Platform design framework: conceptualisation and application

Figures & data

Table 1. Platform design framework.

Problem focus	Core design problem	Literature references
Platform architecture	Describes the structure of the actors, market structure and fundamental setup of the platform
Core interaction	What is the main purpose of the platform? What is the (core) interaction that takes place in the platform? What are the value creating assets being transacted?	Gawer and Cusumano (2008); Katz and Shapiro (1994); Le Masson, Weil, and Hatchuel (2009); Tiwana, Konsynski, and Bush (2010); Van Alstyne, Parker, and Choudary (2016)
Market structure	Which markets are involved in the platform (two-sided, multi-sided markets)?	Parker and Van Alstyne (2005); Rochet and Tirole (2003)
Key actors	Who are the actors representing different market structures and providing main functions?	Le Masson, Weil, and Hatchuel (2009); Morris and Ferguson (1993); Van Alstyne, Parker, and Choudary (2016)
Platform openness	How open is the platform and what is the strategy to manage openness? How openly is the data and information shared?	Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne (2009); Gawer and Henderson (2007); Le Masson, Weil, and Hatchuel (2009); Morris and Ferguson (1993); Schilling (2009); Van Alstyne, Parker, and Choudary (2016); Boudreau (2010); Economides and Katsamakas (2006); Gawer (2014)
Value creation logic	Defines the benefits of the platform and how each user contributes to value creation i.e. describes value functions for platform users.
Actor roles	Who benefits from the platform and how? What are the roles of the stakeholders and how will they change? How to achieve commitment of the stakeholders?	Van Alstyne, Parker, and Choudary (2016); Le Masson, Weil, and Hatchuel (2009); Jacobides, Knudsen, and Augier (2006); Hagiu (2006)
Value proposition	What are the different value propositions for different participants?	Le Masson, Weil, and Hatchuel (2009); McIntyre (2011); Tellis, Yin, and Niraj (2009); Van Alstyne, Parker, and Choudary (2016)
Network effects	How do network effects work? Who is needed to enable network effects?	Armstrong (2006); Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne (2006); Evans (2003); Gawer and Cusumano (2014); Katz and Shapiro (1985); Le Masson, Weil, and Hatchuel (2009); Parker and Van Alstyne (2005); Rochet and Tirole (2003); Van Alstyne, Parker, and Choudary (2016)
Revenue model	What is the price for participating for each stakeholder?	Armstrong (2006); Economides and Katsamakas (2006); Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne (2006); Evans (2003); Hagiu (2006, 2009); Katz and Shapiro (1985); Parker and Van Alstyne (2005); Rochet and Tirole (2003)
Governance	Describes the common rules, laws, practices and managerial level of the platform.
Leadership	Who manages the platform and how?	Gawer and Cusumano (2008, 2014); Iansiti and Levien (2004); Katz and Shapiro (1994)
Ownership	Who owns the platform?	Nocke, Peitz, and Stahl (2007), Tiwana, Konsynski, and Bush (2010)
Platform rules	What types of rules are enforced? How are the services/content regulated? What consumers, producers, providers, and competitors are allowed to do?	Van Alstyne, Parker, and Choudary (2016); Schilling (2009); Boudreau (2010)
Platform competition	Describes the setup for launching the platform and competitive selections.
Platform launch	How to ensure access to the platform? How to attract users from different sides of the platform? How to solve-the chicken-and-egg problem?	Van Alstyne, Parker, and Choudary (2016); Gawer and Cusumano (2008); Economides and Katsamakas (2006)
Platform competitiveness	How does the platform compete against incumbent solutions? What is the unique competitive advantage of the platform?	Rochet and Tirole (2003); Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne (2006); Gawer and Cusumano (2008, 2014); Armstrong (2006)
Innovation & learning	Are platform innovations needed and how are innovation targets set and approved? Who are involved to the platform development and how?	Le Masson, Weil, and Hatchuel (2009); Adner and Kapoor (2010); Boudreau (2010); Gawer and Cusumano (2014); Gawer and Henderson (2007)
Platform growth	How will the platform grow? How big and scalable is the platform intended to be?	Van Alstyne, Parker, and Choudary (2016)

Figure 1. Design science research methodology (adapted from Peffers et al. 2007).

Figure 2. Research workshop information.

Table 2. Platform design framework in the context of DORA – examples of core design choices.

Design category	Examples of core design choices
Platform architecture
Core interaction	Searching, combining, connecting and relaying mobility information.
Market structure	Main markets include the mobility industry (public and private companies), airports, authorities (city and society level, transport information centres) and mobility service providers, e.g. car renting companies. The other side of the multi-sided market are individual passengers. The initial business context is mobility to, in and from airports, but may expand to e.g. analytics.
Key actors	1) Passengers (end-consumers) of mobility services 2) Airports and transport operators as supply-side users 3) Public bodies and authorities as data providers 4) Platform provider (maintaining DORA)
Platform openness	Joint standard setting, partially open data and API. Detailed policy for data sharing is required.
Value creation logic
Actor roles	DORA mobility information and services are used by passenger to optimise travelling. The supplier shares data and provides mobility services to users. Passengers’ choices provide information for the platform and the suppliers use it to develop the services. Public bodies and authorities provide data and complementary services. The platform provider manages the interactions and captures, controls and recombines information into valuable offerings.
Value proposition	Passengers: seamless, reliable and fluent user experience with minimal costs. Suppliers: Improvements in operations and service quality. Powerful distribution channel without additional investments. Morally and economically fair participation, including distribution of financial benefits and costs. Society: Greener and a more accessible and inclusive mobility system.
Network effects	Access to multiple information sources and an abundance of supply and demand for mobility services on the platform are required for core interactions. The business is focused on the platform and the mobility information, while third parties may provide the end-user interface and utilise the services. Suppliers and authorities provide the necessary mobility information, while passengers provide the incentive for the aforementioned to participate.
Revenue model	Short- to middle term: Licensing of key technologies to non-competing regions and industry contexts. Middle term: Pay-per-use API access provided to mobility app developers and other B2B clients. Long term: Unique value creation by integrated information offering with ecosystem revenue sharing. Additional revenues from B2B service-products, such as market analytics and mobility asset use forecasts.
Governance
Leadership	Centralized governance where the platform owner enforces rules and policies that ensure fair competition and governs the entry and exit of individual organisations (contractually agreed standard terms of participation).
Ownership	To ensure the neutrality of the platform, it should be owned by a separate legal entity without direct downstream commercial interests.
Platform rules	To avoid excessive transaction and governance costs, the participants agree to a standard ‘rules for participation’ contract upon entry. Especially the handling, sharing and utilisation of mobility information are agreed on. The rules also enforce e.g. fair competition and facilitate collaborative development actions.
Platform competition
Platform launch	The core stakeholders were involved already in the development and design process. End-user testing is done through the DORA mobile app. The platform overcomes the chicken-and-egg problem by first tapping into the existing user bases of other mobility app developers by B2B API access sales and then evolving to a full platform business model, once a sufficient number of users is established.
Platform competitiveness	Unique features: seamless covering and integrating of the information concerning the whole journey, effortless travel planning, optimal routing, real-time disruption monitoring, and neutrality (independent actor) as a springboard for building trust.
Innovation & learning	Co-operation is required for technology, platform ecosystem and policy –level development. Technologies: standardisation, innovation and collaboration to find and develop missing technological pieces. Ecosystem: collaboration to widen the platform network and to increase the overall value and attractiveness. Third party platform integration. Policy: Freedom of choice, data protection.
Platform growth	Organic growth by additional organisations and city nodes joining the platform adds to the value of the ecosystem. Further growth is possible by integration to other platforms e.g. TripAdvisor, or by significant innovations, e.g. unified mobile ticketing.

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