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ABSTRACT
This article examines the underlying factors contributing to a more strategic and rational alignment behaviour exhibited by certain post-Soviet states compared to others in the region and beyond, despite the high stakes of domestic politics. Specifically, it focuses on Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova, suggesting their consistent, state-centric foreign policies arise from facing protracted ethnic conflicts threatening their territorial integrity. The notion of differential survival risks is proposed to explain this phenomenon. Consequently, resolving these conflicts becomes the paramount concern for these states’ leadership to avoid substantial territorial losses or even loss of sovereignty, relegating domestic issues to a secondary status.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. According to Freedom House, except for Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine (classified as partly free), the rest of the post-Soviet countries are not free (Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022).
2. Waltz, Theory of International Politics.
3. In general, while corruption, organized crime, clientelism and kleptocracy all had implications for the day-to-day functioning of the state institutions, emergence of civil society, etc, these activities never penetrated the foreign policy realm in those states.
4. See, for example, Cheng-Chwee, “The Essence of Hedging”, 159–185; Tessman and Wolfe, “Great Powers and Strategic Hedging”, 214–40; Tessman, ‘System Structure and State Strategy’, 192–231; Koga, ‘The Concept of “Hedging” Revisited’, 633–660.
5. A related term is soft balancing, which implies a diminished form of balancing (see for example, Paul, “Soft balancing”, 46–71; Saltzman, “Soft Balancing as Foreign Policy”, 131–150); by combining diplomatic, economic and institutional means, soft balancing thus focuses on nonmilitary strategies to resist, or constrain a hegemon.
6. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 117–23.
7. Ibid., 126.
8. As Randall Schweller suggests, states’ alignment choices may be ‘driven more by the search for profit than security’ and thus may just amount to opportunistic behaviour (Schweller, “Unanswered Threats”, 165).
9. Walt, The Origins of Alliance.
10. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment”, 233–256; David, Choosing Sides; Barnett and Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments”, 369–395; Goldgeyer and McFaul, “A Tale of Two Worlds’, 467–491; Harknett and VanDenBerg, ‘Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats’, 112–153.
11. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment”, 233–256; David, Choosing Sides.
12. Ayoob, Third World Security Predicament; Holsti, The State, War and the State of War.
13. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment”, 233–256; David, Choosing Sides.
14. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment”, 233–256.
15. Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, 144–172; Schweller, “Unanswered Threats”.
16. Danneels, “Syrian foreign policy”, 13.
17. Ibid., 13.
18. Moreover, traditional alignment theories should not necessarily disregard economic variables in alignment explanations, especially when those economic factors have a direct impact on a leader’s threat perception (Miller, To Balance or Not to Balance).
19. Harknett and VanDenBerg, “Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats”, 112–153: 117–18.
20. Miller and Toritsyn, “Bringing the Leader Back In”, 325–363; Miller, To Balance or Not to Balance. There were even attempts to apply omnibalancing to the United States under Trump administration (Drezner, “Trump, Russia and omnibalancing”).
21. See, for example, Miller and Toritsyn, “Bringing the Leader Back In”, 325–363; Miller, To Balance or Not to Balance.
22. Miller, To Balance or Not to Balance.
23. Ibid.
24. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment”, 233–256; David, Choosing Sides.
25. Russia also instigated and actively supported secessionist movements, a strategy aimed at destabilizing central governments and ultimately leading to their calls for Russian involvement (Miller, To Balance or Not to Balance).
26. Miller, To Balance or Not to Balance.
27. For example, as in line with the omnibalancing theory, President Karimov sought closer relations with Russia, after facing criticism from the West over the Andijan events in 2005, although he had previously always sought to balance Russia.
28. Miller, To Balance or Not to Balance.
29. Coyle, Russia’s border wars and frozen conflicts; Kakachia et al, “Change and Continuity in the Foreign Policies of Small States”, 814–831; Kazantsev et al, “Russia’s policy in the “frozen conflicts” in the post-Soviet space”, 142–162.
30. For example, see for a detailed account of the conflict, Babayev, “Nagorno-Karabakh”, 17–38.
31. ICG, “Armenia and Azerbaijan”, 1.
32. Nassibli, “Azerbaijan”, 157–180.
33. Founded in 1997, the GUAM (named after the initial letters of each of member states) Organization for Democracy and Economic Development is a regional organization which includes Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
34. Mamedov, “Azerbaijan Twenty-Five Years after Independence”, 27–64.
35. Abushov, “Russia’s foreign policy towards the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, 72–92.
36. President of Russia, “Ответы на вопросы журналистов”; President of Russia, “Итоги года с Владимиром Путиным”.
37. Abushov, “Russia’s foreign policy towards the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, 72–92.
38. Markedonov, “Will Azerbaijan join the Eurasian NATO?”.
39. Zurcher, The Post-Soviet wars; German, “Russia and South Ossetia”, 155–167.
40. Cornell, Azerbaijan Since Independence.
41. Such an alignment had occurred when Shevardnadze enjoyed some backing by Russia when facing the domestic opposition.
42. Devdariani, “Georgia and Russia”, 153–203.
43. Sakwa and Webber, ”he Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991–1998”, 379–415.
44. Kuzio, ”eopolitical Pluralism in the CIS”, 81–114.
45. Widespread protests over the disputed November 2003 parliamentary elections culminated in the overthrow of Shevardnadze government, which marked the end of a leadership era in the country, as he was leader of Soviet Georgia (1972–1985) and then one of the Soviet leaders in the Kremlin (1985–1990).
46. Kupatadze and Zeitzoff, ‘”n the Shadow of Conflict”, 181–202.
47. Dinesen and Wivel, “Georgia and Moldova”, 149–166.
48. In addition, moves such as the unilateral decision to outlaw the Russian military bases and cut off electric supplies to them, arresting and deporting Russian nationals accused of espionage for Russia in a demonstrative manner caused much outrage and resentment within the Kremlin (Scott, ”ussia and Georgia After Empire”, 2–5).
49. Benson, Constructing International Security.
50. Ciurea, “Moldova between West and East” 71–83.
51. Cantir and Kennedy, “Balancing on the shoulders of giants”, 397–416.
52. Calus and Kosienkowski, “Relations between Moldova and the European Union”, 99–113; Cantir and Kennedy, “Balancing on the shoulders of giants”, 397–416.
53. Blakkisrud and Kolsto, “From Secessionist Conflict Toward a Functioning State”, 178–210. For example, Transnistrian authorities had joined the EU-Moldova Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement signed in 2014.
54. Remler, “Transnistria, Moldova and Russia’s war in Ukraine”.
55. Dawisha, “Constructing and Deconstructing Empire in the Post-Soviet Space”, 315–337.
56. Jackson, Quasi-States.
57. Romano, Principii di diritto costituzionale generale, 56.
58. It is not surprising that President Aliyev’s “Karabakh is Azerbaijan” phrase became the political rallying cry in Azerbaijan as a patriotic slogan during the second Karabakh war in 2020 and beyond.
59. Zagorski, “Der Berg-Karabach Konflikt aus russischer Sicht”, 105–128; Abushov, “Drawing a Boundary between Structural Factors and Identity in Ethnic Conflict”, 537–557.
60. The fact that wrong choices in their alignment may cause them to lose power is partially compatible with the omnibalancing theory, since the alignment behavior of the elite is both strategic in terms of the state interests as well as the interests of political survival.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Azar Babayev
Azar Babayev is an Associate Professor of Political Science with the School of Public and International Affairs at ADA University (Baku). His research interests are in the areas of conflict resolution and democracy promotion, with a focus on the post-Soviet space. He earned his PhD in Political Science from the University of Mannheim (Germany) and did his postdoc at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt.
Kavus Abushov
Kavus Abushov is an Associate Professor of Political Science with the School of Public and International Affairs at ADA University (Baku). His research focuses on ethnic civil wars and intra-state conflicts, security studies and state-building. His geographic area of focus is the post-Soviet space. He earned his PhD in Political Science from the University of Muenster in Germany and did his postdoc at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.