IED casualties mask the real problem: it's us

Abstract

Casualty figures suggest that the US/Allied Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) policy and the present allocation of national assets, resources, and intellectual capital have not been very successful. A number of explanations for why this has been the case are discussed and critiqued here.

Keywords:

• bricolage
• bureaucracy
• IEDs
• social network theory
• Weber

Notes

1. ‘Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (excerpt, chapters 1 through 5)’, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2005, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-34-119-excerpt.pdf.

2. R. F. Ellis et al., ‘Tactical Successes Mired in Organizational Chaos: Roadblock in the Counter-IED Fight’, Joint and Combined Warfighting School – Intermediate Class # 07-02, Joint Forces Staff College, 2007, http://74.125.47.132/search?q = cache:bUNoDNqRHocJ:www.jfsc.ndu.edu/current_students/jca_cca_awsp/Joint_Improvised_Explosive_Device_Defeat_Organization_(JIEDDO)-Tactical_Successes_Mired_in_Organizational_Chaos_Roadblock_in_the_Counter-IED_Fight.doc+Richard+Ellis+IED&hl = en&ct = clnk&cd = 7&gl = us.

3. GAO, Defense Management: More Transparency Needed over the Financial and Human Capital Operations of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization. GAO-08-342 (6 March 2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08342.pdf.

4. ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED),’ NATO AJP-3.15 (2008). Unclassified.

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6. D. Gambetta and S. Hertog, ‘Engineers of Jihad’, Sociology Working Paper Number 2007-10, Oxford: Oxford University, 2007.

7. D. Gambetta and S. Hertog, ‘Engineers of Jihad’, Sociology Working Paper Number 2007-10, Oxford: Oxford University, 2007.

8. E. Weizman, ‘Lethal Theory’, Roundtable Research Architecture, http://roundtable.kein.org/files/roundtable/Weizman_lethal%20theory.pdf.