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Abstract
Debates on China’s engagement with international institutions centre on a (false) dichotomy that China is either a status-quo or revisionist power. Both sides of this debate have ample empirical evidence to support their arguments and they tend towards conclusions that China’s behaviour and preferences lie in the space in between these two positions. It is important to consider how China presents a contest to international order from with international institutions.
This article examines the question: What is China being socialised into? Drawing on the international practices literature, this paper unpacks the types of norms that China may be being socialised into. It makes the argument that China has been successfully socialised into the practices of international institutions – the ways the bureaucracies work and can be used to achieve political goals – and pluralist-liberal global norms, but incompletely into solidarist liberal norms.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 This also links to the argument made by John Ikenberry, that international order will be difficult to change because it has been institutionalised, see, (Ikenberry Citation2001, Citation2009).
2 This claim is also made by Amitav Acharya (Citation2018, 2) there are a number of books concerned with institutional change, see for example, Heritier (Citation2007); Mahoney and Thelen (Citation2009).
3 Suzanne Xiao Yang has explored the Chinese approach towards sanctions against Iraq, (Yang Citation2013, 185).
4 This is related to internal institutional balancing within the literature. (Yuan Citation2018, 113).
5 This is referred to as new issues in Jones (Citation2018) Chapter four.
6 I thank Jacinta O’Hagan for leading me to this literature on first order and second order norms.
7 Note also that Keohane (Citation1988, Citation1989), Gilpin (Citation1982) and Ruggie (Citation1998) in the 1980s and 1990s all indicated the importance of practices in their discussions on international institutions.
8 These indicators are a synthesis of the works of: Adler and Pouliot Citation2011b, 14–17; Bueger and Frank Citation2015; Bueger and Gadinger Citation2015, 453; Hopf Citation2010; Adler-Nissen and Pouliot Citation2014.
9 Res/Res/1718, October 2006; UN Document S/Res/1874, May 2009; UN Document S/Res/2087, February 2013; UN Document S/Res/2094, March 2013; UN Document S/Res/2270, March 2016; UN Document S/Res/2321, September 2016; UN Document UN Document S/Res/2356, June 2017; UN Document S/Res/2371, August 2017; UN Document S/Res/2375, September 2017; UN Document S/Res/2397, December 2017.
10 “…particularly China, displayed reluctance to fully embrace and implement sanctions.” Noland, Citation2009, 9. Also, Hibbs (Citation2012).
11 Wikileaks (2009). ‘China unlikely to fully implement sanctions on North Korea: A view from Shanghai’ original sent on 12 June 2009, published on Wikileaks <https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09SHANGHAI257_a.html>, accessed on 21 November 2017.
12 Xu et al 2014, ‘China North Korea Relationship’, updated August 22 2014, 3.
13 Interview with a former member of the panel of experts, November 2017.
14 UN Document S/Res1718 (2006) and UN Document S/Res1874 stated that designation of persons or assets should be determined by the committee or the Council, but the resolution left this to the committee.
15 UNSC Committee established, “Implementation Assistance Notice No. 3: Guidelines for the implementation of measures regarding "Luxury Goods" under UNSC resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013)” published 5th December 2011, updated 25th June 2013.
16 As noted in PoE reports the divergent definitions of luxury goods prevent sanctions being more effective. UN Documents: S/2010/571 pp. 28–9, p. 34 (para.85); S/2012/422 pp. 19–21, 31–35, S/2013/337 pp. 41–41.
17 Details of the PoE and their reports <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/panelofexperts.shtml>, accessed 31 July 2013.
18 China has (of 2014) reported to the PoE which was noted by one interviewee as significant step for China. Nonetheless, the distance between what gets reported and what information it is necessary has proved a difficult issue for the PoE, as has confusion over report expectations, e.g. (UN Document S/2013/337:35).
19 The United Arab Emirates has also not responded to requests.
20 Interview with a former member of the panel of experts, November 2017.
21 UNSC Committee established, “Implementation Assistance Notice No. 3: Guidelines for the implementation of measures regarding "Luxury Goods" under UNSC resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013)” published 5th December 2011, updated 25th June 2013.
22 UNSC Committee established, “Implementation Assistance Notice No. 3: Guidelines for the implementation of measures regarding "Luxury Goods" under UNSC resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013)” published 5th December 2011, updated 25th June 2013.
23 UN Document S/2012/422 and UN Document S/2013/337; see also “Clearly, China holds the key to implementing sanctions on the DPRK … It could arguably devote more resources to detecting and stopping North Korean violations” (Wikileaks Citation2010).
24 As noted in the 2012 report of the panel it is noted that China prevented the publication of the report from 2011. UN Document S/2012.422: fn12.
25 Author Participation, UN Headquarters, October to November 2017, especially, meeting, 28th Meeting of the 1st Committee of the UN held on 2nd November, 2017, in conference room 4. See also for example: Jones, Catherine. 2015. The Evolution of China's Peacekeeping Role, in David Curran, Larry Roeder and Robert Zuber (eds) New Directions and Opportunities for Peacekeeping: Expanding Stakeholders and Regional Arrangements (Springer) pp.109-127, pp.119-120.
26 Participant observation by the author, October to November 2017.
27 Wikileaks, 2009. ‘PRC/DPRK: China responds with specificity to US draft’ Wikileaks <https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BEIJING1434_a.html>, accessed on 21 November 2017.
28 Notes on the standards of evidence for the panel of expert’s are noted in the introductory materials of each report.
29 UN Document S/Res 2094( 2013) para.16.
30 In addition, in the Commission Of Inquiry report of the UNHRC into Human Rights in North Korea, China’s note verbale (A/HRC/25/63 pp. 33-36, 7th Feb 2014) and letter to the Inquiry (A/HRC/25/CRP.1, 7th Feb 2014) make it clear that China doesn’t view the report as having collected ‘credible evidence’.
31 UN Document S/PV.5551(2006) p. 4.
32 UN Document S/PV.6141(2009) p. 3.
33 Perlez, Jane. 2013. “China says it won’t forsake North Korea, despite support for UN sanctions” New York Times, March 9, 2013.
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Catherine Jones
Catherine Jones is a lecturer in the School of International Relations at the University of St Andrews. Her teaching and research address questions the relationship between increasing material power capabilities and normative transformation in the context of a rising Asia. Her first book, China's challenge to Liberal Norms was published by Palgave in 2018. Her work has also appeared in various journals including, the Pacific Review, International Politics, Asia Policy, and Contemporary Politics. Email: [email protected]