Assessing the balance

Abstract

Save for the single issue of balance of power theory's relevance to the current system, where we and some of our critics are in real disagreement (and they are wrong), every aspect of this symposium has been highly productive. Our critics do not directly dispute the proposition that a rapid end of a single superpower world is extremely unlikely. They generally endorsed our core finding that the systemic constraints featured in IR scholarship are largely inoperative with respect to a United States that remains the sole superpower. These essays are consequently devoted mainly to discussing the implications of our findings and the future research agenda. In particular, they developed serious challenges to the idea of US led institutional revisionism, generated new ideas about both systemic and non-systemic constraints, and suggested potentially powerful theories about constraints on other states besides the United States.

Notes

¹ In Buzan's judgement, ‘There is only one superpower, and there are no other plausible candidates on the horizon for that status for at least a couple of decades’ (2004, 65).

² As we noted, ‘inoperative systemic constraints mean that, much more than scholars generally believe, U.S. foreign policy is in a realm of choice, rather than necessity’ (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008, 19, emphasis added). Schweller only includes the last portion of this sentence in his article.

³ The same applies to Afghanistan; see Mearsheimer (2001b) and Posen (2001/2002).

⁴ On domestic politics, see, for example, Snyder et al (2009); Kupchan and Trubowitz (2007); and Parent and Bafumi (2008). On alliances, see, for example, Kreps (2008); Walt (2009); Craig (2009); Press-Barnathan (2006); Weitsmnn (2004); and Hansen (2001). On legitimacy, see, for example, Finnemore (2009); Voeten (2005); Schweller and Pu (forthcoming); Clark (2005, forthcoming). On the global economy, see, for example, Mastanduno (2009); Bromley (2008); and Norrloff (2010). On grand strategy, see, for example, Mearsheimer (2011); Miller (2010); Layne (2009); Posen (2007); Legro and Leffler (2008); and Kreps (2011). Ikenberry et al (2009) discuss additional relevant research questions.

⁵ A paper documenting this dynamic is von Hlatky (2011).

⁶ See also Finnemore (2009), who makes a similar argument about the constraining effect of legitimating a unipole's role through institutionalization.

⁷ At points (for example, note 5) Layne seems to say that the world is already multipolar, but most of the discussion is about trends toward multipolarity. Either way, he claims the trends are enough to validate his theory.

⁸ When specifying what specific behaviours balance of power theory would predict, Kenneth Waltz (1979, 125) identifies two things: (1) ‘states allying … even though they have strong reasons not to cooperate with one another [like] the alliance of France and Russia, made formal in 1894’ and (2) ‘making internal efforts to strengthen themselves, however distasteful or difficult such efforts might be [as with] the United States and the Soviet Union following World War II … the United States by rearming despite having demonstrated a strong wish not to by dismantling the most powerful military machine the world had ever known; the Soviet Union by maintaining about three million men under arms while striving to acquire a costly new military technology despite the terrible destruction she had suffered in war.’

⁹ Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.

¹⁰ As Layne phrases it, his prediction is that ‘unipolarity would stimulate the emergence of new great powers that would act as counterweights to American hegemony’.