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Abstract
Devolved management of natural resources offers a means of advancing democracy, combating poverty, and enhancing conservation. Remarkable successes have been claimed for devolved forest reserve management in Tanzania. However, these successes are discordant with the practices of village government, of which village forest management is part. This article outlines the claims made for village forest reserves and juxtaposes these to detailed accounts of the corrupt and violent practice of village government and to the predatory relationship between village government and the central state and district governments. It reevaluates the success of village forest reserves in light of this evidence and considers the broader implications of the problems of local corruption for calls for community-based conservation.
Thanks to Liz Wily, Emmanuel Nuesiri, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Fred Nelson, and Martin Walsh for their comments on earlier drafts. Special thanks to Jim Igoe for his advice and guidance throughout. I also acknowledge the support of an ESRC Fellowship for work on “The Social Impacts of Protected Areas” while working on this article.
Notes
The main source for information about this case is Liz Wily, who was involved in the establishment of village forest reserves here and who has been prolific in her communication of the achievements here (Sjoholm and Wily Citation1995; Wily and Haule Citation1995; Matose and Wily Citation1996; Wily Citation1997; Wily et al. Citation2000; Wily Citation2000; Wily Citation2001a; Wily Citation2001b; Wily and Dewees Citation2001; Wily Citation2002a; Citation2002b; Wily Citation2003). These are an incomplete selection of her writings on the topic. Kajembe and Monela (Citation2000) offer some insights into the dynamics involved here, but are frustratingly succinct and based their work on brief PRA research.
This was expressed several times in different ways. One farmer told me: “The people are complaining a lot, and it is true as they say from time to time that the oppressed does not have rights. Its true that right now it is money that governs. For example your farm could be ruined, but if you ask for help from the agricultural extension officer you get nothing. Someone else will gain. This is a matter which causes a great deal of anguish.”
The taxation has since been abolished, but it dominated village affairs when in existence, and in particular when the village forest reserves were formed (Feldstad personal communication 18 November 2003).
Corruption is a national problem. A national level enquiry into corruption found that “there is no doubt that corruption is rampant in all sectors of the economy, public services and politics in the country” (Presidential Commission of Inquiry Against Corruption 1996, 46). Tanzania performs poorly in Transparency International's surveys. External auditing of District Council accounts was weak because of the lack of qualified staff in the Auditor General's office. Between 1993 and 1996, only 64 audits were carried out, which, given that there are nearly 100 districts, is a small but a fraction of the potential audits that could have been conducted. Moreover, in these audits 33 councils were classified as poor (Fjeldstad and Semboja Citation2000, 25).
I owe the idea of navigation to Jim Igoe.
Furthermore, the relationships I have described are dated by the abolition of most local taxation. We have yet to see what this does to village-district relations and whether this frees villagers from oppressive structures or ushers in a new era of revenue seeking by district governments using other means.