Confucian Family for a Feminist Future

Abstract

The Confucian family, not only in its historical manifestations but also in the imagination of the Confucian founders, was the locus of misogynist norms and practices that have subjugated women to varying degrees. Therefore, advancing women's well-being and equality in East Asia may seem to require radically transforming the Confucian family to approximate alternative ideal conceptions of the family in the West. My article argues against such a stance by carefully examining not only different conceptions of the Confucian family, but also influential contemporary Western ideal conceptions of the family from the justice perspective and care ethics. This article shows (1) that Western conceptions of the family may be neither plausible nor feasible in traditionally Confucian societies and (2) that the Confucian family, once reconstructed in line with Confucianism's core ideas and values, can be conducive to a feminist future in East Asia that is uniquely Confucian.

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank participants at the International Conference on ‘Confucian and Liberal Perspectives on Family, State, and Civil Society’ held at the City University of Hong Kong in December, 2010, for their useful feedback on a draft of this article. Special thanks go to P.J. Ivanhoe for not only his invitation to participate in the conference but also his careful reading of and insightful comments on previous versions of the article.

Notes

Notes

[1] Traditionally, the five Confucian human relations are those between king and minister, father and son, husband and wife, elder and younger, and friend and friend.

[2] This should be distinguished from the neo-Confucian concept of li (理), which is never used in this article.

[3] For this reason, I focus in this article on Korea. Yet the conclusions drawn in this article would have relevance for other East Asian countries that have traditionally been Confucian in varying degrees.

[4] The Zhuzijiali (朱子家禮) is one of the best known.

[5] On this, I rely on Deuchler (1992, Chapter 6). All citations in this section are from this book, unless otherwise noted.

[6] Early Chosôn Confucians followed the ancient custom of China, which allowed a feudal lord to ‘take at one time nine women, a minister or a great officer one wife and two concubines, and a common officer one wife and one concubine’ (p. 233).

[7] Women, however, were strictly prohibited from having any sexual relation other than with the husband. For example, a wife of a high official who committed adultery was decapitated as a model in 1423 (p. 259).

[8] Indeed, both for men and women, not marrying was ‘socially inconceivable’ (p. 243).

[9] Lower class women were exceptions, as they had to participate in the public realm for their own and their families’ survival. However, they were not exempt from the patriarchal ideology.

[10] Traditionally, a wife can be driven out of the husband's home (where she was required to reside after marriage) and returned to her maiden home if she (a) disobeys parents-in-law, (b) cannot produce sons, (c) has (or has thoughts of having) an extramarital affair, (d) is jealous of other women with whom her husband has sexual relations, (e) suffers from an incurable and prolonged illness that dissipates family resources, (f) interferes too much with and is vociferous about the husband's affairs, and (g) steals.

[11] It is interesting to note that some Rawlsian theorists have criticized Okins application of Rawls's theory to feminism. See Cohen (1997).

[12] Whether there can be a care ‘principle’ and what its status might be is a moot question within care ethics. Although Noddings vehemently rejects all general principles for their inability to ‘preserve the uniqueness of human encounters’ (1984, p. 5; cf. p. 36, pp. 84–85), Held rightfully warns against the tendency to reject all kinds of principles since this entails an ‘invitation to capriciousness’ (1993, p. 75). I agree with Held that care ethics endorses principles that are ‘compatible with particular judgments based … on feelings of empathy and on caring concern’ (1993, p. 35).

[13] For Noddings's proposal for developing social policies based on care, see Noddings (2002, Chapter 11). Other examples of attempts to apply the care principle to society at large and beyond include Tronto (1993) and Robinson (1999).

[14] For a more detailed discussion, see Herr (2003).

[15] I shall not discuss here Chan's further claim that jing as ‘an intentional state’ also implies, in addition to ‘seriousness’, ‘the recognition of the worth of its object’ (p. 232) on a par with the Western concept of respect.

[16] See Tu (1986, p. 181).

[17] Some historical examples of the Confucian childrearing that support my thesis can be found in Lee (2009).

[18] This is Chan's (1963) translation.

[19] Tu's (1986) translation.

[20] Concerning its outer form, the representative Confucian family would be consanguineous extended families, both patrilineal and matrilineal, based on the natural feeling of love and affection. Although heterosexual couples may be the norm, the Confucian family may include same sex unions with children and their extended families, as the Confucian family's core function is to enable children to learn and practice ren.

[21] The li of pie pertaining to the spouse relation is then not essential to the family's main function. It may be adhered to, but only to the extent necessary to run the household efficiently. The sexual component ought to be discarded, leaving each couple to decide on how to determine the division of labor.