Towards naval normalcy: 'open seas protection' and Sino-US maritime relations

Abstract

On May 26th, 2015, China published its 10th Defense White Paper which integrated 'open seas protection', along with 'offshore waters defense', into its naval strategy. This shift in naval strategy, albeit largely anticipated, raises a series of important questions about China's maritime ambitions. This article seeks to analyze the causes, nature and challenges of China's latest shift in naval strategy, and its implications for Sino-US maritime relations. The article argues that China's latest shift in naval strategy is a logical corollary of the tension between China's expanding global interests and its asymmetric approach to sea power, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provides the necessary stimulus and justification for such a shift. China's new naval strategy, the paper contends, denotes that it will develop a Mahanian blue-water navy and a basic network of overseas bases in the years ahead. Those two developments are expected to pose a series of significant challenges for China's foreign policy. The article argues that China's new naval strategy presents both challenges and opportunities for China and the world. To accomplish 'open seas protection', China will probably have to modify its policies on a range of issues, and moderate its competitive stance in the near seas. Although China's new naval strategy need not be interpreted in a competitive framework, it does present China with a stark choice: either it pursues more friendly attitudes towards its maritime ambitions by modifying its current policy, or it will be increasingly confronted by a coalition of hostile states.

Keywords:

• Offshore waters
• open seas
• sea power
• China’s navy
• Sino-US relations

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

Acknowledgment

The author wishes to thank Mr. Christopher Colley and Professor Andrew Erickson for their great help with the original draft. The author also likes to express his sincere gratitude to Professor Peter Dutton, Mr. Toshi Yoshihara, Mr. Bill Hayton and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and constructive suggestions on the paper.

Notes

1 The concept of far seas operations was advanced in China as early as the 1990s, however, there have been few discussions, at least up to now, on the implications of the far seas operations for the PLAN’s strategy and modernization. For the concept of far seas operations, see: Li (2009). For the PLAN’s increasing far seas activities over the last two decades, see: Allen et al. (2017); Yung et al. (2010, 2014).

2 For the symmetric approach to sea power, two most significant cases are Imperial Germany's navy before World War I and Imperial Japan’s navy before World War II. Those two historical cases reflected vividly the great impact of Alfred T. Mahan’s theories of sea power. See: Dingman (1991); Herwig (1991). For further details of the symmetric approach to sea power manifested in those two cases, see: Asada (2012); Herwig (2016).

3 The two dimensions of the asymmetric approach to sea power also have historical precedents. The technological dimension was initiated by the French Jeune École school in the late 19th century, see: Røksund (2017). The geopolitical dimension was first proposed by Imperial German Vice Admiral Wolfgang Wegener in the early 20th century, see: Wegner (1989). The continental naval strategy and doctrines, for many years, have rarely received as much attention as the Anglo-American naval strategy and doctrines. For an obsolete but still useful review of the continental naval strategy and doctrines, see: Ropp (1952).

4 For the comparative advantages of sea power and land power in both ancient and modern history, see: Gray (1992). Also see: Dehio (1962); Mahan (1890). For the dilemma and difficulty faced by the land-sea hybrid powers located on the rimland in developing sea power, see: Spykman (1944). For discussions on Nicholas J. Spykman’s geopolitical thought and its contemporary significance, see: Gray (2015); Gerace (1991). For the prospects of China to develop blue-water sea power, see: Lord (2009).

5 The author wants to thank Professor Peter Dutton, Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute, Naval War College, for highlighting this point.

6 So far there have been few, if indeed any, serious articles and professional commentaries on China’s latest shift in naval strategy published in Chinese academic and policy journals. International articles and commentaries on China's latest shift in naval strategy, in general, have usually left out the potential challenges posed by the missions concomitant with “open seas protection” to Beijing’s current foreign policy. Such an ignorance also explains why so far few international scholars have touched on the potential bright side of China’s new naval strategy. Those articles and commentaries, to be exact, are suffering from the intellectual trap of linear reasoning, that is, to deduce China’s future policy and behavior in the far seas purely from its recent behavioral code in the near seas, rather than taking those counteracting or remedying factors into serious and careful consideration.

7 Over the last decade, most, if not all, of American comments and discussions on the growth of China’s naval capabilities as well as its strategic implications for Sino-US competition over East Asian littoral seas are almost solely focused on the comparison of both sides’ hard power alone, while inadvertently ignoring both sides’ soft assets like allies and partners. For a typical example of this calculation, see: Heginbotham (2015).

Additional information

Funding

The research project related with this article was supported by Center for Asian Studies at Renmin University of China under Grant No. 18YYB01.

Notes on contributors

Zhengyu Wu

Dr. Zhengyu Wu is a Professor of International Politics at School of International Studies, Renmin University of China (Beijing, China) where he has taught since 2002. Professor Wu received his Ph. D in Department of History at Nanjing University (Nanjing, China), and has a wide experience of research and study in a number of educational institutions in the UK and USA. His major research fields include Theory of International Politics, Geopolitics and Grand Strategy, East Asian and Chinese Naval and Maritime Affairs.