Civilians’ survival strategies during the Taliban’s insurgency (2007-9), Pakistan: a look at the consequences

ABSTRACT

This article explores the Taliban’s insurgency (2007–9) in Swat valley (Pakistan), with two objectives: (a) how civilians survive violence and (b) what their survival strategies mean for them. Drawing on in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, conducted in 2016 to 2019, it offers a typology of civilians’ survival strategies which includes resistance, accommodation, readjustment and withdrawal. It finds that although the strategies worked, resistance and accommodation have had a detrimental impact on civilians in the form of direct violence. In comparison, readjustment and withdrawal helped them avoiding direct violence but have had a negative impact on civilian life and society.

KEYWORDS:

• Civilians’ survival
• insurgency
• strategies
• Taliban in Pakistan
• consequences
• Swat valley

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 The Taliban are a militant group in the region.

2 Jones and Fair, Counter Insurgency in Pakistan, 65–68.

3 Mohamud and Hafeez, “Crisis in the Swat Valley,” 23.

4 Jose and Medie, “Understanding Why and How Civilians Resort to Self-Protection,” 515–35.

5 Barter, “Unarmed Forces,” 544.

6 Ibid.

7 Baines and Paddon, “This is How We Survived,” 231.

8 Williams, “Protection, Resilience and Empowerment,” 292.

9 Mégret, “Beyond the “Salvation” Paradigm,” 581–82.

10 See Hallward, Masullo and Mouly, “Civil Resistance,” 1–9; and Chenoweth and Cunningham, “Understanding Nonviolent Resistance,” 271–276.

11 Barter, “Unarmed Forces,” 553, 544.

12 Stites, “Movement as a Livelihood,” 11–14.

13 Jose and Medie, “Understanding Why and How Civilians Resort to Self-Protection,” 535.

14 Bellamy and Williams, “The New Politics of Protection,” 825–50.

15 Hoffman, “The Meaning of a Militia,” 639–62.

16 Corbett, Learning from the Nuba, 24–25.

17 Jose and Medie, “Understanding Why and How Civilians Resort to Self-Protection,” 35.

18 Ibid.

19 It goes by different names such as “cooperation”, “support”, “collaboration” and so on. I call it accommodation.

20 Baines and Paddon, “This is How We Survived,” 239.

21 Barter, “Unarmed Forces,” 558.

22 Baines and Paddon, “This is How We Survived,” 230.

23 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence, 87–209.

24 Bonwick, “Who Really Protects Civilians,” 270–77.

25 South, Perhult and Carstensen, Conflict and Survival.

26 Corbett, Learning from the Nuba, 19.

27 Ibid.

28 Barter, “Unarmed Forces,” 544–71.

29 Zimmerman, Songs of Irish Rebellion.

30 Barter, “Unarmed Forces,” 71.

31 Corbett, Learning from the Nuba, 23–27.

32 Baines and Paddon, ““This is How We Survived,” 231–47.

33 Masullo, The Power of Staying Put.

34 See note 4 above.

35 See note 25 above.

36 Kaplan, “Protecting Civilians,” 351–61.

37 See note 24 above.

38 Corbett, Learning from the Nuba, 22.

39 Adhikari, “Conflict-induced Displacement,” 82–89.

40 See note 28 above.

41 See note 39 above.

42 See note 25 above.

43 Bellamy and Williams, “The New Politics of Protection,” 825–50; Suarez and Black, “Surviving Violence,” 1–12; Jose and Medie, “Understanding Why and How Civilians Resort to Self-Protection,” 515–35; Suarez, “Living between Two Lions,” 54–67; Bonwick, “Who Really Protects Civilians,” 270–77; Kaplan, “Protecting Civilians,” 351–67; Kaplan, Resisting War; Barter, Civilian Strategy; and Barrs, How Civilians Survive, 1–21.

44 Oxfam, Protection of Civilians, 5.

45 See Fair and Jones, “Pakistan”s War Within,” 161–88; Jones and Fair, Counter Insurgency in Pakistan; Lindholm, “Swat in Retrospect,” 17–27; and Sultan-i-Rome, “Crisis and Reconciliation in Swat,” 35–79.

46 Cresswell, 30 Essential Skills, 41–46.

47 Jones and Fair, Counter Insurgency in Pakistan, 70.

48 Lindholm, “Swat in Retrospect,” 17–27.

49 Jones and Fair, Counter Insurgency in Pakistan, 28.

50 Sultan-i-Rome, Swat: A Critical Analysis, 7–17; Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country, 462.

51 See note 49 above.

52 See note 48 above.

53 Ibid.

54 Hilali, “Costs and Benefits of Afghan War,” 291–310.

55 Sultan-i-Rome, “Crisis and Reconciliation in Swat,” 53–79.

56 Abbas, the Taliban Revival.

57 Jones and Fair, Counter Insurgency in Pakistan, 28; Sultan-i-Rome, “Crisis and Reconciliation in Swat,” 53–79.

58 Fleischner, Governance and Militancy.

59 Yousafzai and McCormick, I am Malala.

60 Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country.

61 Khattak, “The Taliban in Swat,” 289–313; and Ali and Khan, “The Rise of Tehreek – e – Nifaz – e – Shariat – e – Mohammadi,” 89–118.

62 Malik, “Media and Militancy,” 77–96.

63 Yusuf, “Pakistan”s Military Challenge,” p. 44.

64 Khaliq, Notorious “Bloody Square”.

65 Fair and Jones, “Pakistan’s War Within,” 165.

66 Watson, Taliban Claim Victory Near Islamabad.

67 Fair and Jones, Pakistan’s War Within,” 161–188.

68 See note 47 above.

69 Sheikh and Greenwood, Taliban Talks, 20; and Khan, “The Return of sharia”.

70 Ali, “Peace Talks,” 11.

71 Renno, Swatting at Flies, 10.

72 Jones and Fair, Counter Insurgency in Pakistan, 68.

73 Ibid.

74 Adnan, “How Bad Governance Led to Conflict,“10.

75 Hopkins and Mersden, “Rethinking Swat,” 1–16.

76 Waters, “Snowball Sampling,” 367–80.

77 Kirchherr and Charles, “Enhancing the Sample Diversity”.

78 Braun and Clarke, “Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology,” 77–101.

79 Namey et al., “Data Reduction Technique,” 137–162.

80 Vaismoradi et al., “Content Analysis and Thematic Analysis,” 400.

81 Braun and Clarke, “Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology,” 79.

82 See note 5 above.

83 See also Sanaullah, “Effectiveness of Civilians’ Survival Strategies,” 275–296.

84 See note 4 above.

85 See note 28 above.

86 Hujra is a communal place for different activities and has a big role in organizing the Pukhtun community.

87 Taliban and insurgents refer to the same group and are used interchangeably in this article.

88 Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, 30. Voice is ‘any attempt at all to change an objectionable state of affairs, not only by petitioning to management or higher authorities, but also through protests including the mobilization of the public opinion’.

89 Barter, “Zones of Control,” 340–56.

90 See this in view of Carter Malkasian’s book, War Comes to Garmser: Thirty year of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier, which sheds light on the dynamics of war in Afghanistan. For the significance of honor among Pukhtuns, see pages 8–9.

91 South, Perhult and Carstensen, Conflict and Survival, 26.

92 See this in view of Lindholm’s discussion on gender among the Pukhtoons. Lindholm, “Swat Pathan,” 833–40.

93 Baines and Paddon, “This is How We Survived,” 240.

94 Ibid.

95 See note 28 above.

96 Hirschman, Voic, Exit and Loyalty, 21–29.

97 MeyerIe and Malkasian, Insurgent Tactics, 1–2.

98 For an explanation of unintended consequences, see Merton, “The Unanticipated Consequences,” 894–904.

99 See note 83 above.

100 See note 24 above.

101 Corbett, Learning from the Nuba, 28.

102 Mégret, “Beyond the “Salvation” Paradigm”,” 575–96.

103 See note 28 above.

104 Chenoweth and Cunningham, “Understanding Nonviolent Resistance,” 271.

105 Ibid.

106 For asymmetry, see Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, “How Armed Groups Fight,” 797.

107 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence.

108 Gates, “Recruit and Allegiance,” 122.

109 Fearnon and Laitin, “Ethnicity,” 75–90.

110 Humphreys and Weinstein, “Handling and Manhandling,” 429–47.

111 See note 28 above.

112 Sharp, Waging Nonviolent Struggle.

113 See note 28 above.

114 See note 24 above.

115 South, Perhult and Carstensen, Conflict and Survival, 25.

116 Suarez, “Living between Two Lions,” 54–67.

117 See note 4 above.

118 South, Perhult and Carstensen, Conflict and Survival, 25–26.

119 Malkasian, War comes to Garmser, 9, 45, 66, 221, 250.

120 See note 24 above.

121 See note 4 above.

122 See note 38 above.

123 See note 25 above.

124 See note 4 above.

125 Lindholm, “Swat Pathan,” 833–40.

126 Gham-khadi means the occasion of sorrow and happiness. For details see, Barth, Political Leadership; Ahmed, Sorrow and Joy, 1–15.

127 Malkasian, War Comes to Garmser, 70.

128 Barth, Political Leadership; Ahmed, Sorrow and Joy, 1–15.

129 It is a council of elders, an influential and effective alternative dispute resolution body.

130 Collins, Violence.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Sanaullah

Sanaullah has a PhD in sociology from the University of York, UK. His research focuses on violence, armed conflict, insurgency, Taliban's insurgency in Pakistan and civilians' survival in armed conflict.