Small states in multilateral negotiations. What have we learned?

Abstract

There are many small states in the international system, which have considerably fewer capacities than their bigger counterpart. The study of multilateral negotiations in the European Union (EU), conferences taking place under the umbrella of the United Nations (UN), negotiations on the set up of an International Criminal Court (ICC), as well as the compliance bargaining in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) reveals that small states can sometimes be very influential—despite their size. Small states tend to be most likely to punch above their weight if the negotiations take place in an institutionalised arena with majority-based decision-making rules in which each state has one vote or in contexts in which decisions are made unanimously, if they are selective in negotiations and concentrate their capacities on the most important issues, engage in capacity-building activities to maximise their ideational resources, if they make use of institutional opportunity structures such as chairing meetings and engaging in agenda-setting, and if they individually or collectively apply persuasion strategies from early on.

Notes

¹ For exceptions see Ingebritsen et al (2006); Thorhallsson (2006). For a more comprehensive literature review see Panke (2010a).

² For an overview see < http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/weighting_votes_council_en.htm>, accessed January 2012.

³ The International Monetary Fund (especially the Board of Governors and the Executive Board), the Council of Europe, the International Energy Agency and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (which belongs under the UN umbrella) also use weighted voting mechanisms favouring big states.

⁴ ‘You cannot cover everything’ (interview EU PermRep#44, 16 January 2009). ‘They try to put really emphasis on some dossiers and try to focus even their expertise, which is limited, on these dossiers’ (interview EU PermRep#21, 22 July 2008).

⁵ For the distribution of votes among the 27 member states see < http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/council/index_en.htm>, accessed November 2010. For an overview of policy areas in which weighted voting applies see < www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/code_EN.pdf>, accessed January 2010. The Lisbon Treaty changes the system of weighted voting (the change will enter into force in 2014). According to the ‘double majority principle’ 55 per cent of the member states representing at least 65 per cent of the population are required to pass a legal act.

⁶ In the early stage of EU negotiations, an informal consensus norm requires the member states to work towards a consensus.

⁷ This does not mean that a small state can never have sufficient bargaining resources to prevail vis-à-vis a bigger state, since power resources are context dependent (see Habeeb 1988; Drahos 2003). Also, as the EU vodka case shows, issues prone to bargaining dynamics can be reframed so that they trigger processes of persuasion.

⁸ For an illustration, see the WTO compliance bargaining case study in this special issue.