Azerbaijan’s power plays: analyzing Baku’s policy towards Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh after 2020

ABSTRACT

The article examines Azerbaijan’s policy towards Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh after the 44-day war of 2020. This research answers the questions: What is Azerbaijan’s strategy and policy following the 2020 war, and why has Azerbaijan been conducting them? The article’s argument is that Azerbaijan has been employing military coercion. It includes threats, territorial seizures, ultimatums, full-scale use of force, blackmailing, and other means to secure concessions and maintain a dominant position over its adversary. Applying the concept of coercion the article seeks to explain the article discusses several examples of how Azerbaijan employed these tactics against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Applying the concept of coercion, the research tries to comprehensively explain Azerbaijan’s policy and reveal conducive factors that encourage the implementation of such a policy. In some senses, the post-2020 period can be seen as a continuation of the 44-day war, characterised by lower intensity. The analysis contributes to further understanding of militarized coercion. Although the history of the conflict has been thoroughly examined by scholars, there are still a handful of studies on the post-2020 situation, which makes this article’s contribution important.

KEYWORDS:

• Azerbaijan
• coercive policy
• Armenia
• Nagorno-Karabakh

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1. Artsakh is the historical Armenian toponym of the region. The Artsakh Republic or the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic has been an unrecognized de facto state. Until 1997, it participated in the negotiation process, until 2020 representatives of the co-chair countries regularly met them. In this article, we use both toponyms: Nagorno-Karabakh and Artsakh.

2. De Waal, Black Garden; Landgraf and Seferian, ”A “Frozen Conflict” Boils Over”.

3. von Clausewitz, On War, 77.

4. Freedman and Raghavan, “Coercion,” Ellsberg, The Theory and Practice of Blackmail, Schelling, Arms and Influence.

5. Ibid.

6. Ellsberg, The Theory and Practice of Blackmail․

7. Pape, Bombing to win.

8. George and Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy.

9. Freedman, Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, 23.

10. Sechser, “Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001,” 377–401.

11. Pape, “Coercion and Military Strategy,” 425.

12. Ibid., 431.

13. George, Forceful Persuasion,80–81.

14. Ayson and Pardesi, “Asia’s Diplomacy of Violence,” 85–124.

15. Freedman and Raghavan, “Coercion.”

16. Jakobsen, “Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory,” 161.

17. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 3.

18. Schelling, Arms and Influence; Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy, 4.

19. Pape, “Coercion and Military Strategy,” 425.

20. Ibid., 430.

21. Ibid., 431.

22. Cornell, “Undeclared War,” 5.

23. Dehdashti-Rasmussen, “The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh,” 131.

24. Schmidt, “The Four-Day War Has Diminished the Chances of Peace,” 114.

25. Broers, “The Nagorny Karabakh Conflict Defaulting to War,” 2.

26. President of Russia, November 10, 2020.

27. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 3, 12.

28. President of Azerbaijan, Speech by Ilham Aliyev.

29. Azertac, President of Azerbaijan: If Armenia Doesn’t Want Peace.

30. George, Forceful Persuasion, 7.

31. Before the war of 2020 - a part of Kashatagh region of the NKR, and parts of Kubatlu and Zangelan regions of Azerbaijani SSR during the Soviet period.

32. Armenpress, If That Decision Was Not Made.

33. The map presented by Armenia at the ICJ, https://oc-media.org/app/uploads/2023/02/Armenia-Azerbaijan-clashes-map-01-02-23.jpg

34. Armenpress, November 3, 2023.

35. Armenpress, Armenia Ready to Recognize Azerbaijan’s 86,600 Km2.

36. Report, President on September Battles.

37. It gained superior positions in the southern parts of Gegharkunik region and Nerkin Hand village in Syunik region, and a substantial advancement and visual control over Jermuk city in Vayots Dzor region.

38. President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev Got Acquainted with the Conditions.

39. President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev Met with People Who Returned.

40. For instance, the cases of Hin Tagher and Khtsaberd villages in December 2020, resulting in the capture of numerous Armenian prisoners of war, or Karaglukh hill in March s24–25 2022. Harutyunyan, Civilnet, 20 September 2022.

41. NK reported around 230 losses, Azerbaijan announced 192 losses.

42. Ministry of Defence of Armenia.

43. President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev met with people who returned to the city of Lachin”

44. National Assembly of NKR, Republic of Artsakh National Assembly Media and Public Relations Department Comment.

45. Al Jazeera, Azerbaijan Forces Attack Nagorno-Karabakh.

46. Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy,14.

47. Armenpress, Armenia Not Involved in Military Operations.

48. President of Azerbaijan, December 24, 2021.

49. President of Azerbaijan, July 21, 2023.

50. Azertac, President Ilham Aliyev: Armenia’s Rapid Arming.

51. Trend, Azerbaijan Conveys Concerns to India’s Ambassador.

52. Bagirova, Azerbaijan Says France Laying Ground.

53. Kazimbeyli, Azerbaijan Raises Defense and National Security Allotment.

54. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 16.

55. Ochab, Lachin Corridor Blockade Starves Nagorno-Karabakh.

56. Le Monde, Nagorno-Karabakh: Azerbaijan Sets up Checkpoint.

57. President of Azerbaijan, Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the “Lachin City Day.”

58. Armenpress, Exclusive: Nagorno-Karabakh Exodus Was Genocide; MFA of Armenia, Presentation of the Preliminary Opinion. Former Prosecutor of ICC Luis Moreno Ocampo concluded that “there is a reasonable basis to believe that Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Lachin Corridor that started in December 2022 and Azerbaijan’s military attack on September 19, 2023, constitute genocide under Article II c) and b) of the Convention. (Also, Article 6 c) and b) of the Rome Statute) and the crime against humanity of deportation under Article 7 d) of the Rome Statute, https://luismorenoocampo.com/lmo_en/report-genocides-december-2023/. The ICJ noted that the Lachin Corridor blockade produced a ‘real and imminent risk” to the “health and life” of an ethnic group, “the Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh, https://un.mfa.am/file_manager/un_mission/Preliminary%20Opinion%20-%2023.08.2023.pdf.

59. Armenpress, Nagorno-Karabakh Government Disbands.

60. Amnesty International, Azerbaijan: Blockade of Lachin Corridor.

61. CCBS, Ilham Aliyev: Legal Regimes.

62. ICJ website, Summary of the Order of February. 22, 2023, https://www.icj-cij.org/node/202558

63. Report, President Aliyev: Armenia Deprives Itself.

64. President of Azerbaijan, Azerbaijani and Turkish Presidents.

65. Ebel, After Nagorno-Karabakh.

66. President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev Was Interviewed.

67. Trend, President Ilham Aliyev Warns Revanchists

68. Armenpress, Majority Leader Accuses Opposition.

69. For instance, President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev Has Addressed the Nation; “Armenia is a failed state,” September 22, 2018, https://twitter.com/presidentaz/status/1043438676968132609?lang=en.

70. Azernews, Commission on Toponyms.

71. Saparov, “Place-name wars in Karabakh,” 61–88.

72. Saparov, “Contested spaces,” 534–554.

73. USCIRF, 2023 Annual Report – Azerbaijan Chapter, 50–51.

74. Human Rights Watch, Video Shows Azerbaijan Forces.

75. Miskimmon and O’Loughlin, “Russia’s Narratives of Global Order,” 112.

76. Roselle, Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin, ‘Strategic narrative’, 76.

77. Andrews, “Grand National Narratives,” 52.

78. OC Media, Aliyev Says Yerevan.

79. Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan’s Speech.

80. Prime Minister of Armenia, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Speech.

81. News.am, PM: I Want to Leave Completed.

82. Azertac, President Ilham Aliyev: Western Azerbaijan.

83. President of Azerbaijan, Inauguration Ceremony of Ilham Aliyev.

84. Ergun, “Citizenship, National Identity, and Nation-Building in Azerbaijan,” 825.

85. Midas, Nationalist rhetoric and public legitimacy in Ilham Aliev’s Azerbaijan.

86. Sahakyan, “The rhetorical face of enmity,” 863–82.

87. Heydar Aliyev heritage library, Speech in the inauguration ceremony.

88. Broers, Armenia and Azerbaijan: Anatomy of a Rivalry, 114–120.

89. Kösen and Erdoğan, “Now we are whole,” 571–588.

90. Löwenheim and Heimann, “Revenge in International Politics,” 723.

91. For instance, the war of 2020 was launched on September 27, precisely on the day 100 years before when Turkey started a war against Armenia. Along with dates, place symbolism also has its place of the conflict. The city of Shushi is the most important symbol for both sides in the conflict. Aliyev and Erdogan signed the declaration of allied relations in 2021, not in Baku but in Shushi.

92. Löwenheim and Heimann, “Revenge in International Politics,” 692–93.

93. Huseynova, “A Tool for Propaganda,” 11.

94. Osborn, In Taking Karabakh.

95. Kurt and Tüysüzoğlu, “Is Nagorno-Karabakh no longer a frozen conflict zone,” 48.

96. President of Azerbaijan, Inauguration Ceremony of Ilham Aliyev.

97. Ibid.

98. Chapnick, “The middle power,” 75–76.

99. Rasizade, “Azerbaijan’s prospects in Nagorno-Karabakh,” 223.

100. President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev Addressed the Nation.

101. President of Azerbaijan, Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Opening Ceremony.

102. Axar, “Iron Fist” Monument.

103. News.az, President Ilham Aliyev Interviewed.

104. Waltz, 1979.

105. Penetration occurs when outside powers make security alignments with states within an RSC. Balance-of-power logic encourages the local rivals to call in outside help, and by this mechanism the local patterns of rivalry become linked to the global ones. Buzan and Wæver (2003), 46.

106. Hovsepyan and Tonoyan, “From alliance to ‘soft conquest”.

107. Yemelianova, “The De Facto State of Nagorno-Karabakh,” 1357.

108. Yemelianova, “Turkey, the Karabakh Conflict,” 1–30.

109. Press TV, Iran Calls for Azerbaijan’s Explanation.

110. Al Jazeera, Iran Opens Mission in Strategic Armenia Region.

111. Cheterian, “Friend and Foe: Russia – Turkey Relations,” 1280.

112. Armenpress, Arms Trade with Azerbaijan.

113. President of Azerbaijan, Declaration on Allied Interaction.

114. Caucasus Watch, Nikol Pashinyan Explains.

115. Mediamax, Putin says Armenia’s leadership recognized.

116. Armenpress, Armenia, France Establish Long-Term Cooperation.

117. Commonspace, French Senate Adopts Resolution.

118. Irish, Reuters, France Agrees on Future Contracts.

119. Le Monde, France Announces Sale of Weapons.

120. RFE/RL, Azerbaijan Again Slams France over “Bias.”

121. President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev Was Interviewed.

122. European Commission, Statement by President von Der Leyen.

123. European Council, Armenia: EU Launches a Civilian Mission.

124. The Moscow Times, Russia, Azerbaijan Criticize EU’s Armenia Border Mission.

125. Parliament of Armenia, Alen Simonyan Receives Delegation.

126. Azertac, Joseph R. Biden: The Partnership.

127. On 14 September 2023, Yuri Kim, Assistant Secretary of State, announced that “the United States will not countenance any action or effort – short-term or long-term – to ethnically cleanse or commit other atrocities against the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. The current humanitarian situation is not acceptable.” https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/6667fb89-a975-4fab-d8b8-e8875312e37e/091423_Kim_Testimony.pdf.

128. Hovsepyan and Tonoyan, “From alliance to ‘soft conquest”.

129. Davtyan, “Lessons that Lead to War,” 26–36.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Mushegh Ghahriyan

Mushegh Ghahriyan is a research associate at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia and Institute of Armenian Studies of the Yerevan State University. In 2016, he defended the thesis ‘The Kurdish Issue in the Internal Policy of Iraq in 1991–2011’ and earned his Ph.D. in History at the Institute of Oriental Studies. M. Ghahriyan’s research interests include the Kurdish issue, the modern history and foreign policies of the Arab countries, foreign policy of Armenia, and Armenian-Arab relationships.

Veronika Torosyan

Veronika Torosyan is a PhD candidate and junior researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies at NAS RA. Research interests: Turkish Studies, Russian Studies, Eurasianism, Post-Soviet Regional Studies.

Anush Harutyunyan

Anush Harutyunyan has a PhD in History, junior researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia. The framework of scientific interests involves the ethnic and political history of Transcaucasia in XX-XXI centuries. The title of the thesis is: ‘Creation of the People’s and Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan and the process of formation of the Azerbaijani ethnos in the 1920-1930s.