Does citizen participation affect municipal performance? Electoral competition and fiscal performance in Japan

Figures & data

Table 1. Descriptive statistics (807 city-level municipalities).

	Observations	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Dependent variables
Fiscal autonomy	5691	46.91	14.96	5.11	89.30
Fiscal capability	5357	66.64	26.73	11	192
Independent variables
Walk-over election
(1 = no contest, 0 =  contested)	5630	0.21	0.41	0	1
Political context
Re-election times	5630	1.75	1.01	1	10
Conservative party support
(1 = yes, 0 = no)	5638	0.38	0.48	0	1
Political party support	5638	0.99	1.30	0	6
Control variables
Income per capita	5691	3023.52	607.37	2050.5	11266.5
Lag of municipal expenditure	5691	53,900,000	110,000,000	4,553,889	1,670,000,000
Population	5691	141,652.20	246,467.70	4,110	3,633,130
Area	5691	26634.06	28413.20	510	217,767
Municipal merger
(0 = No merger, 1 =  Annexation, 2 =  New city)	5638	0.89	0.92	0	2

Table 2. Explaining fiscal autonomy (807 municipalities).

	Random effects model	Between effects model	Population- averaged model	Panel- corrected SE	Arellano-Bond dynamic panel model
Walk-over election
(1 =  no contest, 0 =  contested)	0.01	0.06**	0.00	0.03***	−0.01
	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Conservative party support
(1 = yes, 0 = no)	0.02**	−0.02	0.02***	−0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Re-election (centred)	−0.00	0.01	−0.00*	0.00*	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political party support (centred)	−0.01**	−0.02	−0.01**	−0.01***	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income per capita (ln)	1.10***	0.97***	1.10***	0.96***	1.75***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.10)
Lag of municipal expenditure (ln)	−0.40***	−0.65***	−0.39***	−0.61***	0.14*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.08)
Population (ln)	0.42***	0.66***	0.42***	0.63***	2.05***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.43)
Area (ln)	0.02***	0.04***	0.02***	0.04***	−0.16
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.25)
Municipal merger (baseline = no merger):
Annexation	0.02*	0.01	0.02	0.01**	−0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.02)
Municipal merger: New municipality	−0.08***	−0.10***	−0.08***	−0.10***	−0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Lag of DV					0.03
					(0.05)
Constant	−3.10***	−0.58	−3.17***	−0.65**	−34.43***
	(0.66)	(0.53)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(6.35)
Observations	5,604	5,604	5,604	5,604	3,998
R2		0.72		0.68

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p <  0.01, ** p <  0.05, * p <  0.1.

Table 3. Explaining fiscal autonomy—interaction terms (807 municipalities).

	Random effects model	Between effects model	Population- averaged model	Panel- corrected SE	Arellano-Bond dynamic panel model
Walk-over election	0.02**	0.04	0.02***	0.03**	0.02*
(1 =  no contest, 0 =  contested)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Conservative party support	0.02**	−0.03	0.02***	−0.01	0.01
1 = yes, 0 = no)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Re-election (centred)	−0.00	0.01	−0.00*	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political party support (centred)	−0.01**	−0.02*	−0.01***	−0.02***	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Walk-over election x re-election (centred)	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.01*	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Walk-over election x conservative party support	−0.04**	0.03	−0.04**	0.01	−0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Walk-over election x political party support	0.01**	0.02	0.01**	0.01	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income per capita (ln)	1.10***	0.98***	1.10***	0.96***	1.74***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.10)
Lag of municipal expenditure (ln)	−0.40***	−0.65***	−0.39***	−0.61***	0.14*
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.08)
Population (ln)	0.42***	0.66***	0.42***	0.62***	2.06***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.43)
Area (ln)	0.02***	0.04***	0.02***	0.04***	−0.16
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.25)
Municipal merger: Annexation	0.02*	0.00	0.02	0.01**	−0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Municipal merger: New municipality	−0.08***	−0.09***	−0.08***	−0.10***	−0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Lag of DV					0.03
					(0.05)
Constant	−3.09***	−0.66	−3.17***	−0.70**	−34.46***
	(0.66)	(0.53)	(0.31)	(0.29)	(6.34)
Observations	5,604	5,604	5,604	5,604	3,998
R2		0.72		0.68

Note: As table 2.

Table 4. Explaining fiscal capability.

	Random effects model	Between effects model	Population-averaged model	Panel-corrected SE	Arellano-Bond dynamic panel model
Walk-over election (1 = no contest, 0 = contested)	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02***	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Conservative party support (1 = yes, 0 =  no)	0.01***	0.02	0.01***	0.02***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Re-election (centred)	−0.00***	0.02**	−0.00***	0.01***	−0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political party support (centred)	−0.00	−0.03**	−0.00*	−0.02***	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income per capita (ln)	0.83***	1.50***	0.82***	1.39***	0.87***
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.02)
Lag of municipal expenditure (ln)	−0.09***	−0.59***	−0.09***	−0.49***	−0.03***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)
Population (ln)	0.29***	0.66***	0.30***	0.58***	0.31***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Area (ln)	−0.11***	−0.01	−0.11***	−0.03***	−0.15***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Municipal merger: Annexation	0.08***	0.07***	0.07**	0.07***	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Municipal merger: New municipality	−0.02	0.02	−0.02	0.01*	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Lag of DV					0.72***
					(0.01)
Constant	−3.14***	−5.02***	−3.21***	−4.77***	−7.26***
	(0.43)	(0.73)	(0.20)	(0.46)	(0.52)
Observations	5,320	5,320	5,320	5,320	3,761
R2		0.79		0.77
Number of municipalities	784	784	784	784	776

Note: As table 2.

Table 5. Explaining fiscal capability with interaction terms.

	Random effects model	Between effects model	Population- averaged model	Panel- corrected SE	Arellano-Bond dynamic panel model
Walk-over election (1 =  no contest, 0 =  contested)	−0.00	0.02	−0.00	0.01	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.05)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Conservative party support (1 = yes, 0 =  no)	0.01***	0.02	0.01***	0.01**	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Re-election (centred)	−0.00***	0.02	−0.00***	0.01***	−0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political party support (centred)	−0.00	−0.03**	−0.00	−0.02***	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Walk-over election x re-election (centred)	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02***	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Walk-over election x conservative party support	0.02*	0.01	0.02**	0.02	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.09)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Walk-over election x political party support	−0.01	0.01	−0.01**	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Income per capita (ln)	0.83***	1.50***	0.82***	1.39***	0.87***
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.02)
Lag of municipal expenditure (ln) Population (ln)	−0.09***	−0.59***	−0.09***	−0.49***	−0.03***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)
	0.29***	0.66***	0.30***	0.58***	0.31***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Area (ln)	−0.11***	−0.01	−0.11***	−0.03***	−0.15***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Municipal merger: Annexation	0.08***	0.07***	0.07**	0.07***	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Municipal merger: New municipality	−0.02	0.02	−0.02	0.01**	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Lag of DV					0.72***
					(0.01)
Constant	−3.15***	−5.04***	−3.22***	−4.79***	−7.25***
	(0.43)	(0.74)	(0.20)	(0.46)	(0.52)
Observations	5,320	5,320	5,320	5,320	3,761
R^2		0.79		0.77
Number of municipalities	784	784	784	784	776

Note: As table 2.