![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
From 1956 to 1960, the French Army developed a force of Muslim auxiliaries (supplétifs) as a major component of its strategy to combat the National Liberation Front (FLN) insurgency in Algeria. Aside from their military utility in hunting down the guerrillas in the mountains and forests, the supplétifs were instrumental in undermining FLN legitimacy in the countryside. The rapid growth and employment of the supplétif force dismantled FLN political control in the villages, undermined the enemy's unity, and critically weakened the revolutionaries' claim to represent all of Algeria's Muslims. The military and political activities of France's Muslim soldiers also projected an image of Muslim–European unity behind the French cause, and portrayed the French Army as the only legitimate political force in numerous villages. These political successes, however, were limited to the local, tactical level of revolutionary warfare, and the Army was never able to convert the supplétifs into a force of decisive, strategic political significance. They thus had little ultimate impact on the outcome of the conflict.
Notes
1. CitationGaget, Commando Georges, 84.
2. For an illuminating discussion of guerre révolutionnaire – the body of counterinsurgency theory that sprang from French officers' experiences in Indochina only to be further refined in Algeria – see CitationTrinquier, la guerre modern as well as CitationZervoudakis, ‘From Indochina to Algeria’.
3. SHAT, 1H 2195, n° 833/RM.10/4/4, 11 February 1959. Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre, Centre de Documentation, n° 2827/EMA/1, 20 June 1957. A large portion of the research for this article was conducted at the Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre (SHAT) in Vincennes, France in January 2008. These documents are generally identified by document number, an abbreviation for the military headquarters concerned, and date. The archival sources used were: Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre, Service Historique de la Défense, Series 1H (Algérie), cartons 1397, 2195, 2456, 2483, 2539, 3144, 3195, 3749, 4262, 4329, 4378, 4412, and 4450, as well as folders concerning Algeria in the Centre de Documentation.
4. SHAT, Centre de Documentation, n° 2827/EMA/1, 20 June 1957.
5. Jean Servier, quoted in CitationCazorla, ‘Concept d'emploi et évolution statuaire des supplétifs durant la guerre d'Algérie’, 70–1.
6. The SAS were formed in 1955 with the mission of providing accountable local leadership (in contrast to the sometimes tyrannical local notables, called qaïds, who had previously represented France in the villages) and pacification benefits (free medical care, primary education, improved agricultural techniques, etc.) in rural areas. They will be discussed in more detail later.
7. SHAT, 1H 2539, Forces supplétives graph, December 1958.
8. SHAT, 1H 2195, n° 297-S/10e Région Militaire (RM.10)/5, 20 May 1957.
9. Although it came to signify all of France's Muslim soldiers after the war, the word ‘harki’ initially referred only to a member of a certain type of supplétif unit (the harka, described above).
10. SHAT, Centre de Documentation, n° 2827/EMA/1, 20 June 1957.
11. CitationBerstein, ‘Le peau de chagrin de « l'Algérie française, »’, 212.
12. SHAT, 1H 2195, n° 6458/RM.10/4, 13 July 1958.
13. CitationFaivre, Les combattants musulmans de la guerre d'Algérie, 55–7.
14. CitationHamoumou, Et ils sont devenus harkis, 121.
15. SHAT, 1H 2456, Report on ‘Les musulmans dans l'armée française en Algérie,’ Tableau 22, October 1960.
16. SHAT, 1H 2456, n° 524/EMI/1/EFF, 7 December 1959.
17. CitationAgeron, ‘La “guerre psychologique” de l'armée de libération nationale algérienne’, 217–21.
18. See CitationThénault, Histoire de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne, 84–9, for an insightful discussion of the causes and goals of FLN violence against the Muslim population.
19. Gaget, Commando Georges, 25–6.
20. Hamoumou, Et ils sont devenus harkis, 150.
21. Author's interview with BENYOUCEF, Mas-Thibert, France, 23 May 2008. The author conducted three interviews with supplétif veterans now living in the South of France. Names in all interviews have been changed to protect privacy; some harki veterans are still fearful about reprisals from the Algerian government. HOCINE was interviewed in La Ciotat, France on 20 May 2008; ABDERRAHMANE was interviewed on 21 May 2008, also in La Ciotat; and BENYOUCEF was interviewed on 23 May 2008 in Mas-Thibert, France. The interviews were recorded by microphone.
22. Hamoumou, Et ils sont devenus harkis, 161.
23. Hamoumou, Et ils sont devenus harkis, 165.
24. Author's interview with ABDERRAHMANE, La Ciotat, France, 21 May 2008.
25. Author's interview with HOCINE, La Ciotat, France, 20 May 2008. Obviously, he lied about his age.
26. Hamoumou, Et ils sont devenus harkis, 175–6.
27. CitationBoualam, Mon pays, la France, 118–19.
28. CitationMéliani, Le drame des harkis, 39–40.
29. The Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian soldiers of the Armée d'Afrique served France bravely from its nineteenth-century pacification campaigns in the Algerian hinterland through the two World Wars and the Indochina conflict. They are perhaps best known for their seminal role in the liberation of Northern Italy and Provence in 1944–1945, but they also constituted over 30% of French effectives in Indochina from 1947 to 1954. See CitationOrwin, ‘Of Couscous and Control’.
30. Méliani, Le drame des harkis, 29–32.
31. ABDERRAHMANE, La Ciotat, 21 May 2008.
32. Boualam, Mon pays, la France, 34–5.
33. Boualam, Mon pays, la France, 121–4.
34. Faivre, Les combattants musulmans de la guerre d'Algérie, 60–1.
35. SHAT, 1H 2456, Report on ‘Les musulmans dans l'armée française en Algérie,’ Tableau 7, October 1960.
36. SHAT, 1H 2456, Report on ‘Les musulmans dans l'armée française en Algérie,’ Tableau 7, October 1960
37. Philippe Herreman, Le Monde, 24 July 1957, reproduced in Faivre, Les combattants musulmans de la guerre d'Algérie, 41.
38. SHAT, 1H 3244, n° 2753/Service de Sécurité de la Défense Nationale et des Armées (SSDNA)/G/CAO, 18 March 1960.
39. CitationMathias, Les sections administratives spécialisées en Algérie, 142–4.
40. CitationMathias, Les sections administratives spécialisées en Algérie, 135.
41. SHAT, 1H 2195, n° 4459/Cabinet Militaire (CM), 1 July 1958.
42. SHAT, 1H 2456, Report on ‘Les musulmans dans l'armée française en Algérie’, Tableau 8, October 1960.
43. Si Rachid, ‘Lettre de l'aspirant Rachid Adjaoud au GPRA’, 1 November 1960, quoted in CitationHarbi and Meynier, Le FLN, 109. ‘Goumiers’ and ‘Harkis’ were the generic terms FLN personnel used for all supplétifs, whatever the latter's official French designation.
44. Si Rachid, ‘Lettre de l'aspirant Rachid Adjaoud au GPRA’, 1 November 1960, quoted in CitationHarbi and Meynier, Le FLN, 109. ‘Goumiers’ and ‘Harkis’ were the generic terms FLN personnel used for all supplétifs, whatever the latter's official French designation, 1H 2483, Guy Roques, ‘El-Khelaïf, village de montagne au N. de Charon, est devenu le centre d'un système d'autodéfense’ in Dépêche Quotidienne, 29 January 1959.
45. Si Rachid, ‘Lettre de l'aspirant Rachid Adjaoud au GPRA’, 1 November 1960, quoted in CitationHarbi and Meynier, Le FLN, 109. ‘Goumiers’ and ‘Harkis’ were the generic terms FLN personnel used for all supplétifs, whatever the latter's official French designation, 1H 2483, André Seguin, ‘D'anciens rebelles ralliés dirigent des villages et chassent le fellagha’ in Dépêche Quotidienne, 7 August 1958.
46. CitationAgeron, ‘Les supplétifs algériens dans l'armée française pendant la guerre d'Algérie’, 8–9.
47. Ageron, ‘La “guerre psychologique” de l'armée de libération nationale algérienne’, 218.
48. CitationHarbi, Le FLN, 240.
49. SHAT, 1H 2483, André Seguin, ‘Comment pourrait-on organiser les groupes d'autodéfense sans les indispensables fusils de chasse?’ in Dépêche Quotidienne, 8 August 1958.
50. Rapport non signé, ‘Rapport au colonel Salah Boubnider, commandant la wilaya 2,’ 20 October 1960, quoted in Harbi and Meynier, Le FLN, 106.
51. SHAT, 1H 2576/2, 22 Mars 1957, quoted in Thénault, Histoire de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne, 102.
52. SHAT, 1H 3195, n° 335/14e Division d'Infanterie/3/OPS, 25 January 1959.
53. SHAT, 1H 4450, n° 840/Sous-secteur de Nedroma/3, 24 September 1959.
54. SHAT, 1H 3195, ‘Compagnie contre-guérilla de secteur (‘commando de chasse’)’ [numberless]/14e DI/3, dated only 1960.
55. Unlike many of the Army's measures after 1958, the welcoming of defectors into French ranks, dubbed the paix des braves, was unambiguously endorsed by President de Gaulle.
56. SHAT, 1H 3195, ‘Compagnie contre-guérilla de secteur (‘commando de chasse’)’ [numberless]/14e DI/3, dated only 1960.
57. SHAT, 1H 3144, Corps d'Armée d'Oran (CAO), réunion EMI à Alger au sujet des désertions, 1 September 1959. For false ralliés, see SHAT, 1H 2456, n° 524/EMI/1/EFF, 7 December 1959.
58. SHAT, 1H 2483, Francis Attard, ‘L'Ouarsenis à l'heure du plan Challe’ in Journal d'Alger, 18 May 1959.
59. CitationLéger, Aux carrefours de la guerre, 300–1.
60. Colonel Amirouche, ‘Fait retour au capitaine Si Abdullah’, 11 May 1958, quoted in Harbi and Meynier, Le FLN, 546.
61. Léger, Aux carrefours de la guerre, 304.
62. CitationAgeron, ‘Complots et purges dans l'armée de liberation algérienne, 1958–1961’, 19.
63. SHAT, 1H 2483, Jean Taousson and René Sicart, ‘L'Est Constantinois, quatre ans après… la rébellion dans la rébellion’ in Echo d'Alger, 15 January 1959.
64. Boualam, Mon pays, la France, 210.
65. CitationHorne, A Savage War of Peace, 223.
66. Cazorla, ‘Concept d'emploi et évolution statuaire des supplétifs durant la guerre d'Algérie’, 70.
67. SHAT, 1H 4450, n° 840/Sous-secteur de Nedroma/3, 24 September 1959.
68. SHAT, 1H 2195, n° 4397/4/Zone de l'Ouest saharien (ZOS), 25 June 1959; n° 7107/EMI/4/MAT/A, 25 July 1959.
69. SHAT, 1H 2456, n° 524/EMI/1/EFF, 7 December 1959.
70. Faivre, Les combattants musulmans de la guerre d'Algérie, 58.
71. One could surely argue that the source of the Army's inability to coordinate a serious strategic plan for the supplétifs was the growing divergence between Army opinion and Gaullist government policy, and the resulting fissures between factions in the Army itself. The political conflict between de Gaulle and certain senior Army leaders, however, is a question outside the scope of this article. CitationTyre's article, ‘The Gaullists, the Army and Algeria before 1958’, examines the many ambiguities separating the Gaullists' views on Algeria from those of their supposed allies in the officer corps, while CitationCointet's De Gaulle et l'Algérie Française offers a good account of the General's evolving policies toward Algeria after his accession to power.
72. SHAT, 1H 2456, n° 524/EMI/1/EFF, 7 December 1959.
73. SHAT, 1H 2483, André Seguin, ‘D'anciens rebelles ralliés dirigent des villages et chassent le fellagha’ in Dépêche Quotidienne, 7 August 1958.
74. Cazorla, ‘Concept d'emploi et évolution statuaire des supplétifs durant la guerre d'Algérie’, 76.
75. Ageron, ‘Les supplétifs algériens’, 9–10.
76. CitationChalle, Notre révolte, 127–31.
77. SHAT, 1H 2483, Gabriel Conesa, ‘Histoire d'un secteur de la pacification: quand on remplace l'Organisation Politico-Administrative rebelle par une O.P.A. legale’ in Journal d'Alger, 4 May 1959.
78. SHAT, 1H 1397, n° 1506/RM.10/1/OPG, 28 March 1959.
79. Gaget, Commando Georges, 43.
80. Sercar Adda, quoted in Gaget, Commando Georges, 98.
81. Colonel Marcel Bigeard, Pour une parcelle de la gloire (Paris: Plon, 1975), quoted in CitationHardy, Les unités supplétives à l'ombre d'un homme oublié, 160.
82. None of the interviewees had much at all to say about this; ABDERRAHMANE said only that it was ‘the Army together with us’ that would bring Algeria peace and security.
83. SHAT, 1H 1397, n° 3805/EMI/1/ORG, 13 August 1959.
84. SHAT, 1H 1397, n° 1337/Corps d'Armée de Constantine (CAC)/5/RC, 19 April 1959.
85. Cazorla, ‘Concept d'emploi et évolution statuaire des supplétifs durant la guerre d'Algérie’, 78.
86. SHAT, Centre de Documentation, n° 9019/EMI/1/EFF, 19 July 1960.
87. Challe was replaced by General Crépin, a de Gaulle loyalist unknown to the powerful military advocates of French Algeria who had so loved Challe. His leadership, unlike Challe's, was consistently in line with de Gaulle's fast-evolving policies on Algerian ‘self-determination’, and this newfound loyalty to Paris at the highest level further hampered the Army's ability to move the supplétif strategy forward.
88. Faivre, Les combattants musulmans de la guerre d'Algérie, 49.
89. Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 222.
90. SHAT, 1H 2195, n° 8898/EMA/4.P.O./SC, 22 May 1959.
91. Boualam, Mon pays, la France, 209–13.
92. SHAT, 1H 3144, n° [numberless]/CAO/T/2S, 6 April 1961.
93. Gaget, Commando Georges, 189–230.
94. Hardy, Les unités supplétives à l'ombre d'un homme oublié, 155–60.
95. See CitationPervillé, Pour une histoire de la guerre d'Algérie, 243–4 for a good discussion of the various available estimates. See also Méliani, Le drame des harkis, 103–5.
96. The CitationBachaga Boualam, for his part, brought his harkis en masse to Mas-Thibert in the Camargue. He also brought horses from top Ouarsenis bloodlines, which his sons continue to raise for competition.
97. Saint Marc's deposition at his tribunal is available in Challe, Notre révolte, 443–5, and also online at http://www.heliedesaintmarc.com/declaration.pdf.
98. Ethan M. Orwin is a Captain in the United States Army at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The views expressed in this submission are entirely his own; in no way do they reflect those of the United States Army.