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ABSTRACT
Multilateral organizations rarely conduct counterinsurgency campaigns. But most contemporary cases have occurred in Africa. This article analyzes how several multilateral organizations conducted counterinsurgency in the east African theaters of south-central Somalia, northern Mozambique, and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. These multilateral counterinsurgency operations displayed considerable variation in the geographic extent of their operations, their mandated tasks, the size and duration of the mission, as well as their accomplishments. However, they were all heavily influenced by six common attributes that constrained their prospects for success, and which taken together make counterinsurgency a daunting task for even the most effective multilateral organizations.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. See Auerswald and Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan.
2. For example, UN, A New Agenda for Peace, 26.
3. Hansen, ”Legacies and Business?”
4. Hazelton, Bullets not Ballots and Hazelton, ”The ‘Hearts and Minds’ Fallacy.” In several places, Hazelton appears to mix a ‘hearts and minds’ approach focused on ensuring individual rights and opportunities with a ‘good governance’ approach based on building effective state institutions.
5. Hazelton, Bullets not Ballots, 1.
6. The UN defines impartiality in peace operations as implementing the mission mandate ‘without favour or prejudice to any party’. UN peacekeepers ‘should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate’. UN, United Nations Peacekeeping, 32.
7. Berdal, ”What Are the Limits,” 114.
8. de Coning, ”How Not to Do UN Peacekeeping,” 152.
9. von Billerbeck and Tansey, ”Enabling Autocracy?”
10. Berdal and Sherman (eds.), The Political Economy of Civil War and UN Peace Operations.
11. Wardle and Derakhshan, Information Disorder.
12. Trithart, Disinformation against UN Peacekeeping Operations.
13. Sherman and Trithart, Strategic Communications and UN press release, SC/14966, 12 July 2022, https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14966.doc.htm.
14. See de Coning et al., ”Ad-hoc Security Initiatives.”
15. For details, see Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia.
16. Ibid, chapters 5–7.
17. UN Security Council resolution 2297 (7 July 2016).
18. Williams, ”Peacekeepers and Political Stability.”
19. Maruf, ”At least 3,500 AU soldiers killed.”
20. Lotze and Williams, The Surge to Stabilize.
21. See Williams, ”Conventional insurgents.”
22. Lotze and Williams, The Surge to Stabilize.
23. Williams, UN Support to Regional Peace Operations.
24. See Somali Dialogue Platform, The Shaping.
25. Menkhaus and Williams, ”The Political Economy of Peace Operations in Somalia.”
26. See Gaas and Hansen, Ending ‘Forever’ War in Somalia.
27. Gilroy, ”The Online Frontline.”
28. See Williams ”Strategic Communications for Peace Operations.”
29. See Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia, Chapter 11.
30. Petrich, ”Cows, Charcoal, and Cocaine.”
31. Hendricks et al., A Double-Edged Sword, 3.
32. See ACLED dashboard, https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard.
33. For an overview, see ACLED, Actor Profile: SADC.
34. Columbo, ”The Enduring Counterterrorism Challenge.”
35. Rwanda’s involvement appears to be partly about securing its business interests in Mozambique, including mining, construction, and private security. ICG, ”What future for military intervention in Mozambique?”
36. Hendricks et al, A Double-Edged Sword, 6.
37. Challenges Forum., SAMIM in Cabo Delgado, 3.
38. Molomo, Interview.
39. Mandrup, ”Jihadism in Mozambique.”
40. Svicevic and Teixeira, ”SADC’s withdrawal.” ICG put ‘the number of insurgents’ down ‘from about 3,000 to as few as 300’ by 2023. ICG, ‘What future for military intervention in Mozambique?”
41. ”Mozambique: Mozambican Forces Recover Over 90% of Territory Once Controlled By Terrorists,” Agencia Informacao de Mocambique, December 26, 2023, https://allafrica.com/stories/202312260141.html.
42. Molomo, Interview.
43. Svicevic and Teixeira, ”SADC’s withdrawal from Mozambique.”
44. ICG, “What future for military intervention in Mozambique?.”
45. Mandrup, ”Jihadism in Mozambique.”
46. The government decided to regulate the militia in April 2023 with Decree 15/2023.
47. van Rentergem, Al-Shabab in Mozambique.
48. ACLED, Actor Profile: SADC, 4.
49. ICG, ”What future for military intervention in Mozambique?”
50. Challenges Forum, SAMIM in Cabo Delgado, 3.
51. Hendricks et al., A Double-Edged Sword, 6.
52. Nhamirre, ”Will foreign intervention,” 6–7.
53. ACLED, Actor Profile: SADC, 3.
54. Hendricks et al., A Double-Edged Sword, 7.
55. ACLED, Actor Profile: Islamic State, 5–6.
56. Hendricks et al., A Double-Edged Sword, 8.
57. Ibid, 7.
58. See SADC internal document, https://www.zitamar.com/content/files/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/sadc-report-assessement-report.pdf.
59. Hendricks et al., A Double-Edged Sword, p. 6. The extent of SAMIM’s air and naval assets remains unclear even to local experts. See Svicevic and Teixeira, ”SADC’s withdrawal from Mozambique.”
60. SAMIM received logistical support and/or equipment from the African Union and most notably the EU.
61. ICG, ”What future for military intervention in Mozambique?” The EU contributions included camp fortifications and storage containers, medical equipment, vehicles, and boats, as well as technological devices. The AU contributions were funded by China’s donation and included ‘protective assault vehicles, military utility trucks, mine detectors, generators, personnel protective gear, tentages, sleeping bags, beds and mattresses, computers, printers, cameras, conference furniture, projectors, sound systems and other accessories’. AU, ‘African Union hands over military equipment.’
62. Molomo, Interview; ACLED, Actor Profile: SADC, 4.
63. ICG, ”What future for military intervention in Mozambique?”
64. Hendricks et al., A Double-Edged Sword, 2.
65. Ibid, 2–3, 11.
66. ICG, ”What future for military intervention in Mozambique?”
67. Martin, ”They are attacking my base.” See also Hendricks et al., A Double-Edged Sword, 11.
68. Martin, ”They are attacking my base.”
69. For example, Gould et al., The Islamic State in Mozambique.
70. ”Rwanda promises more troops for Cabo Delgado,” Club of Mozambique, April 7, 2024, https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-rwanda-promises-more-troops-for-cabo-delgado-aim-256637/.
71. Columbo, ”The Enduring Counterterrorism Challenge,” 3–4.
72. Challenges Forum, SAMIM in Cabo Delgado, p. 3.
73. João Feijó cited in ”Mozambique: Fresh rebel attacks bid to counter government ‘propaganda’ – analyst,” Club of Mozambique, January 11, 2024, https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-fresh-rebel-attacks-bid-to-counter-government-propaganda-analyst-251976/.
74. Ibid.
75. Svicevic and Teixeira, ”SADC’s withdrawal from Mozambique.”
76. Stanyard et al, Insurgency, Illicit Markets and Corruption.
77. See ACLED dashboard, https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard.
78. Angola planned to deploy troops to Kindu (Maniema) as a ‘peacekeeping unit’ sent to secure the Ad-Hoc Verification Mechanism which was set up to accompany the cantonment process of M23 troops inside the DRC. Letter from the Group of Experts on the DRC (UN doc. S/2023/431, 13 June 2023), Annex 22, 81.
79. Schwikowski, ”Congo.”
80. AU Peace and Security Council communique, PSC/PR/COMM.1203 (2024), 4 March 2024, op.2, https://peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1203rd-meeting-of-the-psc-held-on-4-march-2024-on-consideration-of-the-situation-in-the-eastern-democratic-republic-of-congo-drc-and-the-deployment-of-the-southern-african-development-community-mission-in-the-drc-samidrc.
81. UN, Analysis of Human Rights Situation in 2020, 5.
82. Walker and Stearns, ”What Will Come After MONUSCO?” From October 2023, MONUSCO’s disengagement plan envisaged its uniformed personnel and equipment departing in three stages: first, from South Kivu by 30 April; next during the latter half of 2024, from North Kivu while maintaining a projection capability in the support of protection of civilians; and then from Ituri as well as its remaining forces in North Kivu.
83. ”Scale of SADC’s DRC mission raises concerns,” ADF, March 5, 2024, https://adf-magazine.com/2024/03/scale-of-sadcs-drc-mission-raises-concerns/.
84. Stearns and Walker, ”DRC-Rwanda Crisis.”
85. Letter from the Group of Experts on the DRC, Annex 22, 81.
86. MONUSCO press release, 8 November 2023, https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/north-kivu-monusco-and-fardc-launch-codenamed-operation-springbok-protect-city-goma. See also UNSG report S/2023/932, 7.
87. See UN Security Council resolution 2717 (December 19, 2023).
88. Letter from the Group of Experts on the DRC, Annex 22, 81–82.
89. Security Council Report, ”The Escalating Conflict.”
90. Schwikowski, ”Congo: Can SADC troops defeat M23 rebels?”
91. Svicevic and Teixeira, ”SADC’s withdrawal from Mozambique.”
92. Olivier, ”Back to the DRC.”
93. Ibid.
94. Mutambo, ”AU evaluates funding options.”
95. Security Council Report, ”The Escalating Conflict.”
96. Ibid.
97. Which was supposed to contain $10 million for 2024. Accessed May 18, 2024. https://au.int/en/PeaceFund.
98. AU PSC communique, March 4, 2024.
99. ACLED dashboard.
100. On MONUSCO’s roles enabling authoritarianism via material support and political signals to leadership, see Day et al., Peacebuilding and Authoritarianism.
101. ”Battling fake news for peace and security in DR Congo,” MONUSCO press release, 3 October 2023, https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/interview-battling-fake-news-peace-and-security-dr-congo.
102. ”Building a digital army,” UN press release, 19 August 2023, https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/08/1139682.
103. UNSG report S/2023/932, 15.
104. ”DRC: UN demands ‘independent’ probe after deadly crackdown on anti-MONUSCO protests,” AfricaNews, 1 September 2023, https://www.africanews.com/2023/09/01/drc-un-demands-independent-probe-after-deadly-crackdown-on-anti-monusco-protest/.
105. Letter from the Group of Experts on the DRC, Annex 22, 81.
106. Ibid, Annex 22, 25.
107. Although the Rwandan government denies it, Rwandan troops and operations in DRC were confirmed to the UN Panel of Experts ‘by surrendered M23 combatants, former RDF, as well as intelligence, civil society and East African Community Regional Force sources, armed group leaders and combatants and eyewitnesses.” Letter from the Group of Experts on the DRC, 9.
108. ”Scale of SADC’s DRC mission raises concerns.”
109. For example, South African soldiers in SAMIDRC were killed on 14 February, 8 April, 30 May, and 25 June 2024.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Paul D. Williams
Paul D. Williams is Professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University. Dr Williams’ books include Understanding Peacekeeping (Polity Press, 3rd edition, 2021), Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007–2017 (Oxford University Press, 2018), and War and Conflict in Africa (Polity Press, 2nd edition, 2016).