The US military's social media civil war: technology as antagonism in discourses of information-age conflict

Abstract

This article uses the controversy within the United States (US) military over the use of social media by individual military professionals as a window into larger debates about the nature of information-age conflict. Information and associated technologies are now central to the US military imaginary. But the controversy over social media is one indicator that the dominant discourse of information-age conflict is neither stable nor total. The introduction of a new technology can serve as an antagonism that turns latent, potential contradictions into substantive differences for policymaking. Thus, though the US military generally has embraced information and communication technologies (ICTs), the introduction of a particular ICT can still be a source of controversy. Military imaginaries, technologies and the relationships between them remain dynamic, contingent and sometimes contentious.

Notes

¹ Keitzmann and colleagues define social media as including ‘content sharing sites, blogs, social networking, and wikis’ that allow users ‘to create, modify, share, and discuss Internet content’ (Keitzmann et al 2011, 241). Blogs, followed by MySpace and YouTube, were the first to be adopted by military professionals. This was largely a function of their availability. Blogger.com, for example, was founded in August 1999, MySpace in August 2003 and YouTube in November 2005. Twitter and Facebook did not arrive on the scene until the summer and autumn of 2006, respectively (Keitzmann et al 2011, 241).

² The analysis of advocate and opponent arguments is based on qualitative coding of relevant source materials such as social media content, doctrine manuals, official orders, media reports, and speeches.

³ Nonetheless, even during the 2009 controversy, military blogs provided an important source for understanding social media advocates' position. As early adopters of social media, milbloggers also adopted other forms of social media (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube) and were, therefore, advocates for social media in general, not just milblogging. Additionally, blog posts tend to be longer than tweets and more publicly accessible than Facebook posts, meaning that they remain a valuable source of material for following this debate.

⁴AR 530-1 defined OPSEC as the ‘process [that] identifies the critical information of military plans, operations, and supporting activities and the indicators that can reveal it, and then develops measures to eliminate, reduce, or conceal those indicators’ (Department of the Army 2007, 1). It defined ‘critical information’ as ‘specific facts about friendly capabilities, activities, limitations (includes vulnerabilities), and intentions needed by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively so as to degrade friendly mission accomplishment’ (Department of the Army 2007, 1). It explained that OPSEC is related to but ultimately broader in scope than ‘information security’ because OPSEC is concerned not just with classified information but also with unclassified information (Department of the Army 2007, 1).

⁵ At the time of the 2007 controversy, the site Milblogging.com listed 1766 milblogs in its directory (figure as of 30 July 2007). In spring 2012, roughly 3016 milblogs were listed at Milbogging.com (figure as of 9 April 2012). As far as this author is aware, there exists no similar index of Twitter, Facebook and other social media accounts maintained by individual military professionals.

⁶ See Small Wars Journal, < http://smallwarsjournal.com>.

⁷ The channel can be found at < http://www.youtube.com/MNFIRAQ>.

⁸ The Small Wars Council discussion of the controversy can be found at < http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t = 2780>.

⁹ Speeches available at < http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/selectedspeeches.asp>, accessed 14 April 2012.

¹⁰ CAC blogs can be found here: < http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/cac2/blogwarning.asp>. CAC also maintains accounts at Twitter, YouTube and Facebook, links to which can be found on the CAC homepage at < http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC2/>.

¹¹ Senator Joseph Lieberman has said, ‘Right now, China, the government, can disconnect parts of its Internet in a case of war. We need to have that here, too.’ See < http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1006/20/sotu.01.html>.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Sean Lawson

Sean Lawson is Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Utah. [email protected]