Consciousness is dialetheic

Abstract

In this paper, we argue that consciousness is dialetheic. The first part of the paper introduces the hard problem of consciousness and surveys the most popular responses. These responses are physicalism, non-physicalism and panpsychism. After outlining the general claims made by these standpoints, we argue that each position is unsatisfactory. After elucidating the difficulties with each theory, we present the argument for consciousness being dialetheic. We argue that the theoretical benefits of accepting this conclusion outweigh the ontological costs. Specifically, we argue that if consciousness is dialetheic, then one can maintain the explanatory benefits of both physicalism and non-physicalism. Moreover, our contention explains the incredible disagreement among philosophers attending to the hard problem of consciousness.

Keywords:

• consciousness
• dialetheism
• panpsychism
• physicalism
• non-physicalism

Notes

 1. One should pay attention to the technical term ‘epistemic’ in this sentence. At this point, we do not mean to assert a metaphysical gap between the physical and the phenomenal.

 2. In the original article, Jackson asks the reader to imagine Mary has only complete knowledge of the neurophysiology of vision. However, the argument works just as well by assuming that Mary has complete physical knowledge. It also guards against superficial objections to the thought experiment.

 3. Jackson has since taken back his conclusion and become a physicalist.

 4. It is perhaps worth noting that we find eliminative physicalism (the view that consciousness from a subjective perspective does not exist) to be preposterous.

 5. Naturally, some non-reductive physicalists will not be actively seeking a theoretical account of consciousness in physically reductive terms, such as neuroscientific ones. This, however, reflects the contention of an explanatory limitation, not an ontological one.

 6. For those who are unfamiliar, an eye-squiggly is the common experience of seeing a small squiggly line within the field of one's vision.

 7. While non-physicalism states that consciousness is non-physical, most non-physicalists nevertheless believe consciousness naturally supervenes on the brain. More will be said about this point in later sections.

 8. Strawson refers to those thinkers who claim the physical world is non-experiential as theoreticians of ‘physicSalism’. He means this to be a derogatory designation.

 9. Emphasis original.

10. This is not entirely accurate. While those who accept dialetheism deny the law of non-contradiction is inherently unassailable, they do not accept the truth of all contradictions. To claim that there are dialetheia amounts to the claim that there is a specific set of truth-bearing verbal/written manifestations, such that both themselves and their negations are true.

11. We are speaking, of course, about logical possibility. It is almost certainly empirically impossible to observe all microscopic phenomena, no matter how well developed the instruments involved.

12. It is common for philosophers to speak of shadows as ‘abstract’ as opposed to ‘concrete’ (i.e. physical). An object is generally called abstract if it cannot act in causal relation to physical object.

13. Some readers might claim that we are making an epistemic leap from the physical to the phenomenal in this pronouncement. Point taken. However, we are going to make the common assumption that behaviour is at least somewhat indicative of phenomenology. That being said, we are aware this is a weighty assumption.

14. This is a fancy way of saying that anybody with a human (and most likely other animals) brain in the actual world is conscious.

15. Broadly speaking, consequentialism is a moral theory that states that the morality of an act can be measured by the overall consequences that occur because of the act.

16. Thanks to Eric Dietrich for pointing out this benefit.