‘Full spectrum dominance’: Donald Rumsfeld, the Department of Defense, and US irregular warfare strategy, 2001–2008

Abstract

This article examines the evolution of US irregular warfare (IW) doctrine and practice from 2001 onwards. It argues that, after 9/11, top-tier civilian policymakers in the US Department of Defense (DoD) and across the US government developed a heightened awareness of asymmetric threats and non-conventional forms of warfare, especially those shaped by contemporary globalisation. The result was a gradual turn towards irregular warfare, led by Rumsfeld and the DoD, designed to ensure ‘full spectrum dominance’ across all modes of conflict. This pre-dated the insurgency in Iraq and the promotion of counterinsurgency in the US Army by General David Petraeus and others. Policymakers' reluctance to acknowledge the insurgency in Iraq was not down to a failure to understand the concept of IW, but because they had viewed Iraq in conventional terms for so many years and were reluctant to admit their mistake.

Keywords::

• irregular warfare
• counterinsurgency
• Global War on Terror
• Donald Rumsfeld
• 9/11
• ‘full spectrum dominance’

Acknowledgements

My thanks to Matthew Jones, David Fitzgerald, and Bevan Sewell for feedback on an earlier version of this article as well as to Paul Rich and the two anonymous reviewers.

Notes

^1.Rumsfeld, Memo to President Bush, ‘What Are We Fighting?’

^2. Other forms of IW include: unconventional warfare; terrorism; counterterrorism; foreign internal defence; stabilisation, security, transition, and reconstruction operations; strategic communications; information operations; civil–military operations; counterintelligence; countering transnational criminal activities. In addition to this methodology, IW is also defined as conflict between state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population. See Department of Defense (henceforth DoD), Irregular Warfare, 8, 4.

^3.Kaplan, The Insurgents; Metz, Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy, 145–73. The focus on the US Army specifically has reinforced the impression that top-level policymakers were not driving the turn towards IW. See Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, 99–126; Ucko, New Counterinsurgency Era, 47–63. Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget.

^4. FM 3-24 defined COIN as a sub-set of IW. See US Army/Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency (henceforth FM 3-24), xxiii. See also note 2.

^5.Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget; Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation.

^6. The best account of the activities of Petraeus et al. is in Kaplan, The Insurgents. For an account of the drafting of FM 3-24 by one of the lead writers, see Crane ‘United States’. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife; Kilcullen, ‘Countering Global Insurgency’.

^7.Michaels, Discourse Trap, 107–46. Woodward, War Within.

^8.Ucko, New Counterinsurgency Era; Mockaitis, Iraq and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency; Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla; Metz, Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy; Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror; Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget; Green, ‘The Fallujah Awakening’; Burton and ’Nagl, ‘Learning as we go’; Hoffman, ‘Small Wars Revisited’; Corum, ‘Rethinking US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine’. Morrison Taw also argues that in addition, the competition for domestic resources and the influence of social constructivism on international relations drove the military's embrace of stability operations. Morrison Taw, Mission Revolution.

^9. Michaels, Discourse Trap, 134.

^10. Joint Chiefs of Staff (henceforth JCS), National Military Strategy, March 2004, 23. This phrase was also used during the Clinton years but did not refer to IW; instead it referred to the stages of conflict from peace through to (conventional) war. See Cohen, Quadrennial Defense Review, Section 3 (pages unnumbered), which calls for ‘conventional warfighting capabilities … across the full spectrum of military operations’.

^11. Rumsfeld, ‘Meeting with the chiefs 1/21/01, my 2nd day’, 21 May 2001. Cited in Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 294.

^12. See Bush ‘A Period of Consequences’.

^13. Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 295–6.

^14.Rumsfeld, Prepared Testimony, 3.

^15. Ibid., 6.

^16.Rumsfeld, Guidance and Terms of Reference, 5. On the switch from threat to capabilities-based planning, see Henry, ‘Defense Transformation’, 11–13.

^17. Rumsfeld, Guidance and Terms of Reference, 7. My emphasis.

^18.DoD, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001, 3.

^19. Ibid., iv.

^20. Ibid., 18. My emphasis.

^21. Ibid., 3.

^22. General Accounting Office (GAO), ‘Quadrennial Defense Review’, 2, 9, 10.

^23. Ibid., 10–11.

^24.Rumsfeld, ‘Transforming the Military’, 25–6. On the importance of a multifaceted, ideally interagency, approach, see FM 3-24, 53–78. This, in turn, was derived from classic imperial studies of counterinsurgency written by British and French officers attempting to maintain control of their colonies. See Galula, Counterinsurgency, 61–5; Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 51–2; Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 55, 66.

^25.US Special Operations Command, History, 12–14.

^26. Ibid., 16.

^27. Classic texts on counterinsurgency, which include discussion of the five points highlighted here (and more) include Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency; Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare; Kitson, Low Intensity Operations; Trinquier, Modern Warfare. Contemporary classics include Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife and Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla. On FID, another variant of IW, see Joint Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Internal Defense; Department of the Army, FM 3-07.1; Matelski, Developing Security Force Assistance; James, Understanding Contemporary Foreign Internal Defense and Military Advisement; Childress, The Effectiveness of US Training Efforts in Internal Defense and Development.

^28. National Security Strategy 2002, foreword, p.1. RiceNo Higher Honor, 152–3.

^29. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003, 7–8.

^30.Joint Chiefs, National Military Strategy 2004, 4–5. This strategy was guided by the goals and objectives contained in the 2002 NSS and served to implement the Secretary of Defense's National Defense Strategy of the USA. See p. viii.

^31. Ibid., 4. Emphasis in second quotation in original.

^32. Ibid., 23. The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, March 2005, also discussed these four types of challenges and the importance of preparing for irregular war. See especially pp. 14–15.

^33. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2006, 5.

^34. Joint Chiefs, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism 2006, 13–14.

^35. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 8; see also pp. 11–16. Also Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 29.

^36. National Security Strategy 2002, foreword, pages unnumbered.

^37. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003, 6.

^38. Ibid., 22.

^39. Ibid., 12, 20, 22, 23. See also National Security Strategy 2002, 10–11. Feith ‘Transforming the United States Global Defense Posture’: 34.

^40. Scholarship suggests terrorism occurs due to a complex interplay of forces at three levels: disaffected individuals, enabling groups, and societal conditions that tolerated or actively supported the demands of these groups. See Crenshaw's seminal ‘The Causes of Terrorism’; Richardson, What Terrorists Want; Moghadan, ‘The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A Multi-Causal Approach’; Lisanti, ‘Do Failed States Really Breed Terrorists?’

^41. In June 1993, the Army's capstone field manual, Operations, was updated to include a whole chapter – albeit the second last of 14 – on ‘Operations Other Than War’. Dept of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, ch. 13. See also Joint Chiefs, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.

^42.Rose, ‘FM 3-0 Operations’; Wagner, ‘The challenges of Iraq’.

^43.Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, 2001.

^44.Radics, ‘Terrorism in Southeast Asia’, 124. Walley, ‘Civil Affairs’. On both Africa and the Philippines, see Ryan ‘War in Countries We Are Not at War With’.

^45. On the TSCTI, see GAO, Combating Terrorism, 14–20. On the PSI, see for example US European Command, ‘Reservists Help Needy in Central Africa’. Pope, Opening Remarks. Wycoff, Prepared Statement: 22.

^46. Joint Chiefs, National Military Strategy 2004, 14.

^47. DoD Directive 3000.05 (henceforth DoDD 3000.05), 2.

^48. Ibid., 2–3.

^49.Defense Science Board, 2004 Summer Study.

^50. Ibid., Appendix, 173–5.

^51. Kaplan, Insurgents, 119–21.

^52.Vaïsse, ‘Transformational Diplomacy’: 52–3.

^53. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44.

^54. Ibid., 2.

^55. Ibid., 4.

^56. DoD 3000.05, 3.

^57.Serafino, ‘Department of Defense Section 1207’, 1–2. Hegeland, ‘Nation Building 2.0’.

^58. Policy speech excerpts contained in Vaïsse, ‘Transformational Diplomacy’, 75–81.

^59. Ibid., 76.

^60. Ibid., 36–7. See also Nakamura and Epstein, ‘Diplomacy for the 21st Century’.

^61.Vaïsse, ‘Transformational Diplomacy’, 80.

^62.Nakamura and Epstein, ‘Diplomacy for the 21st Century’, Appendix A, 25–8. Transformational Diplomacy Fact Sheet. Rice, ‘Transformational Diplomacy’. Krasner, Note to the Secretary. Baer, Action Memorandum for the Secretary.

^63.Natsios, Testimony, pages unnumbered.

^64.USAID, Civilian-Military Co-operation Policy, 1. See also USAID, Civilian-Military Operations Guide.

^65. USAID, Civilian-Military Operations Guide, 13–17.

^66. Ibid., 10.

^67.GAO, Combating Terrorism, 20–8; Nakamura and Epstein, ‘Diplomacy for the 21st Century’, 14–24.

^68.Ryan, ‘War in Countries We Are Not at War With’.

^69. National Security Strategy 2002, 7, 10–11.

^70. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003, 20. See also the section on ‘Increasing Capabilities of Partners – International and Domestic’ in National Defense Strategy 2005, 19–20.

^71.DoD News Briefing.

^72.Jones, Statement, 13.

^73.Sattler, ‘The View from the Joint Staff’, 10. O'Connell, ‘Special Operations Forces’, 1. Serafino ‘Security Assistance Reform’, note 1, p. 1.

^74.Serafino, ‘Security Assistance Reform’; Defense Security Cooperation Agency, ‘FY 2009 Budget Estimates’, 422–7. Sattler, ‘View from the Joint Staff’, 7–9. GAO, ‘Section 1206’.

^75.Defense Security Cooperation Agency, ‘FY 2009 Budget Estimates’, 424–5.

^76.Serafino, ‘Security Assistance Reform’, Summary.

^77.DoD, QDR Execution Roadmap: Building Partnership Capacity, 5–6.

^78.Haynes, ‘Letter’, see enclosure. Exec. Office of the President, ‘Statement’, 2. Sheikh, ‘DOD Describes Struggle’.

^79.Tyson, ‘More Leeway Sought’. National Defense Authorization Act for F.Y. 2008, Sections 1209, 1210. Global Partnerships Act of 2011.

^80. Rumsfeld, Guidance and Terms of Reference, 5.

^81. DoD QDR 2001, 30.

^82. National Security Strategy 2002, 6. Repeated in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003, 2, 23.

^83.DoD, Information Operations Roadmap, 4.

^84. Ibid., 8.

^85. Examples include: ‘Marines Distribute Food to Nigerien Poor’, 24 March 2006, http://www.eucom.mil/article/21294/Marines-distribute-food-Nigerien-poor; ‘Sailors Repair School, Build Friendships in Gabon’, 23 March 2006, http://www.eucom.mil/article/21296/Sailors-repair-school-build-friendships-Gabon; ‘US Helps Expand Orphan Care Center in Botswana’, 28 April 2006, http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID = 15320; ‘Sailors Rebuild School, Make Friends in Sao Tome’, 18 April 2006, http://www.eucom.mil/article/21273/Sailors-rebuild-school-make-friends-Sao-Tome; ‘Civil Affairs Team Assists in Malian Humanitarian Aid Mission’, 28 June 2006, http://www.eucom.mil/Article/21167/civil-affairs-team-assists-malian-humanitarian-aid; ‘EUCOM Deputy Shows Support for Democracy, Economic Stability Efforts’, 1 June 2006, http://www.eucom.mil/article/21212/EUCOM-deputy-shows-support-democracy-economic; ‘Command Visit Brings Aid to African Nations’, 27 July 2006, http://www.eucom.mil/article/21123/command-visit-brings-aid-african-nations; ‘EUCOM Supports Namibia Multipurpose Center’, 24 February 2005, http://www.eucom.mil/Article/21706/EUCOM-supports-Namibian-multipurpose-center (all accessed 15 February 2013).

^86.Wald, ‘Phase Zero’, 74.

^87. Ibid., 74–5. http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/homepage/default.

^88.Eckert, ‘Defeating the Idea’. Briscoe, ‘Wanted Dead or Alive’.

^89.Feith, Memo for Deputy Secretary of Defense.

^90.US Special Operations Command, Capstone Concept, 3. DoD QDR 2006, 21–2. See also Joint Chiefs, National Military Strategic Plan, 8, 27, 30. US Special Operations Command, Posture Statement, 4.

^91. DoD QDR 2006, 1.

^92. Ibid., 4.

^93. Ibid., vi–vii.

^94. GAO QDR 2006, 12.

^95.Henry, ‘Defense Transformation’, 11, 13..

^96. GAO QDR 2006, 10.

^97. Ibid., 13.

^98. The others were Institutional Reform and Governance; Joint Command and Control; Locate, Tag, Track; and Sensor-based Management of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise. GAO QDR 2006, footnote 19, p. 15.

^99.DoD QDR Execution Roadmap for IW, 1, 2, 3. Copy obtained by author under Freedom of Information Act.

^100.Rumsfeld, ‘Mobilizing Moderate Muslims’.

^101.DoD QDR Execution Roadmap, Strategic Communication, 2–3.

^102.Strategic Communication & Public Diplomacy Policy Coordinating Committee, National Strategy, 11. For ‘Core Messages – General’, see p. 27.

^103.Office of the Press Secretary, ‘President Attends Armed Forces Full Honor’.

^104.DoD News Transcript and DoD National Defense Strategy, June 2008.

^105.DoD Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 1.

^106. DoD Directive 3000.07.

^107. National Security Strategy 2010, 14, 11, 5.

^108.DoD, ‘Sustaining US Global Leadership’, 1.

^109. Ibid., 6.

^110. Ibid., 4.