China–Taiwan diplomatic competition and the Pacific Islands

Abstract

China and Taiwan have become important actors in South Pacific affairs due to their diplomatic rivalry. Securing the diplomatic recognition of the Pacific Islands countries is expensive for China and Taiwan. There are limits to what the rivals are willing to spend, and they attempt to reduce costs. This dynamic shapes how Taiwan and China engage Pacific Islands politicians. It also motivates their high level official visits to the region, and how they engage South Pacific regional organizations. Despite criticisms that China–Taiwan rivalry corrupts and destabilizes the South Pacific, the issue of whether China and Taiwan's diplomatic rivalry has been beneficial or detrimental to the region remains contentious. China and Taiwan appear to have recently called a truce in their decades-old rivalry. This tacit agreement is still tentative, and the involvement of China and Taiwan in the region has yet to change significantly. However, Taiwan has reportedly begun to reduce funding, and is likely to reform its aid delivery in order to satisfy demands from the South Pacific region's dominant power, Australia, and to improve its image as a humanitarian aid donor. China is also likely to reduce funding while the truce holds. However, China considers its ties with South Pacific governments more important than responding to Australian pressure, and is unlikely to reform its South Pacific aid programmes as a result of the diplomatic truce.

Keywords:

• China
• Taiwan
• Pacific Islands
• Oceania aid

Acknowledgments

The author gratefully acknowledges Bruce Jacobs and Dennis Woodward's assistance with researching this topic, and support from the Monash Arts Postgraduate Publications Award and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy.

Joel Atkinson is a visiting scholar with the Department of International Relations at the University of Seoul, in South Korea. His publications include ‘Vanuatu in Australia-China-Taiwan relations’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 61(3) and ‘Big trouble in little Chinatown: Australia, Taiwan and the April 2006 post-election riot in Solomon Islands’, Pacific Affairs 82(1). He gratefully acknowledges support from the Monash Arts Postgraduate Publications Award and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy.

Notes

1. Phesey's (1999) emphasis on the USSR as the driving factor in Beijing's involvement in Oceania through this period is unjustified.

2. Interview, Taipei, March 2008a. Ideology was possibly a factor in at least one instance. Biddick (1989: 804) suggests that the Tongan monarchy's decision to recognize Taipei was the result of its ‘political conservatism’.

3. Interview (2006) by author in confidence, Canberra, January.

4. Interview, Suva, September 2006a; Interview, Taipei, March 2008b.

5. Interview, Taipei, March 2008a.

6. Interview, Taipei, March 2008a.

7. Interview, Taipei, March 2008a.

8. Interview (2008a) Taipei, March.

9. Interview, Taipei, March, 2008a.

10. That is, travelling at Taiwan's expense.

11. Interview, Taipei, March 2008c.

12. Interview, Suva, September 2006b.

13. This is a recurrent and long-standing issue for Australia (see Henderson 2001: 154).