gl/dFnMLv3MPtNwgeaA6

49 V. Shevchenko, “Chekisty Kazakhstana na strazhe interesov naroda i gosudarstva” [Kazakhstan Chekists on Guard of the Interests of the People and the State], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 74 (1977), p. 35. https://photos.app.goo.gl/bBsL877yWrvPfKtPA

50 For example, see M. Ozimov, “Usilivaem sovmestnuyu rabotu protiv ideologicheskikh diversii imperializma” [Strengthening Joint Work against the Ideological Diversions of Imperialism], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 3 (66) (1975), pp. 11–14. https://photos.app.goo.gl/iZMoKMG97HHAGTs1A; Shevchenko and Gololobov, “Ne oslablyat’ bditel’nost’,” p. 45; Shevchenko, “Chekisty Kazakhstana na strazhe,” p. 36.

51 Rakhimov, “Operativnoe soveshchanie,” p. 122.

52 Gazizov, “Operativnoe soveshchanie,” p. 120.

53 Rakhimov, “Operativnoe soveshchanie,” p. 121.

54 I. I. Tamaev, “Operativnoe soveshchanie v Komitete gosbezopasnosti Kazakhstana” [Operational Meeting in the State Security Committee of Kazakhstan], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 49–50 (1971), pp. 123–124. https://photos.app.goo.gl/dFnMLv3MPtNwgeaA6

55 Ibid., p. 124.

56 N. P. Lovyagin, “Operativnoe soveshchanie v Komitete gosbezopasnosti Kazakhstana” [Operational Meeting in the State Security Committee of Kazakhstan], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 49–50 (1971), pp. 129–131. https://photos.app.goo.gl/dFnMLv3MPtNwgeaA6

57 Vasil’ev, “O nekotorykh osobennostyakh verbovki,” p. 27.

58 Zh. Karatabanov, “Iz praktiki proverki pokazanii perebezhchikov s kitaiskoi territorii” [From the practice of verifying the testimony of defectors from the Chinese territory], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 2 (53) (1972), p. 83. https://photos.app.goo.gl/rjkb68sTeCn3EQoS9

59 N. Shevrygin, “Pouchitel’noe delo” [An Enlightening Thing], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 60 (1974), pp. 80–85, https://photos.app.goo.gl/yTa5vkXp95NsXcbcA. For other cases of Chinese tasked to penetrate into the Soviet territory for a reconnaissance mission under the guise of a deserter, see Yu. Sotnikov, N. Lovyagin, and N. Shevrygin, “Rassledovanie ugolovnogo dela agenta kitaiskoi razvedki” [Investigation of the Criminal Case of a Chinese Intelligence Agent], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 2 (57) (1973), p. 77. https://photos.app.goo.gl/5o2UJ4VGFo5TFvyB7; Filip Kovacevic, “The Soviet-Chinese Spy Wars in the 1970s: What KGB Counterintelligence Knew, Part II,” Wilson Center (22 April 2021), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/soviet-chinese-spy-wars-1970s-what-kgb-counterintelligence-knew-part-ii; Kovacevic, “The Soviet-Chinese Spy Wars in the 1970s,” 9 June 2021.

60 Vasil’ev, “O nekotorykh osobennostyakh verbovki,” p. 27.

61 Dzhandil’dinov, “Operativnoe soveshchanie,” p. 105.

62 “Nekotorye osobennosti chekistkoi raboty,” p. 84.

63 Shevchenko and Gololobov, “Ne oslablyat’ bditel’nost’,” p. 46.

64 “Nekotorye osobennosti chekistkoi raboty,” p. 84.

65 V. Safronov and S. Kulakov, “Agenty-kitaitsy uchastvuyut v proverke perebezhchikov iz KNR” [Agents-Chinese Are Involved in Screening Defectors from the PRC], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 3 (70) (1976), pp. 21–27. https://photos.app.goo.gl/Z2zB4116rbY5vJpQ8

66 Podshivalov and Agban, “Uspekh marshrutirovaniya,” p. 39.

67 Safronov and Kulakov, “Agenty-kitaitsy uchastvuyut,” pp. 22–24. One of the authors, Major General V. Safronov, continued to contribute to the KGB Sbornik on the coordination between investigators and operatives to identify Chinese double agents. See Filip Kovacevic, “Reading the 1980s KGB In-House Journal: The Case of a Chinese Sleeper Spy in Siberia,” Wilson Center (3 February 2022), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/reading-1980s-kgb-house-journal-case-chinese-sleeper-spy-siberia

68 G. K. Kozlov, “Operativnoe soveshchanie v Komitete gosbezopasnosti Kazakhstana” [Operational Meeting in the State Security Committee of Kazakhstan], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 49–50 (1971), pp. 117–118. https://photos.app.goo.gl/dFnMLv3MPtNwgeaA6 However, the article does not mention who exactly stole the weapons and ammunition.

69 Shevchenko and Gololobov, “Ne oslablyat’ bditel’nost’,” p. 42.

70 Ibid., p. 42.

71 Ibid., p. 44.

72 Ibid., p. 42.

73 Ibid., p. 43.

74 Tamaev, “Operativnoe soveshchanie,” pp. 124–125.

75 Draga, “O vzglyadakh kitaiskogo rukovodstva,” p. 103.

76 Ibid., pp. 103–106.

77 Ibid., pp. 100–101.

78 “Tiger” was mentioned in another KGB periodical, Trudy. See Filip Kovacevic, “The Soviet-Chinese Spy Wars in the 1970s: What KGB Counterintelligence Knew, Part III,” Wilson Center, 4 June 2021, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/soviet-chinese-spy-wars-1970s-what-kgb-counterintelligence-knew-part-iii

79 Shevchenko and Gololobov, “Ne oslablyat’ bditel’nost’,” p. 44.

80 Myansur Khairov, “Istoriya operativnykh organov pogranichnykh voisk” [History of the Operational Bodies of the Border Troops], Veteran granitsy (2013), p. 51.

81 Valentin Mzareulov, “Razvedyvatel’noe—Operativnoe upravlenie” [Intelligence—Operations Directorate], Istoriya otechestvennykh spetssluzhb i pravookhranitel’nykh organov, https://shieldandsword.mozohin.ru/kgb5491/structure/GUPV/ru.htm

82 Khairov, “Istoriya operativnykh organov pogranichnykh voisk” [History of the operational bodies of the border troops], p. 55.

83 “Otchety rukovoditelei organov KGB i komandirov pogranichnykh chastei v Komitete gosbezopasnosti” [Reports of Heads of KGB Bodies and Commanders of Border Units in the State Security Committee], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 77 (1978), p. 34. https://photos.app.goo.gl/zSC2HYNscm8dbK1j8

84 Ibid., p. 31.

85 Ibid., pp. 27–28.

86 Reveko and Kolesnikov, “Iz praktiki kontrrazvedyvatel’noi raboty,” p. 31.

87 “Otchety rukovoditelei organov KGB,” p. 29.

88 Ibid., p. 30.

89 Ibid., p. 28.

90 Rakhimov, “Operativnoe soveshchanie,” pp. 22–23.

91 “Agenturno-operativnaya obstanovka, ee osnovnye elementy i istochniki eе izucheniya” [Agent-Operational Situation, Key Elements, and Sources of Study], 1970, https://www.4freerussia.org/kgbmanuals/2022/10-AgentsandOperationalSituation-1970.pdf, pp. 23–25.

92 This recommendation mainly concerns the KGB recruitment work in the USSR. By contrast, it was extremely difficult to recruit Chinese individuals in communist China. See Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions, pp. 203–210.

93 “Nekotorye osobennosti chekistkoi raboty,” p. 85.

94 Vasil’ev, “O nekotorykh osobennostyakh verbovki,” p. 30.

95 “Nekotorye osobennosti chekistkoi raboty,” p. 84.

96 Vasil’ev, “O nekotorykh osobennostyakh verbovki,” p. 30.

97 Ibid.; see also “Nekotorye osobennosti chekistkoi raboty,” p. 84.

98 Vasil’ev, “O nekotorykh osobennostyakh verbovki,” pp. 30–31.

99 Ibid., p. 25.

100 Lovyagin, “Operativnoe soveshchanie,” p. 129.

101 Reveko and Kolesnikov, “Iz praktiki kontrrazvedyvatel’noi raboty,” p. 33.

102 Yu. Kedrov, “Nekotorye izmeneniya v psikhologii kitaiskikh grazhdan i uchet ikh v chekistskoi rabote” [Some Changes in the Psychology of Chinese Citizens and Taking Them into Account in the KGB Work], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 108 (1985), p. 58. https://www.kgbdocuments.eu/assets/books/journals/sbornik/108.pdf

103 Vasil’ev, “O nekotorykh osobennostyakh verbovki,” p. 31.

104 B. Dmitriev, “Glubzhe i tshchatel’nee proveryat’ pokazaniya narushitelei granitsy iz KNR” [Deeper and More Thorough Check of the Testimony of Border Violators from the PRC], Sbornik KGB SSSR, No. 3 (66) (1975), pp. 47–48, https://photos.app.goo.gl/x6MvXpUFP839Qw7r5

105 Dmitriev, “Glubzhe i tshchatel’nee proveryat’ pokazaniya narushiteley granitsy iz KNR,” pp. 47–48.

106 Vasil’ev, “O nekotorykh osobennostyakh verbovki,” pp. 25–26.

107 Kedrov, “Nekotorye izmeneniya v psikhologii,” pp. 52–55.

108 Ibid., pp. 52–55.

109 Ibid.

110 Ibid., p. 56.

111 “Nekotorye osobennosti chekistkoi raboty,” pp. 84–85.

112 Kedrov, “Nekotorye izmeneniya v psikhologii,” pp. 56–57.

113 Ibid., p. 57.

114 “Nekotorye osobennosti chekistkoi raboty,” p. 85.

115 Kedrov, “Nekotorye izmeneniya v psikhologii,” p. 57.

116 Ibid., pp. 57–58.

117 Preobrazhensky, KGB v Yaponii, Chap. 2, “Skol’zkaya verbovka kitaitsev.”

118 Kedrov, “Nekotorye izmeneniya v psikhologii,” p. 59.

119 Reveko and Kolesnikov, “Iz praktiki kontrrazvedyvatel’noi raboty,” p. 32.

120 Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), p. 5.

121 Kovacevic, “The Soviet-Chinese Spy Wars in the 1970s,” 9 June 2021.

122 For a Western counterintelligence agency’s struggle with Chinese characters, see Knüsel, “Swiss Counterintelligence and Chinese Espionage during the Cold War.”

123 Sanshiro Hosaka, “Repeating History: Soviet Offensive Counterintelligence Active Measures,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2022), pp. 429–458. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2020.1822100

124 Chinese intelligence’s practice of infiltrating agents into adversaries is well documented. For example, see Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations, p. 6 and Peter L. Mattis, “Li Kenong and the Practice of Chinese Intelligence,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 28, No. 3 (3 July 2015), p. 552. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2015.1022467

125 “Agenturno-operativnaya obstanovka, ee osnovnye elementy i istochniki eе izucheniya,” p. 4.

126 It is reported that there are intelligence liaison officers in the Chinese embassy in Moscow, whom the Russian intelligence services (the FSB, Foreign Intelligence Service, and GRU) contact when problems arise (e.g., many cases of Chinese technological intelligence prosecuted by the FSB). Faligot, Chinese Spies, p. 265. Implications for contemporary Russian intelligence activities will be published elsewhere.

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Sanshiro Hosaka

Sanshiro Hosaka is a Research Fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security (Tallinn) and a Ph.D. student at the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu. He served as a Project Manager for the Japan-funded intergovernmental committees in the field of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. He also worked for the Japanese diplomatic missions in Dushanbe and Kyiv. He received research awards from the Japanese Association for Russian and East European Studies (2017) and the Japanese Association for Ukrainian Studies (2022). His recent book, Choho kokka Roshia: Soren KGB kara Puchin no FSB taisei made [Intelligence State Russia: From the Soviet KGB to Putin’s FSB Regime] (Tokyo: Chuokouron, 2023), received the “Yamamoto Shichihei” humanities and social science publication award. The author can be contacted at [email protected].