RATIONAL DEMOCRACY, DELIBERATION, AND REALITY

Abstract

Deliberative democracy is unrealistic, but so are rational-choice models of democracy. The elements of reality that rationalistic theories of democracy leave out are the very elements that deliberative democrats would need to subtract if their theory were to be applied to reality. The key problem is not, however, the altruistic orientation that deliberative democrats require; opinion researchers know that voters are already sociotropic, not self-interested. Rather, as Schumpeter saw, the problems lie in understanding politics, government, and economics under modern—and postmodern—conditions. Modernity entails levels of complexity that stymie voters' attempts to be well informed about which political promises will actually solve social problems. Postmodernity adds to complexity an overabundance of fragmented information experienced impatiently and fleetingly by citizens who confuse entertainment with knowledge, and whose political demands are as unrealistic as their personal desire for a unique identity. These factors can be added, one by one, to the minimalist rational-choice model of politics, with each step leading us farther away from deliberative democracy.

Notes

1. James S. Fishkin's proposal to use deliberative opinion polling acknowledges that modern democracy falls far short of the ideals of small-group, face-to-face democracy. Therefore, one has to recreate small communities where deliberation is possible. Individuals should be randomly selected from the general population to discuss a current political issue in an environment that promotes deliberation in the best sense of the word. At the end, the participants are polled so that an approximation is achieved of what the members of the polity would think if they had appropriate opportunities to reflect about the issues (Fishkin 1995).

2. Together with the renewed interest in human passion, we also have to come to terms with new processes of information and communication which are typical for postmodern societies: the shift from knowledge of the first order (expert knowledge) to knowledge of the second order (meta and media competencies); the shift of information gathering to the “blogosphere” (Sunstein 2008).

3. “Modern democracy is a product of the capitalist process” (Schumpeter [1942] 1975, 297). We need not subscribe to models of historical materialism to find some truth in this statement. At the system level there are structural compatibilities or elective affinities of economic and political systems. At the behavioral level “political economy,” in the version founded by Schumpeter and Anthony Downs, implies the transfer of market-like models from economics to political science. Rational decision making is the central idea—and it is in politics as problematic as in economics. Modernization theory adds the innovative aspect: If people are encouraged to produce new ideas in the economic sphere it would be strange if they abstained completely from thinking in the political sphere.

4. However, to complicate the problem further we add three qualifications. First, these variables must not be considered independent of each other. For instance, a strong ideological orientation will promote or impede the ascription of charisma to a politician. For the adherent it is charisma, for the opponent it is devilish seduction. Second, starting with the rational core of economic theory does not mean that we have a linear abatement of “rationality” from the core to the peripheral variables. Spin-doctors may accomplish a strategic-rational construction of personal charisma or a rational getup of visions in the course of a political campaign. Third, there is no systematic scaling of knowledge or ignorance along the series of variables. While the economic growth rate may be used as a simple indicator of the “success” of the incumbent administration, people may be ignorant about the economic context and unable to assess the efforts of the government. Visions may serve as diffuse orientations for the future, but they may also be elaborated in a series of sensible and concrete studies.

5. Empirical surveys and experimental studies show that people are not simply selfish, but are also prone to accept collective commitments: They do not only want to maximize their personal welfare, but they also want to live as decent people. However, in academic practice there are double standards. On the one hand, in discussions with philosophers of science astute political economists concede that utility functions are neutral, in the sense that they might include any variables, including altruistic ones. On the other hand, economic studies generally work with the core assumption of selfishness equalizing rational decision making with egoistic utility-maximizing. Thus Dennis Mueller lays it down that “the basic behavioral postulate of public choice, as for economics, is that man is an egoistic, rational, utility-maximizer” (Mueller 2003, 1). Several possible criticisms impose themselves: (1) The export of the economic model to politics is inadequate, because the areas are different. (2) The model is inadequate in both fields. (3) Egoism is realistic, but rationality is not. (4) Rationality is realistic, but egoism is not. (5) Both rationality and egoism are unrealistic as predominant features. (6) Differentiation is necessary in the political realm: Voters are like the homo economicus, but policy-makers refer to the common good; or (7) vice versa. (8) Motivations are defined correctly in both areas, but the interpretation of the situation may nevertheless result in a wide range of behaviors.

6. Competition is the essence of any market, and microeconomics depicts it as the result of numerous small business units. But Schumpeter observed that big corporations are no less innovative than small firms, leading him to ambivalence. Big business is economically favorable, but may be politically detrimental. The loss of small private property firms makes “personal entrepreneurs” disappear. The capital side becomes abstracted from concrete individuals, and abstract capital cannot arouse loyalty and affect the legitimation of the market. This legitimatory deficit will bring capitalism to an end.

7. Daniel Bell (1976) suspected that two cultural worlds would damage each other with unpredictable consequences for the system's viability: the world of rationality embodied in politics and economy and the world of leisure, Bohemian culture, spontaneity, consumption. The inconsistency could cause a systemic crisis. But the postmodern system seems to have mastered the contradiction (Prisching 2006).

8. Strategic behavior by voters can also come into play. If the polls predict an overwhelming victory of the incumbent party, voters who favor the party but not without ambivalence may cast their ballots in favor of the opposing party. Another example: Candidate John comes closest to the position preferred by the voter, but his chances are considered bad. Therefore, the voter supports candidate Jane, so as not to “throw away” his vote.

9. It is difficult to get a comprehensive impression of the qualities of a man or woman who is visible only in short TV presentations. One should be able to assess his or her cognitive quality as well as personal trustworthiness. He or she should be strong, but without dictatorial inclinations. Someone like you and me, but with high qualifications, moral integrity, and psychological health. An honest man or woman, but by all means a person who can use a repertory of tricks if necessary. A “political entrepreneur” with high ambitions who is content with getting a relatively low salary. Observers note that the profile demanded is impossible to fulfill.

10. There is another argument for the importance of personalities. Voters may have “expressive” preferences as well as instrumental ones. Instrumental preferences treat policies as means to the end of utility. Expressive preferences give certain types of behavior an intrinsic value: voting is a duty, a commitment, a satisfaction, independent of the weight of the individual vote. The same logic may apply to the assessment of a candidate: an honest candidate may be considered the best one, regardless of the ends he or she will honestly pursue.

11. The counter-argument is obvious: Such an assessment is not possible. Politicians are superficial products. A counter-counter-argument: The long election campaign, which is burdening and challenging for the candidate, and the many stressing and unpredictable situations give spectators and journalists the chance to assess personal qualities accurately.

12. For instance,

A classic case is the finding that the public supports spending on “assistance to the poor” much more than it does spending on welfare. The different wording of the question “frames” the issue differently due to the connotation of the word welfare. Questions about “welfare” should evoke a different sampling of considerations (e.g., fraud, abuse, “welfare queens,” mismanagement) than questions about “assistance for the poor” (e.g., struggling families, hungry children, people living in squalor, lack of available jobs for breadwinners), leading respondents to give different answers. (Shapiro 1998, 508; cf. Zaller and Feldman 1992)

Opinions depend on which elements (associations, stories, ideas) come to the minds of the respondents. The ideological framework may provide a (relatively) stable background, but current issues that have just been reported in the media may not yet have been integrated into an ideological perspective for most voters (Zaller 1992).

13. Herbert J. Gans (1991, 4) calls this kind of individualism “popular individualism,” the individualism of the American upper middle class. For instance, people who hold jobs rather than pursue careers may be unable to afford the kind of self-development that affluent people can try to realize. “Uniqueness used to be a goal of upper-class individualism, sought by people of independent wealth who did not need to work and aimed instead to create a personal lifestyle for themselves. Now uniqueness is more often an occupationally relevant goal of entertainers, artist, politicians, intellectuals—and professors—who must distinguish themselves from competitors offering a roughly similar product or service, and who yearn to be so original that they will be assured of fame or fortune in their particular line of work.” The restriction to the mentioned groups underestimates the change which permeates postmodern society.

14. It goes without saying that atrocities can be caused by the feeling of injustice, together with the ascription of guilt to those who are held to be responsible for injustice.

15. James Bryce (1888, 253), writing between the two world wars, proposed imagining a businessman reading his morning newspapers and developing sentiments or expectations based on little conscious reasoning:

In examining the process by which opinion is formed, we cannot fail to note how small a part of the view which the average man entertains when he goes to vote is really of his own making. His original impression was faint and perhaps hapless; its present definiteness and strength are mainly due to what he has heard and read. He has been told what to think, and why to think it. Arguments have been supplied to him from without, and controversy has embedded them in his mind. Although he supposes his view to be his own, he holds it rather because his acquaintances, his newspapers, his party leaders all hold it. His acquaintances do the like.

16. Some theorists argue that declining expectations may result from disappointment (Dahrendorf 1988). But this will not ease the pressure on politics if those with low expectations stop participating politically.