What am I? A philosophical account of personhood and its applications to people with brain injury

ABSTRACT

This article identifies the dilemma faced by clinical staff when asked to support the withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration in a patient in a vegetative state. On the one hand, they are expected to treat the patient as a person in their daily interactions; on the other, they are asked to withdraw treatment on the grounds that it is futile, which may seem to run counter to treating people as persons. The article highlights that similar debates exist within the philosophical community about the nature of personhood and describes two philosophical accounts of personhood. The aim is to help clinicians articulate the reasons for their intuitions more clearly, and thus justify their beliefs.

KEYWORDS:

• Personhood
• Brain injury

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 For some potential responses and alternatives to McMahan's position, see Kittay (2005) and Smith (1990).

2 Our thanks go to an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection.