Ethics, Ontology and Capabilities

Abstract

Amartya Sen's capability approach is concerned with the evaluation of inequality, and in particular with the description of the space in which equality should be assessed (the space of capabilities, or potential functionings). I will argue that Sen's approach is a philosophical exercise aimed at providing the ground for substantive theorising to proceed, that it does not itself engage in substantive theorising, and that it is mainly concerned with ontological description. Sen uses the categories of capabilities and respectively functionings to describe advantage and well-being. This ontological description can then be used for ethical theorising. But, as will be argued, the main emphasis of Sen's approach has been on the former, not on the latter. I will also argue that ontological realism is essential to Sen's approach, and that much of the persuasiveness of Sen's arguments spring from this (not explicitly acknowledged) ontological dimension. Furthermore, I will argue that an explicit recognition of this dimension is crucial for the development of Sen's perspective.

Acknowledgments

For very helpful comments on an earlier draft I am most thankful to the members of the Cambridge Social Ontology Group, and also to two anonymous referees. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia), given through the POCI (Programa Operacional Ciência e Inovação) 2010.

Notes

¹Although Levinas's ethics could be said to play a role in Sen's writings on agency, Sen's favourite author on this topic seems to be Adam Smith, as Walsh and Putnam also note, whose ethics can be said to be much more ‘descriptive’ than Levinas's (1971).

²For a discussion of the notion of powers in the context of a structured ontology see Martins (2006), Lawson (2003), Cartwright (2000) or Ellis (2001).