Multi-layered Migration Deterrence and Technology in Spanish Maritime Border Management

ABSTRACT

Until 2006 Spain witnessed growing irregular maritime immigration from the African continent. This intensification in irregular migration has led to the design and application of a migration control policy whose instrumental and institutional structures are becoming increasingly complex. Irregular immigration at maritime borders has been addressed through what we have referred to and characterized as a multi-layered deterrence strategy which has been gradually implemented and upgraded along the main entry points and migration corridors. The Spanish strategy is tightly intertwined with the unfolding of the EU Integrated Border Management approach and combines higher inputs of surveillance and border control technologies with multilateral cooperation agreements reached with transit and origin countries. High-tech border surveillance increases interception probabilities, but effective migration deterrence is conditioned by high expulsion rates once the border has been crossed. It is in the task of border implementation that technology appears as one of the pillars of the control structure and where its effect on deterrence depends on its embeddedness in a mix of instruments and actions.

Notes

1 In February 2014, Jorge Fernández Díaz, Spain’s Minister of the Interior, made some remarks on the “elastic” definition and “malleable” character of the borders around the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. In his opinion the “bodies” of border patrol officers represent the “real Spanish border” in operations of immigrant interdiction in maritime areas close to these cities. In his opinion, “the no-land area between the several walls of the control perimeter is not Spanish territory so it is possible, under the rule of law, to repatriate irregular migrants climbing up the external wall” (El País; 13 February 2014).

2 The legal definitions of repatriation, compulsory return, expulsion and deportation are different, but all involve the involuntary departure of the migrant from the receiving country. The term employed herein is intended to account for all of these departing flows.

3 In April 2014, the European Parliament approved a new regulation to ensure the protection of fundamental human rights in the context of maritime surveillance and place a clear duty upon units participating in FRONTEX operations to engage and save lives (European Parliament 2014).

4 In this part of the article we use “integrated border management” in a general sense, as a compound of coordinated policies of migration control. Later on (part four of the article) “Integrated Border Management (IBM)” will be used when focusing on the specific EU approach, defined by the Council of the European Union as consisting of the following aspects: “border control (checks and surveillance) as defined in the Schengen borders code, including relevant risk analysis and crime intelligence; detection and investigation of cross border crime in coordination with all competent law enforcement authorities; the four-tier access control model (measures in third countries, cooperation with neighbouring countries, border control, control measures within the area of the free movement including return); inter-agency cooperation for border management (border guards, customs, police, national security and other relevant authorities) and international cooperation; coordination and coherence of activities of Member States, Institutions and other bodies of the Community and the Union” (Council of the European Union 2006, 4).

5 In the dictionary sense of the word, “deterrence” involves discouraging someone from doing something. This can be achieved directly or indirectly by different means and manners. Due to their deterrent effects we also include in our analysis the sealing off of borders and immigration enforcement (return, readmission), both of which also have deterrent effects. For years a large part of International Relations, Security and Strategic Studies used the concepts of “deterrence” and “dissuasion” as synonymous, although others see “dissuasion” as a broader concept which includes “deterrence” (Kluger 2002; Gray 2003) (see Figure 1).

6 While the political and social construct of African immigration as the paradigm of undesired immigration has taken hold in Spain over the past two decades (Izquierdo 2003), it is rooted in the historical process of building the national identity (Vives 2011).

7 “Conditions the ability” does not necessarily mean “restricts,” because maritime areas also may facilitate operational opacity and lessen the strict observance of fundamental rights. In a sense, the internal expansion of border lines into frontiers (Anderson 1996) happening recently in Ceuta and Melilla, with migrants being extracted from the in-betweens of border fences, creates a new type of “no man’s land.” This time within the line and not before it, but with the same implication: you are “still not there” even if all the fences are on Spanish soil.

8 Most migrants are returned in flights chartered by the Spanish government in collaboration with FRONTEX. From 2010 to 2014 Spain deported 26491 migrants on more than 250 flights, ranking as the European country with the most return flights, even more than Italy, a country with a considerably higher influx of irregular migrants (information contained in a parliamentary answer during a session of the Spanish parliament, retrieved from Cadena Ser, 3 April 2015, http://cadenaser.com/ser/2015/04/03/sociedad/1428012211_939510.html).

9 Only partial data is available on the expenditure of the Spanish government on migration control during the last two decades. The scarcity of data is indicative of the lack of transparency in the implementation of this sphere of migration policy.

10 Hayes and Vermeulen (2012, 23–25) mention other related EU initiatives such as International Maritime Organization requirements (Automatic Identification Systems, Long Range Identification and Tracking), EU fisheries control and Vessel Monitoring and Detection Systems, the SAFESEANET run by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), the EU e-Maritime initiative, counter drug trafficking and maritime piracy initiatives, and National and EDPS military operations.

11 The European Commission projects an implementation cost for the preferred decentralized approach of €318 M for the 2011–2020 period, versus the €913 M for a centralized design (European Commission 2011b, 39). Hayes and Vermeulen (2012, 70) believe the cost will be considerably higher (€874 M), particularly in the common application of surveillance tools.

12 INDRA is a leading Spanish technology company which developed the External Surveillance Integrated System (SIVE) of border security. This system was implemented along different stretches of the Spanish coastline, and was successfully exported to other countries such as Latvia and Romania. INDRA is leading the first validation stage of Perseus with an exercise that involves detecting and tracking vessels in the Straits of Gibraltar.

13 When evaluating cost controls, differentiating between the effectiveness and efficiency of the technology used is in order, since the effectiveness of the control and the effects of deterrence could lower the number of illegal crossing attempts, thus increasing the costs per person intercepted, all else being equal. This could be erroneously interpreted as a reduction in the process’s efficiency when considering the number of attempts that are prevented by the deterrence effect.

14 The economic crisis strongly affected the national labor markets in southern Europe and one might think that Spain’s appeal as a destination for labor immigration is now lower than before, and that therefore irregular maritime migration has decreased. Some clarifications are in order. Although the link between labor immigration and business cycles is valid in general terms, it is less pronounced in irregular maritime migration from Africa to Europe, because in these cases structural push factors are prevalent. In overall terms irregular maritime migration in the Mediterranean has not decreased during the crisis even though the southern European economies were highly affected by it. But Spain’s relevance as a destination has clearly been reduced, and although in other countries like Greece or Italy the economic crisis is also severe, irregular immigration has been growing in these corridors due to deviation effects, which are in turn driven by other factors (like geopolitical instability in some transit countries).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Spanish National Research Program [CSO2014-53680].