Evolutionary game theory in patent alliance dynamics: strategy and policy implications

ABSTRACT

This study investigates the dynamics of patent alliances, underscoring their strategic relevance for firms pursuing technological innovation and market leadership. We address the issue of opportunistic behaviour stemming from the contractual gaps in these alliances, proposing strategic measures to curtail such conduct and bolster alliance robustness. Utilising Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT), we conduct numerical simulations to analyze the motives for alliance formation, the efficacy of anti-opportunism strategies, and their influence on alliance durability. The study highlights how regulatory policies increase repercussions, fostering cooperative alliances. Our simulations, predicated on defined parameters such as the likelihood of detecting and sanctioning opportunistic actions, showcase how these factors shape the strategic decisions of alliance members. This study enriches the theoretical discourse on patent alliance management by integrating the EGT approach, shedding light on effective deterrents against opportunistic behaviour and mechanisms fostering alliance solidarity. We advocate for a synchronised approach that aligns stringent regulatory practices with corporate strategies to ensure the resilience and success of patent alliances, crucial for navigating the complexities of competitive technology markets and maintaining long-term alliance efficacy. This comprehensive strategy is essential for managing the intricacies of patent alliances and securing their long-term viability and productivity.

KEYWORDS:

• Patent alliances
• opportunistic behaviour
• regulatory measures
• evolutionary game theory
• organisational strategy

Acknowledgement

This study was supported by Key Research Base of Universities in Jiangsu Province for Philosophy and Social Science ‘Research Center for Green Development and Environmental Governance’

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Data availability statement

Data will be made available on request.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China [grant number 71774071]; Key Program of National Social Science Fund of China [grant number 21AZD067]; and National Foreign Expert Project (Foreign Youth Talent Program) [grant numbers QN2023014007, QN2023014008, QN2023014009].

Notes on contributors

Li Mingxing

Li Mingxing, is working as Associate professor in School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, Jiangsu 212013, P.R. China; He is also working in Research Center for Green Development and Environmental Governance, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, 212013, P.R. China; E-mail: [email protected]

Xiaomeng Chi

Xiaomeng Chi, is working in Engineering Management, Jiangsu University Cranfield Tech Futures Graduate Institute,Zhenjiang, 212013, P.R. China. Email:[email protected]. ORCID:0000-0001-9032-740X

Jialu Su

Jialu Su, School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, P.R. China; E-mail: [email protected]. ORCID: 0000-0002-2231-3273.

Hongzheng Sun

Hongzheng Sun, School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, Jiangsu 212013, P.R. China; E-mail: [email protected]. ORCID:0000-0002-8709-9677

Oswin Aganda Anaba

Oswin Aganda Anaba, School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, P.R., China; School of Applied Science and Arts, Bolgatanga Technical University, Sumbrungu, Upper East Region, Ghana E-mail: [email protected]. ORCID: 0000-0002-7879-7035

Asad Ullah Khan

Asad Ullah Khan, School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, P.R., China.

Syed Usman Qadri

Syed Usman Qadri, School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, P.R., China.