The US Congress and the politics of Afghanistan: an analysis of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees during George W Bush's second term

Abstract

This article considers the role of United States Congress in the Afghanistan conflict—and notably that of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees—from 2005 to 2009. Both of these committees had some legal oversight of the Afghan War, especially with regard to funding. During the first half of this period the Republicans had a majority while in the second half the Democrats took control. This led to differences in approach and method, which are here examined. Certainly, congressional committees operate generally in the open, which gives them a unique influence in framing issues in the press and thus before the public. Furthermore, five key members of the Obama administration belonged to these committees, attended their hearings and had much of their opinion shaped by their activities. An in-depth analysis of them during Bush's second term can provide us with valuable insights into the Obama administration's later policy decisions.

Notes

¹ The actual power of the legislative branch in foreign policy has been a matter of some controversy and analyses have led to often strikingly different assessments. Attention has waxed and waned, the high points of scholarly scrutiny generally corresponding to periods of congressional assertiveness—the 1970s (during and just after the Vietnam War) and the late 1980s and 1990s (near the end of Reagan's terms and just after the Cold War). The clear weakness of the presidency after Nixon's resignation led to the assertion that power had been ‘radically redistributed’, notably with regard to ‘control over US foreign policy, long a Presidential perquisite’ (Franck and Weisband 1979, 3). In the late 1980s and 1990s scholars presented strikingly different points of view (Burgin 1997). Some insisted that Congress had become too powerful and even talked of an ‘imperial Congress’ (Krivitz and Rabkin 1989; Jones and Marini 1988) while others argued the legislative branch was practically impotent (Koh 1988; Hinckley 1994). The question resurfaced, often with criticism of Congress's role (or lack thereof), at the start of the Iraq War (Lindsay 2003).

² For more on the details of the US intervention see Jones (2009), Peceny (2006) and Tomsen (2011)

³ Congressional Record, Senate, S10234, 10/10/02, < http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2002-10-10/pdf/CREC-2002-10-10-pt1-PgS10233-7.pdf>, accessed 15 February 2012.

⁴ Interestingly enough, oversight, with regard to Afghanistan, actually increased under the Obama government with a Democratic Senate—although there was very little debate over the Libya intervention.

⁵ Congressional Record, Senate, 3/10/01, S10141 < http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRECB-2001-pt13/html/CRECB-2001-pt13-Pg18463.htm>, accessed 3 May 2012. Biden visited as early as January 2002 although the Defense Department tried to prevent this (Biden 2007, 321–325)

⁶ See S2712, < http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-107s2712enr/pdf/BILLS-107s2712enr.pdf>, accessed 3 February 2012. For an analysis of the text see Hadi (2006)

⁷ See ‘Securing Afghanistan's future: accomplishments and the strategic path forward’, 17 March 2004, and ‘Afghanistan national development strategy’, 2008–2013.

⁸ For more information on the committee members, see Appendix 1.

⁹ As a reservist he actually did short periods of active service in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

¹⁰ Henceforth AS will be used in references to the records of Armed Services Committee hearings.

¹¹ Congressional Record, Senate, 6/9/06, S9019, < http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2006-09-06/pdf/CREC-2006-09-06-pt1-PgS8998-2.pdf>, accessed 20 May 2012.

¹² Congressional Record, Senate, 6/9/06, S9019, < http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2006-09-06/pdf/CREC-2006-09-06-pt1-PgS8998-2.pdf>, accessed 20 May 2012, S9018

¹³ For more information on the committee members, see Appendix 2.

¹⁴ Henceforth FR will be used in references to the records of Foreign Relations Committee hearings.

¹⁵ Joseph Collins says that he heard Eikenberry say this in 2005 in both Kabul and Washington (Collins 2011, 6).

¹⁶ A few months later Edelman would write a highly critical letter to Hillary Clinton, asserting that her questions fed enemy propaganda. As the Associated Press pointed out, Richard Lugar had asked similar questions but never been so attacked (New York Times 2007).

¹⁷ House Armed Services Committee, ‘Security and stability in Afghanistan’, 11 December 2007.

¹⁸ See, for example, Robert Corker at the same hearing.

¹⁹ For a comprehensive view on the question see the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's report ‘Evaluation U.S. foreign assistance to Afghanistan’, 8 June 2011.