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Abstract
Exiled Tibetans in India are an unusual marginalised community. With their own government structure operating within the sovereign state of India, albeit without legal recognition, they are both de facto refugees from the perspective of the Indian state and Tibetan ‘citizens’ in the eyes of the Tibetan government-in-exile (TGiE). Based on ethnographic fieldwork, this paper examines the complex, dynamic and at times contradictory three-way relationship between this population and the two ‘governments’ which strive to identify, document and rehabilitate them. After sketching out the context of relations between India and (exile) Tibet, these interactions are explored through two key sets of state-population relations: the identification of individuals as citizens and refugees, and the provision of welfare. Interweaving ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ perspectives on such state–citizen and state–state relations, this paper juxtaposes the rhetoric of both ‘governments’ with Tibetan citizens’ micro-political interactions with these state structures and foregrounds the importance of scale for analyses of the state. The paper concludes by reflecting on how this case can offer a critical spotlight on broader understandings of the everyday state. It is argued that this case provides particularly valuable leverage in demonstrating the partial and processual nature of statehood and powerfully exposes the contingent practices which underlie the social construction of political power in so-called ‘normal’ states.
Acknowledgements
This paper is based on doctoral research funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (studentship PTA-031-2004-00028), fieldwork supported by a grant from the University of London Central Research Fund and an ESRC Postdoctoral Fellowship (PTA-026-27-2536) based at the School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the ‘Experiencing the state: marginalised people and the politics of development in India’ workshops held at the Department of Geography, University of Cambridge in 2008 and 2009. I would like to thank the organisers, participants and discussants at these workshops, Professor Miles Ogborn and the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments, and the Tibetan and Indian interviewees for their kind cooperation in this research.
Notes
1. These are the Departments of Home, Health, Religion and Culture, Information and International Relations, Security, Education, and Finance.
2. In-depth interviews and focus groups were undertaken with 28 TGiE officials, 17 Tibetan non-governmental organisation (NGO) staff, and a cross-section of over 100 exile Tibetans in these settlements. The latter included both male and female, monk and lay interviewees, and a range of occupations, age groups, those born in exile and individuals who had sought refuge in India at different periods in their lives. Indian journalists, lawyers and local government officials were also interviewed. Archives of the exile Tibetan government and community were consulted in Dharamsala.
3. Chimni (2003, 444) suggests three reasons behind India's refusal to sign the Convention and Protocol: these international agreements were perceived to be Eurocentric and thus potentially threatening to India's non-aligned status; the regime contained in the Convention is too burdensome for developing countries like India to implement and; once India becomes a party to the Convention it would allow intrusive supervision by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), an organisation perceived as acting on the behest of Western donor countries.
4. This ranges from mandate refugees who come under the UNHCR's remit (including individuals from Afghanistan, Burma, Sudan and Iraq) to groups who are recognised as de facto refugees by the GoI (e.g. Sri Lankan Tamils and Tibetans).
5. Visas can be issued on the IC and a ‘no objection to return to India’ (NORI) stamp is required in order to re-enter India.
6. However, though demonstrating Tibetan agency, such fraudulent practices have arguably led to the GoI's imposition of more stringent conditions for newcomer refugees (Indian advocate, Dharamsala).
7. Section 3 of the Indian Citizenship Act (1955) stipulates that a person ‘born in India on or after 26th January 1950 but before 1st July, 1987’ is a citizen of India ‘irrespective of the nationality of his parents’ and a person born between 1st July 1987 and 2nd December 2004 is a citizen of India if one of the parents is a citizen of India at the time of the birth. A person born in India after 2nd December 2004 is a citizen by birth if both parents are citizens of India at the time of the birth or if one of the parents is a citizen and the other ‘is not an illegal migrant at the time of birth’. Only 1–4% of Tibetans in India have taken up Indian Citizenship (The Hindu, 26th May 2005).
8. Whilst in theory Tibetan citizenship extends to all Tibetans both in Tibet and in exile, in practice it is only those in exile who are able to enact the obligations and enjoy the rights of this citizenship. For a full list of rights and obligations see the Charter of Tibetans in Exile (Tibetan Government-in-Exile 1991).
9. The Green Book and chatrel system were started by a group of Tibetan monks and lay people in 1972 who established the ‘Tibetan Freedom Movement’ to administer the contributions. However, the enshrinement of the Green Book and chatrel in the 1991 Charter has seen a shift from civil society to government administration. It should be noted that whilst chatrel payments are technically voluntary, as there is no legal means of enforcing payment and to call for mandatory taxes within India would have been unlawful, the TGiE is careful to stress that this is not a ‘donation’, as this connotes a different form of relationship, and crucially one not based on obligation and duty (Department of Finance 2005).
10. According to interviews at the TGiE's Department of Religion and Culture, monks and nuns account for around 30% of Tibetans in South Asia.
11. The 2009 Demographic Survey of Tibetans in Exile calculated the total dependency ratio to be 41% (Planning Commission 2010).
12. Run by the TGiE's Department of Education, the Tibetan Transit School provides newcomers aged 18–30 with residential classes in English, Tibetan and computer studies for 1–3 years.
13. The GoI spent almost 182 million Rupees up to December 2006 on resettlement of Tibetan refugees (Ministry of Home Affairs 2008, 123) and such funding is ongoing.
14. For example, 29% of the exile Tibetans questioned in the TGiE's Planning Commission's socio-economic survey (2000) used Indian hospitals (Planning Commission 2004, 59).